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Abstract 
 
The prisoner reentry movement has generated several reforms in community corrections 
that attempt to more effectively manage supervised offenders, including the use of 
progressive sanction policies to guide responses to violation behavior.  This project 
investigates the effectiveness of recently introduced progressive sanction guidelines 
governing post-prison offenders under the supervision of the Ohio Adult Parole 
Authority, the central feature of which is a violation response grid. This grid is formally 
embedded within a broader violation policy revision that emphasizes responsiveness to 
offender risk and needs, reduced reliance on revocation hearings, and community 
sanction alternatives to early violation behavior.  The overall project consists of four 
components, which include quantitative analyses of policy implementation and offender 
recidivism based on coded information from case files, a survey-based process 
evaluation, and an independently conducted validation study.  The offender-based 
analyses are designed around a historical comparison group approach that relies on 
samples taken from before and after the policy implementation.  The process evaluation 
is based on focus group sessions with officers that were then used to develop a self-
administered officer survey tapping several attitudinal dimensions related to policy 
implementation.  Results from the study reveal patterns that are consistent with goals and 
objectives of the policy.  In particular, they show significantly reduced reliance on 
revocation hearings, revocation sanctions, and local jail detention, more efficient and 
concentrated use of hearings, better congruence between offender risk and revocation 
sanctions, and increased progressiveness in response.  These findings are substantiated in 
multivariate models predicting revocation hearing outcomes and are consistent with 
results from the validation study.  The sanction guidelines have no independent effect on 
key supervision outcomes in fully specified survival models.  They do, however, enhance 
the effectiveness of sanction-based programming, especially for high risk offenders.  
Further, combining treatment services with restrictive sanctioning also significantly 
reduces recidivism at the high-risk level in the post-guidelines sample, even though 
punitive sanctioning by itself shows no generalized benefit.  The focus group and 
statewide officer survey data reveal that although procedural training on the sanction grid 
was perceived to be sufficiently adequate to apply it appropriately in practice, there is 
widespread disagreement among respondents that officer skills and opinions were 
considered in its design.  Those officers who did perceive more agency responsiveness 
reported a better understanding of the primary intent of the policy to better structure the 
sanctioning process, increase consistency and reduce disparities across regions.   
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Executive Summary 
 
Recent increases in prison releases have caused explosive growth in the number of 
offenders under supervision, increased reliance on parole revocations, and exacerbated 
problems related to caseload management.  The prisoner reentry movement has generated 
several reforms in community corrections that attempt to more effectively manage these 
offenders, including the use of progressive sanction policies to guide responses to 
violation behavior.   
 
This project investigates the effectiveness of recently introduced progressive sanction 
guidelines governing post-prison offenders under the supervision of the Ohio Adult 
Parole Authority.  The central feature of these guidelines is a violation response grid, a 
structured decision-making tool that uses offender risk, violation severity, and cumulative 
behavior to determine levels of organization response that range from unit sanctions to 
in-custody revocation hearings.  This grid is formally embedded within a broader 
violation policy revision that emphasizes responsiveness to offender risk and needs, 
reduced reliance on revocation hearings, and community sanction alternatives to early 
violation behavior.  The policy became effective in July 2005.  Despite differences in 
operational design, progressive sanctioning systems share several core principles of 
deterrence and procedural fairness, including consistency and certainty of response and 
an escalating range of sanction options that are proportional to the severity of non-
compliance.  However, the effectiveness of these models in statewide jurisdictions among 
post-prison populations has not yet been demonstrated.  The project provides important 
evidence in this regard through a comprehensive investigation of Ohio’s new sanction 
guidelines on the dimensions of both implementation and offender recidivism outcomes.   
 
The overall project is organized around four major components:  
 
1.  Quantitative analysis of policy implementation.
†  This component of the 
project addresses whether the main procedural and policy objectives of the policy 
have been accomplished, producing a wide range of findings from an incident-
level analysis of before and after differences on proportionality and uniformity of 
response, efficiency in the use of violation hearings, severity of sanction 
outcomes, and which factors are most important in predicting agency responses.  
2.  Quantitative analysis of recidivism and offender outcomes.  This component 
addresses the question of whether the guidelines have an independent impact on 
recidivism, and whether progressive sanctions have a moderating effect on the 
role that other key factors play in shaping supervision outcomes.  In particular, the 
study investigates the relative efficacy of punitive versus rehabilitative responses 
and how the relationship between those responses and recidivism changes after 
implementation. 
                                                 
† All phases of the project pertaining to the first two components were conducted by the principal 
investigators at ODRC.  
  viii
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
3.  Independently conducted survey-based evaluation of policy implementation.
‡ 
This component relies on focus group and statewide survey responses from parole 
officers and parole unit supervisors to investigate through qualitative methods 
staff perceptions of training on the new guidelines, attitudes regarding 
implementation of the policy, perceived barriers to implementation, and (through 
statistical methods) the relationship between officer attitudes and several 
perceptual dimensions pertaining to understanding of purpose and effectiveness of 
the sanction grid.   
4.  Independently conducted replication/validation study of quantitative 
findings.  This phase of the project addresses the major research questions of the 
first and second components through a series of parallel descriptive and 
multivariate analyses of both policy and offender outcomes.  The replication study 
relies on a parallel sample of offenders, drawn using an identical sample design 
and subject to same matching procedures as the sample used in the main study.   
 
Design and Data Sources 
 
•  The quantitative analyses of offender records were conducted using a variation of a 
separate sample pre-test/post-test research design that relied on the use of a historical 
comparison group.  Under this basic design, the effects of an intervention on outcome 
variables in a posttest sample are compared to observations from a comparable, but 
separate, sample constructed prior to the change and thus not exposed to the 
intervention.   
 
•  The comparison group consists of a stratified, random sample of first-time post- 
release control and parole releases that started supervision during October-December 
2003.  The progressive sanctions (i.e., post-test) sample is representative of 
supervision starts in August-October 2005.  The study compares outcomes between 
these two groups that stem from supervision experiences shaped by the sanctioning 
regimes and policy settings in place before and after introduction of the progressive 
sanctions reform.    
 
•  Sample design and selection criteria yielded total sample counts of 1,040 and 1,012 
for the comparison and PS groups, respectively.  Propensity score matching 
techniques and covariance modeling are used to correct for any observed sample 
differences.  The follow-up period of observation for both samples is the first year of 
supervision, or until the date of early termination, whichever occurs first.   
 
•  An identical design was used to select an overlapping, parallel sample from the same 
set of sampling frames to be used for the replication analyses.   
 
 
 
                                                 
‡  The last two components of the project were independently conducted by researchers at the Division of 
Criminal Justice at the University of Cincinnati under the direction of Lawrence Travis, Ph.D.  The 
validation study involved both replication of the data collection phase and selected statistical analyses.  Its 
purpose was to provide an auditing framework through which the potential for agency bias in reporting 
results from the internally conducted quantitative evaluation could be formally examined.   
  ix
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
 
•  Information from case file material, field officer supervision notes and electronically 
available documents was collected using an incident-based method by which detail on 
up to ten violation-incidents was retrospectively coded during the first year of 
supervision.  The study is based on the full range of non-compliant and criminal 
behavior that occurred during the study period, as long as that behavior occurred 
while under active parole supervision.  
 
•  Information was also collected on residential and employment history and all 
programming and treatment interventions, including start and end dates, descriptive 
information, and reason codes associated with each change in status.  These 
interventions may be imposed as sanctions, or as otherwise indicated through needs 
assessments or supervision plan documents. The coded information was then merged 
with standard administrative files containing offender demographics, committing 
offense and sentence characteristics, release dates, supervision length, field unit 
location, and risk assessment scores.  
 
•  The policy implementation analysis is based on a restructured version of the data file 
in which offender-incidents are treated as the observation units.  Results from the 
initial bivariate analyses in this component of the project are based on 3,248 
incidents, in which the central analytical concern is with pre and post-guidelines 
differences in agency response.  The offender-level recidivism analyses are based on 
a propensity score matched sample of 1,044 cases, in which the main outcomes of 
interest are felony reoffending and major violation behavior.    
 
•  The independent implementation evaluation was based on a two-stage data collection 
process involving focus groups, semi-structured interviews, and a self-administered 
officer survey.  Four structured focus group sessions involving 5-12 parole officers 
each were conducted by the University of Cincinnati researchers in the Cincinnati, 
Cleveland and Chillicothe Adult Parole Authority regions during mid-2006.  
Individual interviews with officers were conducted in the Lima region in place of 
focus group sessions.  Supervisors were also individually interviewed in each of these 
regions, resulting in 14 interviews overall.  The focus group data were then used as a 
basis for development of statewide, mail-based survey of officers and parole unit 
supervisors.  The survey includes self-reported background items and multiple 
clusters of likert-type items tapping attitudes related to training on sanction grid, 
perceptions about its purpose, perceived effectiveness, and subjective experiences 
using the grid.  Additional sets of survey items relate to professional orientation, 
perceptions about supervisory relations, organizational climate, and perceptions about 
the appropriate role of a parole officer.  The survey was administered in early 2007 to 
460 officers who used or supervised others using the violation sanction grid.  The 
final response rate among the targeted group (i.e., those who use it) was 83%, 
suggesting significant generalizability to the universe of parole officers in Ohio.   
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Main Findings 
 
Procedural and Policy Objectives 
 
•  Results from the incident-level analyses of policy outcomes reveal patterns that are 
consistent with goals and objectives of the policy.  In particular, these results show 
significantly reduced reliance on revocation hearings, revocation sanctions, and local 
jail detention, more efficient and concentrated use of hearings, and better congruence 
between offender risk and revocation sanctions.   
 
•  The guidelines have also increased the progressiveness and proportionality of 
responses, as measured through violation hearing rates across cumulative incidents 
and violation severity.  The incident-level multivariate models substantiate these 
findings, showing that post-grid offenders are significantly less likely to experience a 
violation hearing and to be revoked or returned to prison, net of control variables.  
Further, in the revocation models split out by sample cohort, the effects of violation 
history, prior violations and assessed risk are all significantly stronger under the new 
system, suggesting that the objective criteria of the sanction grid extend to revocation 
decisions as well.   
 
Offender Outcomes 
 
•  The bivariate results with regard to supervision outcomes show that offenders 
supervised under the new sanction guidelines have generally higher failure rates.  
This is consistent with recent one-year recidivism patterns reported in administrative 
data available on full release populations.  These differences are rendered non-
significant, however, in the multivariate models that control for standard sources of 
recidivism.  In other words, the introduction of progressive sanctions has played no 
independent role in increasing recidivism, even under a more limited use of 
revocation hearings.   
 
•  The results also show that offenders who are younger, less violent, chronically 
unemployed, and medium to high risk (excluding sex offenders) are more likely to 
commit new crimes.  Technical violations are strongly associated with both felony 
reoffending and major violation behavior, and the sanction grid neither worsens nor 
attenuates their impact.  We find similarly strong effects when the violation rate is 
measured dynamically in the final models.  Residential instability is mildly predictive 
of new crimes, but not major violation behavior.    
 
The Role of Rehabilitative versus Punitive Responses under Progressive Sanctioning 
 
•  In models based on early violators (at risk for chronic non-compliance), prior 
programming sanctions substantially reduce the risk of felony reoffending, while 
control-oriented sanctioning has a worsening effect.  In other words, front-end agency 
responses to violations that include community-based referrals and treatment 
interventions work better than an excessive use of punitive sanctions.  Further, the 
intensive use of restrictive conditions and discretionary jail detention may be 
especially problematic for improving outcomes among the lowest risk offenders.  The 
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effect of halfway house referrals is significant but less important than the general 
programming effect, which encompasses a wide range of services and interventions.   
 
•  The beneficial impact of sanction-based programming is consistent throughout the 
results, and the effects are generally enhanced under the sanction guidelines.  When 
the early violator models are split by sample group, halfway house referrals and 
program sanctions work substantially better under the sanction guidelines.  They 
work especially well for post-guidelines high-risk (non-sex) offenders, consistent 
with an established body of correctional treatment literature.  In contrast, there is no 
mitigating effect of program referrals for those offenders in the pre-grid cohort.  
Further, combining treatment services with restrictive sanctioning also significantly 
reduces recidivism at the high-risk level in the post-grid sample.   
 
•  In dynamic models predicting felony behavior on the full-sample split equations, 
program sanctions and supervision plan activities combine to reduce the risk of 
reoffending, but only among in the post-grid release cohort.  In terms of relative 
importance, the strongest predictors in these final analyses are chronic 
unemployment, offender risk and successful involvement in sanction-based 
programming or services.   
 
Replication Study 
 
•  The replication study generally substantiates the findings reported in the main ODRC 
analyses of policy implementation and offender outcomes.  Similar to the ODRC 
results, the validation results from the incident-level analysis show that the sanction 
gird is negatively related to both officers’ decision to pursue a hearing and returns to 
prison for a technical violation.  There are very few differences in the factors that 
influence the incident-level outcomes before and after the sanction guidelines were 
implemented.   
 
•  Also consistent with the ODRC results, the replication analyses of offender-level 
outcomes indicate that that the sanction grid had no appreciable effect on offender 
behavior.  Taken together, the replication study findings raise the level of confidence 
that can be placed in the main findings from the ODRC components of the project.   
 
Independent Process/Implementation Evaluation 
 
•  Analysis of the focus group and statewide officer survey data reveal that although 
procedural training on the sanction grid was perceived to be sufficiently adequate to 
apply it appropriately in practice, there is widespread disagreement among 
respondents that officer skills and opinions were considered in its design.  Those 
officers who did perceive more agency responsiveness reported a better 
understanding of the primary intent of the policy to better structure the sanctioning 
process, increase consistency and reduce disparities across regions.   
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•  In turn, favorable attitudes regarding agency respect for officer professionalism, 
understanding of primary intent and satisfaction with regional administrators all 
combine to positively impact perceptions about effectiveness of the sanction grid and 
its ability to produce better control over offenders under supervision.   
 
•  Officer characteristics have little or no effect on perceived outcomes of the sanction 
grid, but officers who are more authoritative in their approach to supervision are less 
favorable regarding the sanction grid’s effectiveness.  Interestingly, officers who view 
the basis of their power to compel offender compliance in coercive terms have more 
favorable opinions about the grid, while those who view this power on the basis of 
legitimate authority are less favorable, especially with regard to effectiveness and 
offender control, suggesting that some officers might actually perceive the grid as 
undermining their legitimacy.   
 
Conclusions 
 
•  The findings from the project suggest that progressive sanction regimes can serve as 
an important and seemingly cost-effective population management tool when 
revocation and incarceration resources are used in a parsimonious fashion and limited 
mostly to high risk offenders or those who pose public safety risks.   
 
•  The progressive structure of the grid also allows for critical, community-based 
treatment interventions to occur before pursuing a hearing, without increasing overall 
rates of felony reoffending.  The results further indicate that revocation outcomes in 
the current system are influenced only by formal, policy-based criteria.  Any policy 
changes that rescind or otherwise weaken these elements of the guidelines may 
potentially compromise the uniformity and proportionality that has been achieved. 
 
•  The guidelines also provide a structural opportunity to align treatment sanctions with 
high-risk and potentially chronic violators on the front-end of supervision, allowing 
those offenders to retain any pro-social experiences gained without facing the 
presumption of immediate revocation.  The results indicate that these interventions 
are especially effective for high risk and need clients supervised under the guidelines, 
and they support a heavier use of control sanctions for these groups where necessary, 
even though overuse of punitive sanctions worsens outcomes in general.   
 
•  The enhanced benefits of sanction-based programming and treatment interventions 
for those offenders supervised under progressive sanctions suggests that for those 
involved in such services, the certainty of the consequences for failing to comply 
have now become more pronounced under the sanction grid.  It might also be because 
these policies provide stronger guidance to consider the full range of risk and needs, 
resulting in better alignment of services once violation behavior has occurred.  
Finally, it is possible that structured sanctioning promotes closer monitoring of 
compliance with treatment services and that this occurs earlier in the supervision 
process.   
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•  The fact that the progressive sanction policy has no independent global effect on 
improving offender outcomes should be viewed in the context of findings from the 
survey-based process evaluation, which suggest that full potential for sound 
implementation was compromised by the perceptions among some officers that their 
opinions and professional skills were not considered in the design of the sanctioning 
system.  This appears to have had the effect of undermining officer perceptions about 
its overall effectiveness, and in some cases, increasing perceptions that the sanction 
grid undermined legitimacy-based sources of authority.      
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Introduction 
 
The explosive growth in prison releases nationwide presents enormous challenges 
for the effective management of offenders under community supervision.  Probation and 
parole populations in the United States continued to expand in 2006 and now exceed 5 
million offenders (Glaze and Bonczar, 2007).  The number of offenders on parole at 
yearend 2006 approached 800,000, an increase of 2.3% over the previous year.  The Ohio 
Adult Parole Authority (APA) has likewise experienced substantial increases in its total 
supervision population, growing over four percent in 2007 to a level of 35,000 amid 
record levels of prison intake in recent years.  Prison releases to supervision exceeded 
12,000 in FY 2007, while the community supervision population overall increased over 
90% from fiscal yearend 1997 to 2006 (Bureau of Research, Ohio Department of 
Rehabilitation and Correction [ODRC], 2008; Bennie, Norton, and Martin, 2008).  These 
increases have been accompanied by a significant shift in the composition of this 
population toward higher proportions of violent and sex offenders (Bennie et al., 2008).  
Officers continue to confront larger and more specialized caseloads with fewer agency 
resources.   
The growth in prison releases also poses challenges to the successful 
implementation of system-wide reentry plans, which envision extensive program 
coordination, specialized treatment interventions, and sophisticated use of risk and needs 
assessment tools to achieve positive supervision outcomes and thereby reduce recidivism.  
But these plans also call for more effective supervision practices to ensure compliance 
with the conditions of supervision and increase offender accountability.  Indeed, the Ohio 
Reentry Plan, as part of a broader set of recommendations on reentry-centered offender 
supervision, explicitly calls for policy revisions that would provide for the statewide 
adoption of standardized, progressive sanction guidelines (ODRC, 2002).  
 These recommendations reflect a broader national movement in community 
corrections toward a more structured form of sanctioning that reduces reliance on 
revocation in favor of a continuum of escalating responses determined by both offender 
characteristics and public safety concerns (Council of State Governments [CSG], 2005; 
Burke, 1997).  Progressive sanctioning policies emphasize community treatment options 
that are appropriately responsive to offender risk in seeking to stem a growing wave of 
returns to prison that frequently result from technical rule violations.  Nationally, 35% of 
prisoners admitted to state prisons are parole violators and two-thirds of those revocations 
are for technical violations and not new criminal convictions (Travis, 2003).  These 
patterns have led prison and jail administrators to reinforce calls for more effective 
supervision management as they struggle to handle overcrowding and budgetary crises.  
 In Ohio, while technical returns represented just over 10% of all admission types 
in fiscal year 2007, the volume of returns continues to increase as supervision populations 
grow and is now approaching 3,500 annually (Bureau of Research, ODRC, 2008).  Two-
thirds of supervised releases in Ohio commit at least one violation within the first year of 
release (Martin, Dassanayaka, and Van Dine, 2004).  And although technical return rates 
in Ohio have begun to decline moderately, they have been largely offset by recent 
increases in felony re-commission rates, adding to the urgency to implement proposed 
reentry policies governing supervision practices.  Yet there is an emerging consensus 
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among parole authorities that overly punitive responses to technical violations will not 
reduce recidivism, nor will they necessarily enhance public safety (Burke, 2004).  This 
view is consistent with an established body of evidence underscoring the utility of 
addressing risk and criminogenic needs in reducing recidivism over punishment alone.    
The recommendations to craft a more reentry-based sanctioning process first put 
forth in Ohio’s reentry plan were eventually implemented in July 2005 through a 
comprehensive policy reform governing the Adult Parole Authority’s response to 
violations of the conditions of supervision.  The Ohio guidelines are part of a broader 
reform movement in which structured sanctioning policies have been implemented in 
several other agencies.  But since these policies are so new, very little evidence exists by 
which to gauge their overall effectiveness.   
The major purpose of this project is to study the effectiveness of Ohio’s 
progressive sanction policy, both as an efficient management tool and as a reentry-based 
approach to increasing rule compliance and thereby improving supervision outcomes.  
More specifically, the major goals are to investigate whether the introduction of the 
guidelines and policy improved supervision outcomes in the aggregate, increased 
administrative efficiency and the progressiveness of sanction responses, and resulted in 
more explicit use of structured risk assessment as a factor in shaping agency response to 
violations.  It further investigates the impact of the sanction guidelines on individual-
level supervision outcomes, and explores how the relationships among risk, violations, 
sanction response, and new criminal offending change before and after implementation.  
Finally, it seeks to validate the quantitative findings through an independently conducted 
replication study, and add context to those findings through a process evaluation of the 
implementation of the policy based on parole officer survey and related focus group 
data.
1
  
Organization of Report
2
 
This report is organized as follows: we begin with a brief overview of recent 
empirical and conceptual work that has helped inform the current use of graduated 
sanctions, followed by a discussion of the major features of Ohio’s guidelines and 
supporting policy.  We then specify two major sets of research questions that we 
investigate through our quantitative analyses.  Next, we overview the design and discuss 
the analytic strategy behind these analyses, discussing our data sources, collection 
methods, comparison group and sampling design.  Findings from the study are presented 
in two sections:  one addressing implementation and operational effectiveness of the 
sanction grid based on analyses of core process measures, and the second showing 
descriptive and multivariate findings related to pre/post policy differences on important 
dimensions of offender outcomes.  Finally, we discuss the policy implications of the 
findings, and conclude with a discussion of how they contribute to emerging theories of 
reentry and procedural justice.   
                                                 
1 The replication study and process evaluation were conducted independently by the University of 
Cincinnati and included in the scope of project components funded by NIJ. The process evaluation is based 
in part on a survey of Ohio parole officers’ attitudes and perceptions surrounding the Adult Parole 
Authority’s progressive sanctions policy.  The design and results of both components are reported in 
Appendix 9.   
2 The main body of the report is limited to presentation of the design, methods, and findings from the 
quantitative analyses of policy effectiveness conducted by ODRC.   
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Empirical and Theoretical Foundations of Graduated and Progressive Sanction 
Models  
 
  Graduated sanction models refer to both court-based dispositional options, which 
vary by level of confinement or supervision required, and agency-based schedules of 
increasingly restrictive responses that vary proportionally with an offender’s degree of 
non-compliance (Weibush, 2002).  In either case, these models have been heavily 
influenced by empirical findings from a growing body of “best practices” research on 
effective supervision and treatment strategies.  By the mid-1990s, early forms of 
alternative judicial sanctioning, such as electronic monitoring and intensive probation, 
were shown to be of limited effectiveness, overemphasizing surveillance and punitive 
approaches without addressing underlying behavior or improving offender outcomes 
(Petersilia and Turner, 1993).  Many of these programs failed to include treatment 
components (Cullen, Eck and Lowenkamp, 2002; Paparozzi and Gendreau, 2005), even 
as other work demonstrated that the effectiveness of intensive supervision is enhanced 
when combined with such treatment (Petersilia and Turner, 1991).   
A larger body of meta-analytic research has conclusively demonstrated the 
effectiveness of correctional interventions that employ established programmatic 
principles, especially those that are responsive to higher risk offenders (e.g., Andrews et 
al., 1990; Andrews and Bonta, 1998).  Early intermediate sanction programs, however, 
focused inappropriately on lower-risk offenders, counter to the “risk principle” and 
related findings demonstrating that intensive services work best when targeted at the 
higher risk and need levels (Gendreau, 1996; Paparozzi and Gendreau, 2005; 
Lowenkamp and Latessa, 2005).
3  Recent findings from a large study of residential 
treatment programs in Ohio has shown widespread effectiveness among higher risk 
offenders, but iatrogenic effects for their lower risk counterparts (Lowenkamp and 
Latessa, 2005).  
These findings are consistent with a related set of findings documenting the 
effectiveness of drug courts and court intervention programs (Office of Justice Programs, 
1998), which represent the earliest use of incremental sanctioning within the context of a 
program, or intervention, model (Taxman, Soule, and Gelb, 1999).  Importantly, these 
approaches have demonstrated that a more structured use of graduated sanctions provides 
incentives to participate in drug treatment (Harrell, Cavanagh, and Roman, 1999), and 
that the overall effectiveness of drug courts is greater among higher-risk offenders 
(Lowenkamp, Holsinger and Latessa, 2003, cited in Lowenkamp and Latessa, 2005).  
Graduated sanctions models, as implemented in drug court programs, emphasize the 
importance of swiftness and certainty in imposing an increasingly severe schedule of 
penalties for non-compliance with program rules.  These penalties sometimes include 
intensive treatment.  Drug court models thus combine elements of monitoring and 
treatment-oriented responses in creating a more balanced approach to progressive 
sanctioning (Harrell and Roman, 2001).   
This well established body of best practices research has most recently helped 
inform the development in several jurisdictions of progressive sanctioning guidelines 
                                                 
3 The risk principle, as used commonly throughout the correctional treatment literature, refers to the notion 
that treatment services are most effective when their intensity is matched appropriately to an offender’s risk 
of reoffending.   
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governing the system-wide supervision of parole and probation caseloads.  These reforms 
have usually been implemented as part of broader reentry strategies designed to confront 
large violator populations and improve overall success rates.  They are generally referred 
to as administrative models because they govern behavior within a particular setting and 
become part of the standard supervision practice (Taxman et al., 1999).  Although they 
share common elements, there is wide variation across jurisdictions in the operational 
design of these policies, ranging from loosely structured menus of sanction options to 
complex violation response matrices that incorporate multiple decisional points as well as 
positive reinforcement rewards (Burke, 2004; Carter, 2001).   
The matrix-based systems which are most closely related to Ohio’s sanction grid 
typically incorporate offender risk as a major factor in determining sanction response.  
Many of these systems have been developed in consultation with the National Institute of 
Corrections (NIC), which has strongly advocated that empirically-based risk assessment 
be incorporated explicitly into graduated response systems in order to develop more 
targeted and structured decision-making tools (Burke, 1997).  Various classification 
tools, such as the LSI or Salient Factor Score, are used to place offenders into low, 
moderate, or high-risk categories.  Risk profiles are usually arrayed against broad 
categories of violation severity to help guide officers in imposing appropriate responses, 
which may range from verbal reprimands to parole revocation (CSG, 2005; Carter and 
Ley, 2001; Burke, 2004).  These more recent reforms are thus consistent with basic 
assumptions of the risk principle, recognizing that both public safety and rehabilitative 
responses should be aligned with an offender’s risk of reoffending.   
Graduated sanction reforms share several broader objectives, including an 
emphasis on swiftly imposed responses, certainty in agency adherence to the sanction 
policy, and an increasingly severe range of responses, all of which serve as deterrents to 
non-compliance by increasing its perceived costs (Taxman et al., 1999; Wiebush, 2002).  
Violation matrices also provide responses that are proportional to the seriousness of 
misconduct.  But their incorporation of risk management principles and reliance on local 
community resources reflects broader utilitarian objectives as well, as parole agents 
attempt to tailor responses according to assessed criminogenic needs and limit revocation 
options to high risk violators who fail in program interventions (Wiebush, 2002).  A more 
elaborate theoretical basis for the effectiveness of these elements in reducing supervision 
failure has recently been advanced by Taxman et al. (1999), who argue that the 
deterrence principles and consistency and uniformity of response inherent within 
progressive sanctioning schemes reduce disparity and increase favorable perceptions of 
procedural justice, thereby enhancing the legitimacy of parole authorities and promoting 
compliance (see also Rottman, 2007; Sherman, 1993).  Offenders are more likely to view 
the sanctioning system as procedurally fair when rules and the consequences of violations 
are explained in advance, and when sanctions are imposed consistently but with an 
appropriate level of officer discretion (CSG, 2005; Harrell et al., 1999).   
  In spite of this important theoretical refinement, the effectiveness of 
administrative models of progressive sanctions in statewide jurisdictions has not yet been 
demonstrated, especially for post-prison settings in which the costs of re-incarcerating 
technical violators is highest.  Relevant research has been limited so far to drug court 
evaluations, descriptive assessments of changes in revocation patterns and other process-
level indicators (see Carter, 2001), or limited studies of probation departments (e.g., The 
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Civic Institute at Mercyhurst College, 2002).
4 We address this gap in the literature by 
conducting a comprehensive investigation of Ohio’s new sanction guidelines on the 
dimensions of both implementation and offender recidivism outcomes.  Before outlining 
our research questions, we first present an overview of the major elements of the policy 
and response grid, situating the policy within the context of recent legislative changes.   
 
The Ohio Progressive Sanction Grid and Violation Policy 
 
The emergence of structured parole sanctioning in Ohio is traceable to major 
statutory changes implemented as a part of Ohio’s 1996 Truth-in-Sentencing law, more 
commonly known by its legislative label, SB2.  Among its many changes, SB2 provided 
presumptive sentencing guidelines, abolished parole and imposed definite sentences on 
most felony offenders.  The sentencing guidelines component of SB2 presumed diversion 
for first-time, low-level offenders, but also provided for prison sentences as low as six 
months for lowest felony levels.  Although it ended parole release for most new 
admissions, it retained supervision after prison for those who used to receive parole, now 
called Post Release Control (PRC).  
In addition to violent offenders, however, it also made non-violent offenders 
subject to discretionary PRC placement.  Discretionary PRC placements have declined 
sharply in recent years under tighter criteria, but the law substantially changed the size 
and composition of the post-prison supervision population to include large numbers of 
previously unsupervised low-level felons.  Caseloads evolved into a mix of older parolees 
serving longer, indeterminate terms, and younger PRC cases perceived to be resentful and 
harder to manage.  While parolees remain subject to revocation, those violating PRC face 
a maximum nine-month penalty upon each return, the cumulative total of which cannot 
exceed half of the original sentence.
5
Large numbers of discretionary PRC releases in the early post-SB2 period led, in 
turn, to a sharp increase in technical returns.  The combination of high return rates, short 
penalty intervals, inconsistent handling of violation behavior and under-utilization of 
community sanctions underscored the need to reform revocation and supervision 
practices.  The establishment in the mid-1990s of a single, due process violation hearing 
in the field increased consistency, but failed to reduce the level of technical returns.  
Eventually a series of advisory workgroups was formed starting in 2001 (in consultation 
with NIC) to develop baseline information on violation and response patterns, expand the 
range of community sanctions, and ultimately recommend ways to organize a new system 
of progressive sanction guidelines consistent with Ohio’s Reentry Plan.  
 
4 This study of Erie County (Pennsylvania) probationers evaluated a modified sanction matrix emphasizing 
“zero-tolerance” responses, finding that technical violation and felony commission rates were lower than 
under an alternative matrix system without that enhancement.  Although the study used random 
assignment, it employed few controls, used non-standard follow-up periods, and relied on small caseload 
counts, thus limiting its generalizability.   
5 We use the term “revocation” generically throughout this report, even though that term is technically 
reserved in Ohio only for parolees who are returned for technical violations, not PRC violators.  
Revocations and “prison sanctions” are conceptually similar, with both types of offenders experiencing 
similar lengths of stay once returned.   
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Figure 1. Ohio APA Sanction Grid.
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The sanction grid that is the subject of this evaluation is presented in Figure 1.  
The grid is formally embedded within a broader policy that governs responses to  
violations of the conditions of APA post-prison supervision, serving as a structured 
decision-making tool that provides guidance in imposing sanctions based on offender risk 
and violation severity.  This new violation policy became effective in July 2005.  It 
replaced a less structured one that allowed for more local discretion, and made the 
following key changes that have important implications in shaping our research questions 
below:  1) As before, the policy directs officers to consider both public safety and the 
overall history of the offender in addressing noncompliance, but now makes explicit 
reference to the sanction grid and an offender’s risk level in determining the most 
appropriate response; 2)  It limits the mandatory issuance of a hold order (when criminal 
proceedings have not been initiated by local jurisdictions) to a more restrictive set of  
situations involving firearms, sex offenses, bodily injury, threatening behavior, and out-
of-state fugitive status, requires higher-level approval for local detention that is otherwise 
discretionary, and creates a general presumption that violation hearings will be held in 
non-custody settings; and 3) The policy replaces a less structured checklist system (used 
mostly to determine the need for a custody hearing) with a risk-based, progressive matrix 
format to guide the actual level of response to violation behavior.  The procedural aspects 
of a violation hearing itself are addressed in a separate policy that remained unchanged 
across our study period.  While the sanction grid does not formally govern hearing 
dispositions (i.e., revocation decisions), it has important implications for dramatically 
changing the volume and type of offenders who are referred through staffing decisions.   
The policy’s emphases on the risk principle and community sanction alternatives 
are reflective of the Department’s broader reentry goals relating to supervision practices.   
These goals include embracing a supervision philosophy emphasizing offender 
accountability, public safety, and balanced, progressive responses to non-compliance.  
They are consistent with procedural justice notions of deterrence described above, which 
maintain that legal compliance is best achieved by promoting fairness, preserving 
offender dignity, and responding with certainty and swiftness to negative behavior 
(Sherman, 1993; Taxman et al., 1999).  In sum, the policy represents an acceleration of 
an ongoing shift away from the punitive control of offenders toward an approach 
emphasizing balance and community-level response.   
The structure of the sanction grid is similar to other violation response matrices, 
especially those that incorporate risk.  Violation behavior is categorized within risk level, 
forming the vertical axis of the grid.  Risk scores are from the offender’s static 
assessment used to determine initial level of supervision.  High-level violations include 
absconding, violations of protective orders, victim contact, program terminations, change 
of residence and certain misdemeanor offenses.  Low-level violations mostly include 
employment, reporting, substance abuse, and curfew violations.  Sex offender violations, 
weapons infractions, threatening behavior, out-of-state fugitive status, and causing bodily 
injury are handled uniquely as “major” violations and not addressed through the grid.    
Otherwise, sanctions for new felony behavior with no other technical violations would be 
imposed at the post-conviction stage.   
Responses are determined by cross-classifying these categories by the cumulative 
number violation-incidents as a way of incorporating sanction history into the decision-
making process.  Unlike many other systems, however, the matrix does not provide 
structured menus of specific sanctions in each response cell, nor does it incorporate 
incentives along with sanctions as part of a single unified system of response strategies.  
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Rather, the cells refer to mainly to levels of organizational response, which include local 
unit-level responses, parole board summons, or violation hearings.  A sanction, as 
formally defined by the policy, refers broadly to any official response imposed pursuant 
to relevant sections of the Ohio Revised Code.  More specifically, unit-level sanctions 
imposed by local supervising units include responses such as more restrictive conditions, 
structured supervision activities, substance abuse testing and monitoring, referral to a 
substance abuse specialist, housing and other community referrals, upgrades in 
supervision levels, increased reporting, informal and written reprimands, summons to a 
parole board officer, and halfway house and/or non-residential program placement.  
Referral to a violation hearing is necessary in order for a revocation of release to be 
considered.   
The sanction grid allows multiple opportunities to impose unit-level sanctions 
before initiating the process to pursue a violation hearing.  This break between local and 
hearing-level response thus constitutes the main progressive element of the Ohio system, 
rendering it less structured and incremental than other graduated sanction systems, such 
as conventional drug courts, that incorporate more nuanced response options. 
Importantly, however, this helps preserve officer discretion and allows opportunities for 
more tailored rehabilitative interventions to be imposed at the higher risk levels, 
consistent with policy language directing officers to consider a wide range of offender 
background factors in fashioning responses to violation behavior.  On the other hand, the 
system is explicitly proportional in that the number of local sanctions allowed decreases 
with increases in risk and violation severity.  As an intermediate step, the grid directs 
officers to schedule one or more Parole Board Summons prior to resorting to a violation 
hearing.  These refer to unit-level sanctions that require appearances in front of paroling 
officers as a vehicle for amplifying the importance of abiding by the conditions of 
supervision and restating the consequences of non-compliance.  Finally, the grid 
presumes that violation hearings will be scheduled out of custody except when 
overridden by pubic safety concerns or in cases involving out-of-state fugitives.   
 
Research Questions 
 
Figure 2 summarizes the major factors that helped shape the development of the 
policy, along with a conceptual model of its hypothesized procedural and offender 
outcomes.  Increasing prison intake and the surge of relatively lower-risk offenders onto 
supervision in early stages of SB2 created new, simultaneous challenges in the areas of 
population and supervision case management.  The policy reforms include several 
elements designed to confront those challenges through more selective and efficient use 
of sanctioning resources.   
Implementation of the policy and sanction grid was preceded in the short term by 
an executive directive that restricted the use of local jail detainment and in-custody 
violation hearings to incidents involving only the most serious forms of violation 
behavior.  This language was then incorporated into the policy itself, along with the full 
range of factors to be considered in responding to all forms of non-compliance and in 
preparing to pursue a violation hearing.  As outlined in Figure 2, the major objectives of 
the policy include the following: increased proportionality (i.e., responses appropriate to 
the level of violation severity) and uniformity across regions at the organizational level of 
sanctions imposed, progressive sanctioning (i.e., unit sanction versus revocation hearing) 
and presumptive use of community-based options for early violators, better 
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responsiveness to risk, and more selective use of hearings and confinement resources. 
These objectives are representative of those embraced by several jurisdictions receiving 
technical assistance from NIC in the early 1990s (Burke, 1997).  Implementation of the 
policy is expected to produce changes in several specific areas of agency response, some 
of which are highlighted in Figure 2.  These changes, in turn, have implications for 
improved offender outcomes under a policy setting more responsive to offender risk and 
need levels.  The study is broadly organized around two major sets of research questions 
that follow from this conceptual model:   
 
1)  Procedural and Policy Objectives: In addressing the overall aspects of 
implementation, we first ask whether the organizational level of 
response (unit/local sanction versus violation hearing) is proportional 
and uniform, consistent with the basic principles of a procedural justice 
approach to parole supervision.  Further, is the overall administrative 
efficiency of the agency increased through a more selective use of 
revocation hearings and local jail confinement, thereby preserving this 
option for higher risk, repeat violators?  Have officers increased the use 
of programming/treatment interventions, where appropriate, as an early 
alternative to more punitive sanctions?  And do offender risk and 
overall violation history become stronger determinants of 
organizational and sanctioning response?  These questions address the 
core objectives of the new policy guidelines and constitute the basic 
outcomes on which the systems of other agencies have so far been 
evaluated.  
 
2)  Offender Outcomes: We extend the scope of the study further by also 
addressing the sources of supervision outcomes before and after the 
start of the sanction guidelines.  Broadly speaking, we ask whether 
there is a significant improvement in offender outcomes after 
implementation, net of other determinants of supervision behavior, and 
under what circumstances progressive sanctions are most effective.  We 
also address how the role of offender risk changes in determining those 
outcomes under a system of decision-making more sensitive to risk 
profiles, and whether the previously reported (see Gray et al., 2001; 
Travis and Petersilia, 2001) positive effect of technical violations on 
new criminality is attenuated or exacerbated under an overall less 
punitive system.  Further, we investigate the relative efficacy of 
punitive versus rehabilitative responses in general, and ask how the 
relationship between those responses and recidivism changes after 
implementation.   In sum, we cast a broadly defined set of questions 
that bear directly on establishing the managerial appeal of progressive 
sanctions, while contributing to a separate literature on the general 
analysis of violation behavior (e.g., Fendrich, 1991; Gray, Fields, and 
Maxwell, 2001; Schulenberg, 2007). 
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Figure 2. Ohio Progressive Sanction Policy Impact Model 
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Research Design and Data Sources 
 
The study uses a variation of a separate sample pretest-posttest research design 
(Campbell and Stanley, 1963) that relies on the use of a historical comparison group.  
The design is shown in schematic form below:      
 
O1        (X)               (Historical Comparison Group) 
   X  O2     (Post-Intervention/Sanction Guidelines Group)  
 
Under this basic design, the effects of an intervention on outcome variables in a 
posttest sample are compared to observations from a comparable, but separate, sample 
constructed prior to the change and thus not exposed to the intervention.  This design 
typically uses an analysis of covariance approach and is common in a large body of 
sentencing guideline research and evaluations of system-wide policy interventions, but is 
potentially undermined by threats to internal validity relating to cohort and history 
effects.  Since there is no conventional comparison group, observed treatment effects are 
potentially due to other sources unrelated to the policy changes investigated here.   
We attempt to minimize these potential biases through statistical controls, 
matching procedures, and by optimizing our sampling design, such that the data are 
drawn from sampling frames representing release cohorts from the periods immediately 
before and after implementation of the new policy in July 2005.  The comparison group 
consists of a random sample of first-time Post Release Control and Parole releases that 
started supervision during October-December 2003.  The progressive sanctions (PS) 
sample is representative of supervision starts in August-October 2005.  In both cases, the 
starting frames excluded re-releases to supervision after a technical return, as well as 
releases to Transitional Control (i.e., vocational furlough), Monitored Time (i.e., 
supervision based on record checks only), interstate compact, or a detainer.  The follow-
up period of observation for both samples is the first year of supervision, or until the date 
of early termination, whichever occurs first.  For the comparison group, this period ends 
just prior to the January 2005 hold-order directive, thereby minimizing any possible 
contamination from a related policy change governing revocation practices.
6 We refer 
throughout the report to these two samples as the pre and post-guidelines groups since 
agency response to violation behavior was governed by the policy environments that 
existed before and after introduction of the progressive sanctions reform.   
  Both samples include all females released during the two periods who met the 
selection criteria.  Males were selected at conventional precision levels through a 
stratified random sampling scheme using a 20% oversampling rate to offset missing or 
otherwise unusable case file material.  The male population was stratified by type of 
                                                 
6 It should be noted that in spring of 2006, the APA implemented a separate revision to its offender 
classification policy that included a formal incentive system to promote positive behavior.  We consider 
this to have occurred late enough in the post-test follow up period that any meaningful contamination 
should be minimal, especially in light of the slowly escalating nature of the reward system.   
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release (parole, discretionary PRC, and mandatory PRC), sex offender status, and parole 
region and drawn proportionally from each stratum.  These procedures yielded total 
sample counts of 1,040 and 1,012 for the comparison and PS groups, respectively.  Since 
key offender background characteristics, including risk level, were not available 
electronically for the entire 2003 release population, cases were not matched to the PS 
group at the time of sample selection.  Instead, we use propensity score matching 
techniques and covariance modeling to correct for any observed sample differences.  The 
matching procedure is discussed in more detail in the recidivism outcome analyses 
below.   
  The study is based on data coded from a variety of electronically available and 
paper copy supervision records.  The primary source of information used in obtaining the 
complete supervision history of an offender, including narratives of the violation and 
sanction histories, are the field officer’s supervision (FOS) notes.  FOS notes record all 
offender contacts, service referrals, violations committed, sanctions imposed, program 
completions and employment changes.  New PC tablet technology was made available to 
all field officers by the end of 2004, such that hand-written notes are now digitally 
recorded and uploaded to a web-based tracking system.  Coding for the PS cohort was 
done from the electronic version of these notes.  Since this version was unavailable for 
most of 2004, data collection for the comparison group took place in the field at local 
APA unit offices.  In both cases, the violation and sanction data were coded from 
narrative, log-style entries.   
  Information from the case file material was collected using an incident-based 
method by which detail on up to ten violation-incidents was retrospectively coded during 
the first year of supervision.  Incident types are broadly categorized in terms of rule 
violations and criminal behavior.  Data coders were trained to record the full range of 
non-compliant and criminal behavior that occurred during the study period (excluding 
traffic citations), even if the behavior did not lead to an APA sanction.  Each coded 
incident consisted of detailed information on up to seven specific violations and/or 
sanctions, since some incidents involved multiple violations tied to a single APA 
response or court disposition.  Coded information was limited to behavior that occurred 
while under active APA supervision.  
Observations were also collected on residential and employment history and all 
programming and treatment interventions.  These data were coded and assembled in the 
form of multiple records per offender (for each employment, residential, or programming 
episode) consisting of start and end dates, descriptive information, and reason codes 
associated with each change in status.  This information also came mostly from field 
notes, although several other source documents were used throughout the data collection 
effort, including violation and arrest reports, hold orders, sanction receipts, supervision 
plans, termination recommendations, and self-reported supervision activities.  For the PS 
group, a paper copy of the sanction grid (if marked) was used to supplement and verify 
information obtained from the field notes.   
All information collected from the case file documents was entered into a series 
of databases, restructured, and then merged with data extracted from several 
electronically available administrative data sources.  These sources include standard 
agency data on offender demographics, committing offense and sentence characteristics, 
release dates, supervision length and field unit location.  They also include status codes 
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relating to re-incarceration events (revocation or felony recommission), thus providing a 
supplementary source of information on supervision outcomes.  Similarly, we added 
administrative data on field hearings, residential address records and substance abuse 
referrals in order to provide an alternative source of information in those areas as well.   
  For the treatment group, offender risk scores were extracted from Reentry 
Accountability Plan (RAP) databases, which consist of separate static risk and dynamic 
needs assessments scored during the offender’s incarceration.  The categorized static 
score is one of the key axes of the sanction grid, as well as the basis for the APA’s 
supervision classification system.  The instrument was originally developed for use with 
ODRC’s parole guidelines system, but was later incorporated into the current reentry 
assessment process.  The overall score represents the sum of six individual items that 
mostly measure an offender’s prior criminal history.  Although risk profiles vary in the 
aggregate over time, the unavailability of automated assessments on all releases prior to 
2004 precluded the use of a conventional case matching design at the time the samples 
were drawn.  Subsequent collection and coding of missing risk scores for the comparison 
group did allow, however, for propensity score matching to be used retrospectively to 
correct for non-equivalency between the two groups.  These procedures are discussed 
further below.  
 
Analytic Strategy: Policy Implementation  
 
Our assessment of the effectiveness of the new sanction policy centers around two 
major sets of quantitative analyses that correspond with each set of research questions 
above.  In the first section of the analysis, we use bivariate comparisons, contingency 
tables, and multivariate models of agency response to address the extent to which the 
major policy objectives have been implemented effectively.  The bivariate analyses allow 
us to compare differences across samples in specific field-based activities and 
organizational responses that are central to progressive sanctioning.  Some of the findings 
are presented by levels of offender risk and violation severity, since those factors are 
considered explicitly in the new decision-making guidelines.  We then switch to 
regression analyses of two key decision points in the sanctioning process, level of 
organization response (i.e., local vs. violation hearing) and violation hearing disposition, 
in order to examine the net effects of the sanction guidelines on these outcomes, as well 
as the moderating effect they may have with regard to how risk and violation behavior 
determine responses before and after implementation.   
Throughout the implementation assessment, we use a restructured version of the 
dataset that treats offender-incidents as the basic unit of analysis.  In this type of file 
arrangement, each incident, along with appended offender-level data and the coded 
violation and sanction detail, constitutes a separate record. The results from the bivariate 
analysis below are based on 3,248 incidents after exclusion of missing data on incident 
type.
7 Propensity matching, which is used throughout the recidivism analysis below, was  
 
7 The restructured file consists of 1,196 offenders (out of the combined starting sample of 2,052, reduced to 
1,963 after exclusion of missing data) with at least one coded incident.  For this portion of the analysis, a 
small number of cases with valid violation codes, but missing incident types were excluded.  Refer to 
Appendix 1 for a complete summary and description of all samples and related subsets used throughout the 
analysis.   
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Mean
0.134
0.795
0.260
0.753
0.126
0.438
0.079
0.234
0.414
0.208
0.144
0.164
0.468
0.368
1.230
0.866
0.546
33.382
3.033
0.260
0.165
0.195
0.182
0.086
0.099
0.091
0.182
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Definitions of Variables used in Offender-Incident Analysis (combined pre and post guidelines samples; N=3,248)
Variable Name Definition
Organizational Outcomes:
Level of Organizational Response† 1=Incident resulting in revocation (VSP) hearing (or hearing pursued); 0=Unit-level response
Hearing Location 1=Hearing held with offender in custody; 0=Out-of-custody hearing
Pre-Hearing Jail Detention 1=Incident involving pre-hearing local jail detention (i.e., jail hold); 0=No jail hold issued
Sanctions Imposed:
Hearing Outcome 1=Hearing resulting in revocation/return to prison; 0=Non-revocation disposition
Revocation/Return†   1=Incident with revocation/return as most serious sanction imposed**; 0=Other sanction
Programming/Treatment/Restrictions 1=Incident with programming/treatment or restrictions as most serious sanction imposed**; 0= Other sanction
Halfway House Placement   1=Incident with halfway house placement as most serious sanction imposed**; 0=Other sanction
Independent Variables:
Offender Risk Reentry Accountability Plan Static Risk Assessment Score
  Low 
  Medium
  High
  Sex Offender
Violation Severity Severity level of most serious violation behavior committed at each incident
  Major
  High
  Low
Cumulative Violation Rate Total violations committed through current incident (per month)
Sex   1=male; 0=female
Race 1=non-white;  0=white
Age Age (in  years) at start of supervision
Felony Category of Commitment Offense Felony category: F1/life sentence to F5 (coded in reverse order of seriousness)
Parole-Eligible Sentence  1=Released on discretionary parole; 0=Released on post release control
Parole Region: Parole region at start of supervision
Akron
Cincinnati
Columbus
Lima
Mansfield
Chillicothe
Cleveland (reference)
**Outcomes include multiple sanctions of lesser severity. Incidents with no APA response are excluded. 
†Dependent variables used in incident-level regression models.
1
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not applied at this stage since the primary analytic concern is with agency response, not 
offender behavior.  Using the full sample also increases statistical power when studying 
more serious back-end sanctioning, which is otherwise limited by the one-year follow-up 
period.   
 
Measures Used in Policy Implementation Analysis   
 
Table 1 presents mean levels and definitions of the measures used throughout our 
evaluation of the sanction policy’s major administrative and procedural objectives.  We 
define administrative effectiveness broadly in terms of organizational outcomes and 
sanction responses, following from the conceptual model presented in Figure 2.  
Organizational outcomes are measured in three ways, including whether the behavior is 
considered at the unit or hearing level, the location of violation hearing, and whether a 
local jail hold is placed during the course of the APA’s response.  Sanction responses are 
defined as hearing and overall incident dispositions, grouped by type (e.g., restrictions on 
activities or additional conditions imposed) and coded to the most serious based on 
degree of restrictiveness.  In both cases, the items are measured in dichotomous fashion, 
as shown in Table 1.  The mean levels of these measures indicate that, in the aggregate, 
only a small minority of incidents in the first year of supervision involve revocation 
hearings or jail detention.  They also show that while 75% of the incidents that are 
referred to hearings result in a revocation (or prison return), overall responses to 
violations, not surprisingly, are generally less severe.   
The unit/hearing decision and revocation measures also serve as dependent 
variables in our multivariate analyses of agency response.  The independent variables 
used in those models are defined in Table 1.  These variables represent a combination of 
sanction grid elements and other control variables likely to play a role in explaining 
variation in response patterns.  Offender risk refers to the static risk assessment score 
described above, collapsed in order to conform to the risk categories considered on the 
grid.  Sex offenders are defined as a separate risk category across all analyses regardless 
of their static risk score.  This is because responses to violations among sex offenders are 
decided by policy on an individual basis, they are generally under more intensive 
supervision, and the length of their supervision is substantially longer than among non-
sex offenders.
8  The ordinal measurement of violation severity is also consistent with the 
policy language, such that “major” violations (discussed above) refer to behavior subject 
to presumptive custody hearings and not necessarily guided by progressive sanctioning.  
Detailed violation behaviors were collapsed according to policy definitions (outlined in 
Figure 1) and coded to the most serious category in the case of incidents with multiple 
violations.  The cumulative violation rate is a dynamic variable, defined as the total 
number of violations divided by months at risk as of the date of the current incident, and 
serves as a standardized measure of violation history.   
These models also include several background attributes.  Felony category is an 
ordinal measure of offense severity, with five levels ranging from life sentences to the 
least serious fifth-degree offenses.  The life and first degree felonies have been combined 
and the values reverse-coded, such that higher values correspond with more serious 
 
8 Formal classification of sex offenders is determined by a combination of their Static 99 risk score and 
static RAP score.   
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Figure 4. Revocation Outcome at Hearing*
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Figure 5. Location of Hearing: In-Custody*
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Figure 3. Organizational Response: Revocation 
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offenses.  Parole eligibility refers to an offender’s sentence structure, coded as 1 for 
discretionary parole releases serving indeterminate terms under the pre-SB2 legal code.
9 
Region is a categorical variable denoting the geographically-based administrative unit in 
which the offender is initially placed at the start of supervision and is included to test for 
regional differences in policy implementation.   Finally, the sex and race (white/non-
white) are treated as dummy controls, while age is measured continuously as age at start 
of supervision.   
 
Results: Implementation Analysis 
 
  We begin by examining simple bivariate relationships between group status and 
those outcomes that are central to evaluating the main procedural and administrative 
objectives of the violation policy.  More selective use of revocation, increased use of 
graduated responses, and more structured sanctioning based on risk among the PS sample 
would all be consistent with effective implementation.  Significant differences on these 
measures are determined on the basis of chi square test statistics.   
The results in Figures 3 and 4 show pronounced and significant differences in 
revocation hearing patterns before and after the start of the violation policy.  APA 
officers pursue hearings for PS offenders in the first year of supervision at a rate less than 
half that for the comparison group (8% vs. 19%), reflecting greater reliance overall on 
local unit-level sanctions in the post-reform period.
10  On the other hand, the rate of 
revocations (or return to prison sanctions, in the case of PRC) imposed at violation 
hearings is substantially higher for the PS group, approaching 90% compared to less than 
70% for the pre-guidelines sample.  Hearings are also significantly more likely to be held 
in custody settings now than before (Figure 5), reversing a recent upward trend in the use 
of non-custody locations.   
All of these findings are strongly consistent with major objectives of the sanctions 
policy.  They point to higher return rates among an increasingly smaller core of higher 
risk offenders who are more likely to be eventually referred to a custody hearing.  This 
trend is strikingly evident in comparisons of administrative data on the composition of 
the entire returned violator population in FY 2005 and FY 2007, which indicate a 26 
point reduction during this period in the overall percentage of returns who are low-risk 
non-sex offenders (not shown).  Further, as shown in Figure 6, use of pre-hearing jail 
holds is also down significantly, again consistent with policy guidance away from 
reliance on detention and in-custody hearings unless otherwise dictated by the severity of 
the violation behavior.
11  In sum, the process-level findings in Figures 3-6 point to a more 
structured and efficient use of costly, punitive resources under the current system, 
preserving those penalties as back-end options for higher risk offenders or those who 
pose the most immediate risk to public safety.   
                                                 
9 A small number of SB2 offenders serving combined flat and indeterminate sentences are included in this 
category.   
10 These numbers include hearings pursued by officers even when a hearing is not actually held, such as in 
the case of subsequent absconding.  
11 In other analyses of the composition of incidents involving jail detention (not shown), holds are less 
associated with offender risk among the PS group, reflecting the shift toward use of current violation 
behavior as the main determining factor in placing a hold order, as dictated by the new policy.   
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While the policy and grid explicitly govern level of organizational response, 
general guidance on the nature of the sanction to impose is less structured.  Officers are, 
however, directed to consider the offender’s risk, case history and location on the grid in 
deciding how to respond, even at the unit level.  Figures 7-14 shift the focus to a broader 
study of sanction and response patterns beyond those that pertain only to violation 
hearings and major decision points.  In doing so, we assess the effectiveness of the policy 
in shaping the progressiveness of sanction severity and increasing the congruence 
between specific sanctions and offender profiles.  The results are organized around the 
most serious sanction imposed for each violation-incident, again treating incidents as the 
unit of analysis.  In this section and elsewhere, we use a sanctioning continuum 
constructed by collapsing detailed sanction codes into the following categories, listed in 
decreasing order of restrictiveness: revocation, halfway house placement, increased 
restrictions/conditions on supervision, programming/treatment, formal reprimands and 
informal warnings.  Criminal behavior handled solely through court proceedings with no 
APA response is grouped separately and excluded from most of the analysis below.   
Figure 7 shows group differences in the level of revocation outcomes among all 
incidents involving APA sanctions.  Not surprisingly, revocation rates are significantly 
lower in the aggregate among the PS sample, consistent with the sharp reduction in 
violation hearings described above.  Although rates are also relatively low in the 
comparison group (below 20%), interesting and significant findings emerge after 
controlling for risk, as shown in Figures 8 and 9.  Figure 9 shows a marked linear 
relationship between risk and rate of revocation among PS offenders, with significantly 
greater concentration in the high risk and sex offender categories.  The differences by risk 
category in the comparison group are non-significant.  While not definitive, these initial 
findings suggest that risk has now become a guiding factor in determining how agency 
responses to violations are fashioned, ultimately affecting revocation decisions.   
Figure 7. Most Serious Sanction: Revocation/Return to 
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Figure 8. Revocation/Return by Risk Level: Pre Guidelines 
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Figure 9. Revocation/Return by Risk Level: Post Guidelines 
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On the other hand, the results are more mixed in Figures 10-12, which present 
differences in the rates of middle-range sanctions imposed, again controlling for risk.  In 
Figure 10, we consider the use of programming/treatment as the most serious sanction 
imposed, either alone or in combination with other restrictions on supervision.
12 There is 
a higher reliance on programming sanctions in the aggregate among the PS sample, as 
expected under a more community-oriented approach, though the difference is not 
statistically significant.  As shown in Figure 11, however, significant differences by risk 
do emerge in the post-grid period, similar to the results above on revocation outcomes, 
indicating an increased use of unit-level sanctions for lower-risk offenders.  In Figure 12, 
we present data on halfway house sanctioning, which has traditionally been an attractive 
community-based alternative to incarceration offering both rehabilitative and punitive 
appeal.  The patterns reveal an overall higher reliance on halfway house referrals in the 
post-grid period, especially among sex offenders, but significant risk-based differences 
emerge only among the comparison group.  Although there are now more halfway house 
opportunities available for sex offenders, the growing use on this option for the lowest 
risk offenders is seemingly counter to the risk principle and should be further considered 
for its effectiveness as a sanction for that group.  One likely explanation is that the grid 
encourages officers to exhaust all possible community-based alternatives prior to seeking 
a hearing or imposing revocation, without regard to an offender’s compatibility with 
more intensive services.    
 
Figure 10. Most Serious Sanction: 
Programming/Treatment (alone or with other 
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12 In this case, programming and restrictions are treated as comparable in terms of severity.  Informal 
warnings and reprimands may also have been imposed in combination with programming.   
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The findings from Figures 7-12 are presented in detail in an alternative format in 
Appendix 2, in which the distribution of all incidents is shown by sanction category 
(including those with local prosecution only), controlling for both offender risk and 
violation severity.  This table presents additional detail by type, including sanctioning 
rates among pure programming and restriction categories.  The pre and post grid totals at 
the bottom clearly demonstrate the shift away from using revocation toward increased use 
of programming and restrictions in combination.
13 This is true in general, but especially 
so at the medium risk level, suggesting a growing preference for heavy use of mixed 
sanctioning and increased conditions among offenders who were previously being 
revoked at much higher levels.  In our recidivism analysis below, we explore the relative 
efficacy of these various sanction responses over time.  Finally, the results in Appendix 2 
show a clear upward, progressive pattern by risk in the likelihood of a technical return 
among high severity violators in the post grid sample.  By contrast, there are only trivial 
differences by risk category in the revocation rates among serious violators in the 
comparison group.   
The final set of cross-tabular results is summarized in a series of bar chart 
comparisons in Figure 13.  The results from the top half are presented in greater detail in 
Appendix 3.  The purpose in both sets of charts is to evaluate the central operational 
objectives of the sanction grid itself: first, to implement a system by which rule violations 
are treated in a progressively more serious manner; and second, to provide alternative, 
front-end community treatment options for higher risk offenders.  In assessing these 
policy objectives, violation hearing and program sanction rates are both shown by risk 
level, controlling for violation severity, incident number and pre/post guidelines status.  
Bar charts are used in order to facilitate comparisons across the two samples in the rates 
of program/treatment sanctioning and hearing referrals (as opposed to unit level 
sanctions), the main decisional point addressed on the sanction grid.
14 For each cross-
tabulation we present the rates across the first, third and fifth (or higher) incidents during 
the first year of supervision.  Unfortunately, sample design limitations and restrictions in 
the length of our follow-up period preclude more detailed analyses of in and out-of-
custody hearing options, for which guidance is available at only the highest incident 
levels on the grid.  For the same reasons, all incidents beyond the fifth are combined into 
a single category for purposes of this analysis.
15  While this limits the generalizability to 
the initial period of supervision, there is still sufficient variation in our data to assess our 
basic questions concerning progressiveness of response.   
The rates of both outcomes are shown along the vertical axes of the charts in 
Figure 13.  Differences in the rates at each risk level are reported for both the pre and 
post grid samples, controlling for violation severity and incident number.  In the top half 
of the figure, the charts show pronounced sample differences across all risk categories in 
both the levels of hearing rates and progressiveness of response, especially for medium 
                                                 
13 The overall rates for the combination category are lower in this table than reported in Figure 10 because 
they are based on use of both responses together.  Figure 10 shows programming rates alone or with 
restrictions.   
14 In the violation hearing rate analysis, Parole Board Summonses are combined with unit sanctions, since 
that option is used so infrequently.  The rate of program sanctions imposed refers to the rate at which at 
least one such sanction is imposed, regardless of other sanctions.   
15 See Appendix 3 for cell counts and distributions of violation hearings for each incident up through the 
sixth or higher.  This table also presents response patterns for sex offenders.   
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and high risk offenders.  The PS cohort exhibits considerably lower hearing rates in 
nearly every area of the grid.  Further, as incidents accumulate, there is a remarkable, 
monotonic progression in the likelihood of a hearing for higher-risk PS offenders who 
commit high-severity violations.  This is in contrast to hearings pursued among pre-grid 
offenders, for whom there is much less differentiation by offender risk.  For example, 
among high-risk offenders, the likelihood of a revocation hearing at the time of the first  
 
Figure 11. Programming/Restrictions by Risk Level: Pre/Post 
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Figure 12. Halfway House Sanctions by Risk Level: Pre/Post 
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incident is less than five percent for the PS group.  These numbers then increase to 20% 
at the third incident and 30% at the fifth or higher incident.  The corresponding rates for 
the comparison group are 20%, 50%, and 44%.  The data show almost no instances of 
non-compliance with the policy among the low-severity violation categories.  
  Considering the bottom half of Figure 13, the results within each risk level show 
comparable rates overall of program sanctions imposed, but noticeable differences across 
incident number.  Among high risk offenders, program referral rates at the time of the 
first incident are much lower for both low and high severity violations in the PS cohort, 
reflecting a more graduated use of lower-level responses in the earlier stages of 
supervision.  After the initial incident, however, there is a relatively elevated and 
sustained use of these interventions under the sanction grid (in many cases along with 
other restrictive sanctions, as shown in the aggregate counts in Appendix 2) in the high 
severity category of all risk levels.  At the 5
th and higher incidents, for example, high-
risk/high-severity progressive sanction offenders experience program sanction rates at 
more than double the rate of their pre-grid counterparts.  These findings on organizational 
and specific sanction responses in Figure 13, along with the more detailed results in 
Appendix 3, provide strong evidence of effective implementation on these very basic 
objectives of the violation policy.  
Our final set of analyses assessing implementation effectiveness is presented in 
Tables 2 and 3, in which the relationships discussed so far are summarized in a series of 
multivariate logistic regression models.  The purpose is twofold: first, to examine the 
overall net impact of the sanction guidelines on key policy outcomes; and second, to test 
for any differential effects of formal decision criteria on those outcomes before and after 
introduction of the policy.  An increase in the importance of the basic elements of the 
  22
 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
  23
                                                
sanction grid in shaping decisions across samples would provide additional evidence in 
support of effective implementation.   
Starting with Table 2, we consider the relative impact of formal policy criteria on 
the decision to pursue a violation hearing, extending the cross-tabular analysis described 
in Figure 13.  The models exclude sex offenders, incidents involving major violations, 
and incidents with no APA response because we are interested at this stage only in 
responses that are guided formally by the sanction grid.  In the first model based on the 
combined pre and post-grid samples, we specify violation hearing responses as a function 
of the decision criteria and “treatment” effect (i.e., policy intervention), measured 
through a dummy variable coded as 1 to indicate PS group status.  The results indicate a 
strong and significant negative effect of the policy reform, controlling for offender risk, 
incident number and current violation severity.  The odds of pursuing a revocation 
hearing are nearly 80% lower for violation incidents involving PS offenders compared to 
those among the pre-grid comparison sample.  This is consistent with the bivariate effect 
shown in Figure 3 reflecting the policy mandate to seek local, non-confinement 
alternatives to violation behavior in the early phases of supervision.   
This initial model also reveals strongly significant effects among the other 
variables, confirming the central role of the formal structural elements of the sanction 
grid in determining level of organizational response.  But how does the impact of these 
factors vary by treatment and comparison group status?  We consider this question in the 
second and third models of Table 2, in which the equations are run separately for each 
sample.  Contrary to expectations, the magnitude of the effects is only slightly larger 
among the PS sample, with differences between the coefficients across models failing to 
achieve statistical significance.  This is partly due to general continuity in the importance 
of these criteria over time in guiding this decision, especially with regard to the 
overriding concern of public safety, as reflected in the effect size of the violation severity 
variable in both cases.  On the other hand, the one-year follow up period and the 
exclusion of major violations clearly limits the statistical variation in decision outcomes 
that would increase as offenders progress through the sanction grid.  These study design 
limitations potentially dilute the interactive effects of the sanction criteria that are 
modeled in Table 2.   
Table 3 extends the incident-level multivariate analysis of implementation 
effectiveness to revocation/prison sanction outcomes.  Following our earlier strategy, we 
expand the focus beyond the explicit procedural aspects of the grid itself to a more 
general examination of dispositional outcomes.  As in Table 2, the main analytical 
concerns are in assessing the main effects of the sanction guidelines (net of controls), and 
to test the extent to which sanctioning criteria vary in their effects before and after 
reforms.  The models in Table 3 are based on all cases, including sex offenders and the 
most serious violators, in order to maximize variation in the outcome and generalize the 
results on revocation patterns to the broader population of offenders sanctioned by the 
APA.  They are also specified using a limited set of offender background characteristics 
that serve, with minor changes, as a set of standard control variables throughout our 
recidivism analyses below.
16  
 
 
16 The selection of the controls and their role in the case matching procedures and model development 
process are discussed in greater detail in sections that follow.   
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Figure 13. Violation Hearing and Program Sanction Rates, by Incident Number, Offender Risk and Violation Severity 
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Table 2. Logistic Regression Analysis of Sanction Grid Criteria and Decision to Pursue Revocation Hearing 
 BE x p ( B ) B E x p ( B ) B E x p ( B )
Violation Severity
  High 2.696 14.815 *** 2.669 14.431 *** 2.735 15.406 ***
  Low (reference)
Incident Number 0.334 1.397 *** 0.295 1.343 *** 0.401 1.493 ***
Offender Risk
   High 0.948 2.580 *** 0.794 2.213 ** 1.318 3.736 **
   Medium 0.840 2.316 *** 0.663 1.941 * 1.245 3.472 **
   Low (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample -1.512 0.220 ***
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Nagelkerke R Square 0.338 0.317 0.258
Model chi-square 318.101 *** 168.994 *** 87.268 ***
-2LL 912.504 589.396 320.995
Note: Excludes sex offenders and major violations not considered by grid. 
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.
Full Sample (N=1,566) Pre-Guidelines (N=749) Post-Guidelines (N=817)
2
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Since revocation actions are embedded as an end-point within the initial decision 
to pursue a hearing (addressed in Table 2), the two outcomes are highly correlated and 
are thus jointly dependent on some of the same explanatory factors.  Nonetheless, the 
study of incident-level revocations is still compelling because of the discretionary 
judgment employed by hearing officers at this stage of the sanctioning process.  The 
results in Table 3 from the first model based on the combined sample indicate that PS 
offenders are about half as likely to be revoked when sanctioned, net of background 
controls and basic sanctioning criteria.  The effect is strongly significant and, not 
surprisingly, consistent with the negative guidelines effect on hearing decisions reported 
in Table 2, reflecting the fact that fewer offenders are at risk for revocation under a policy 
aimed at a more selective use of revocation hearings.  The controls are mostly non-
significant, with the exception of parole release and the isolated regional effect.  The 
Mansfield regional effect is likely reflecting the elevated use of technical returns 
associated with local reentry court activities, while the parole effect indicates the reduced 
likelihood of return characteristic of longer-term discretionary parole inmates whose 
release rates temporarily surged in FY 2004.  
Results from the full-sample model also confirm the importance of objective 
decisional criteria in explaining revocation sanctions, including the cumulative violation 
rate.  Interpreting the odds ratio, unit increases in the rate per month increase the odds of 
reincarceration by 16%.  We include this measure to control for possible sample 
differences in overall violation behavior, but also to assess whether this additional aspect 
of an offender’s overall profile is more predictive of responses under the new policy 
guidelines.  Indeed, as shown in the split sample models of Table 3, both the violation 
rate and higher risk categories have significant positive effects on revocation after 
implementation but not before.  And although violation severity is significant in both 
models, committing a major violation under the new policy substantially increases the 
odds of revocation, since those violations are now subject to a presumptive hearing.   
These results, taken in the context of the findings from Table 2, point to a new 
sanctioning system under which reliance on the most severe sanctioning resources is 
limited and increasingly reserved for the more chronic and serious, higher-risk offenders 
under supervision.  While there is also evidence of graduated sanctioning in the pre-
guidelines period, the results from Table 3 suggest that the risk-based criteria used to 
justify a revocation recommendation at the time of case staffing are sharpened and 
extended to the dispositional stage, ultimately helping to guide revocation decisions.  It 
should be noted that in separate cross-tabular analyses restricted only to incidents 
involving hearings (see Appendix 4), we found essentially the same pre/post sample 
differences in the relationships between revocation outcomes and the categorical 
measures in Table 3, suggesting that the findings reported here are not simply an artifact 
of referring more of those offenders to a hearing in the first place.   
In sum, the multivariate findings presented in Tables 2 and 3 are largely 
consistent with the simple pre/post differences on the core process measures reported 
earlier.  Together they provide substantial quantitative evidence of an effectively 
implemented system that exhibits strong regional uniformity, structured decision-making 
capacity, and improved resource management, all consistent with administrative 
objectives.  But once implemented, do these systems enhance prisoner reentry?  In the 
sections below, we shift attention to our second set of major research questions, 
addressing the role of progressive sanctions in influencing offender recidivism outcomes.
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Table 3. Logistic Regression Analysis of Incident-Level Revocation Outcomes 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Sex
  Male 0.269 1.308 0.325 1.384 0.153 1.166
  Female (reference)
Race
  Non-white -0.261 0.770 ^ -0.356 0.700 ^ -0.104 0.901
  White (reference)
Age at Release -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 0.999 -0.022 0.978
Felony Level of Committing Offense 0.017 1.018 -0.019 0.981 0.074 1.077
Parole Release
  Parole Release -0.873 0.418 *** -1.112 0.329 *** -0.365 0.694
  Post Release Control (reference)
Parole Region
  Akron -0.007 0.994 -0.150 0.860 0.133 1.143
  Cincinnati -0.153 0.858 -0.184 0.832 -0.285 0.752
  Columbus 0.172 1.188 0.450 1.568 -0.257 0.773
  Lima 0.224 1.251 0.558 1.747 -0.100 0.905
  Mansfield 0.796 2.218 ** 0.764 2.147 * 0.669 1.952
  Chillicothe 0.206 1.229 0.536 1.709 -0.099 0.905
  Cleveland (reference)
Violation Severity
  Major 3.932 51.005 *** 3.616 37.193 *** 4.399 81.346 ***
  High 2.807 16.556 *** 2.752 15.671 *** 3.018 20.446 ***
  Low (reference)
Violation Rate 0.152 1.164 ** 0.117 1.124 0.195 1.215 **
Offender Risk
   Sex Offender 0.719 2.053 ** 0.012 1.012 1.412 4.103 ***
   High (non-sex offender) 0.883 2.418 *** 0.539 1.715 1.203 3.331 **
   Medium (non-sex offender) 0.451 1.570 * 0.312 1.367 0.659 1.933 ^
   Low (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample -0.725 0.484 ***
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Nagelkerke R Square 0.292 0.308 0.300
Model chi-square 337.354 *** 185.201 *** 163.692 ***
-2LL 1184.630 632.687 528.128
*p < .05; ** p < .01; *** p < .001.; p < .10
Full Sample Pre-Guidelines Post-Guidelines
 (N=1,970) (N=938) (N=1,032)
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Analytic Strategy: Offender-Level Recidivism 
 
  Following a discussion of variable definitions and case matching procedures, we 
begin the outcome analysis with a summary of bivariate-level findings on the full range 
of non-compliant behavior, from violations of the rules of supervision to new felony 
behavior.  Group differences on several supervision outcome measures are presented and 
situated within recent data on ODRC recidivism trends.  We address our questions 
relating to supervision outcomes primarily through multivariate event history methods, 
first by estimating a series of Cox regression models, then by switching to analyses based 
on discrete-time logistic regression techniques.  We use these methods, which are 
detailed further below, because they are well suited to studying durational outcomes and 
have become a standard quantitative approach in recidivism research.  The main focus 
throughout is on felony reoffending, modeled using offender-level records with sufficient 
detail on the timing of failure and various supervision activities to support these statistical 
techniques.  Our basic analytical approach is to first assess the independent role of the 
sanction guidelines on serious offending in the full matched sample, controlling for 
violation, background and socio-demographic characteristics as in the incident-level 
regression models above.  Again, the impact of the intervention is measured through 
dummy effect coding, an approach common in system-wide policy evaluation studies 
(e.g., Harrell, Mitchell, Merrill, and Marlowe, 2003) and sentencing reform research 
(e.g.,  Koons-Witt, 2002: Griffin and Wooldredge, 2006). This will allow us to establish 
whether group differences persist beyond the bivariate level.   
We then extend these baseline analyses to consider whether progressive 
sanctioning exerts a moderating force on technical violations and offender risk, factors 
we expect will show strong main effects on supervision failure.  Next, we consider the 
relative efficacy of punitive and rehabilitative responses in reducing risk of re-offending 
in an analysis of offenders who commit violations early in supervision, with an emphasis 
on high-risk offenders.  Finally, in order to more fully explore the dynamics of agency 
response and intervention, we consider the role of several time-dependent predictors of 
recidivism through a set of discrete-time event history models.      
 
Measures Used in Offender Recidivism Analysis 
 
  The independent variables used in the case matching procedure, and then later 
throughout our recidivism analysis, are shown in Table 4.  The operational definitions are 
the same as shown in Table 1 for those variables also included in the incident-level 
models above.
17  Mean levels on these and other items are presented from the unmatched 
samples in Table 4 to show the extent to which they are significantly different.
18  In 
                                                 
17 In the Cox regressions, the violation rate is treated as fixed, defined as the total number per month of 
non-felony or non-major violations committed up through the incident preceding the failure event or until 
the end of supervision (for censored observations).  
18 We eliminated from the analysis a small number of cases for which source documents were not 
available, yielding an unmatched sample size of 1,963, after additional exclusion of cases with outlying 
violation behavior. 
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addition to the demographic and offense characteristics, we also checked for control 
group equivalency on employment status, education and residential instability.  The 
employment variable is coded as 1 if the offender had no documented episodes of part or 
full-time work (including self-employment), even if only for part of the follow-up period.  
We are thus concerned only with the overall effects of chronic unemployment, since 
precise job start and end dates were unavailable in a substantial number of cases.   
Education and residential instability are also measured as dichotomous dummy variables.  
Education is coded 1 for offenders with a GED or diploma at the start of supervision 
(including attainment while incarcerated).  The residence measure is constructed by 
collapsing the distribution of instability (number of non-residential programming moves 
per month) into high and low categories.  The recidivism models use the same four-
category risk scheme, but sample differences are shown by both category and total score.   
  A comparison of the mean values on these items shown in Table 4 reveals that the 
groups are significantly different on five key variables likely to be related to offender 
outcomes.  Specifically, post-guideline offenders are better educated but have more 
residential instability, are much less likely to have been paroled, are generally less violent 
with shorter incarcerations, and pose less of a risk for reoffending.  We therefore used a 
retrospective propensity score matching procedure in order to correct for these 
differences and reduce sample heterogeneity.  Propensity score methods are a well- 
documented approach to minimizing pre-existing treatment and comparison group 
differences that have the potential to bias estimates of observed treatment effects.  Since 
the pre/post groups have been shown above to be significantly different on key covariates 
of reoffending, attributing any observed improvement in offender outcomes to the effects 
of progressive sanctioning is confounded by such differences, especially with regard to 
risk.    
Following conventional methods, we applied this procedure by first estimating a 
predictive model of treatment group selection, which yields a predicted probability, or 
propensity score, to be used in the subsequent matching analysis.  The model was 
estimated in a highly parsimonious fashion, specifying group selection as a function of 
age, discretionary parole release, felony level of the committing offense, and assessed  
risk (not shown).  These particular variables were selected because they are considered 
most relevant to explaining recent compositional changes in Ohio prison release 
populations.
19  A final best-fitting model was selected that omitted the non-significant 
effects of felony level.  To compensate for any specification error in the propensity 
model, we retain statistical controls throughout the analyses below to further adjust for 
remaining heterogeneity.   
 
19 Education was not used in the analysis due to substantial levels of missing data.   
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Table 4. Descrip
Variable Nam Post
Socio-Demo
Sex   .800
Race* .481
Age 35.1
Employm .284
Educatio
Residential
Parole Region:
Akron .154
Cincinna .234
Columbus .142
Lima .093
Mansfield .067
Chillicoth .086
Cleveland (r .223
Offense Ch
Felony Categor 3.15
Parole-Eli
Offende
  Low (re .362
  Medium .348
  High .109
  Sex Off .181
Total Risk .820
*p ≤ .05; 
tive Statistics and Definitions of Variables used in Offender-Level Outcome Analyses (Unmatched Pre and Post Guidelines Samples; N=1,963)
e Definition Pre
graphic Covariates:
1=male; 0=female  0.821 0
1=non-white; 0=white 0.526 0
Age (in  years) at start of supervision 35.2
ent Status 1=no indication of employment (full or part time during follow-up period); 0=at least some employment 0.302 0
n*** 1=GED/high school diploma or higher; 0=other 0.522 0.610
 Instability*** 1=high rate of change in residence; 0=low rate or no change in residence 0.145 0.211
Parole region at start of supervision
0.142 0
ti 0.199 0
0.138 0
0.114 0
0.092 0
e 0.079 0
eference) 0.234 0
aracteristics:
y of Commitment Offense* Felony category: F1/life sentence to F5 (coded in reverse order of seriousness) 3.29
gible Sentence*** 1=Released on discretionary parole; 0=Released on post release control 0.376 0.194
r Risk:*** Reentry Accountability Plan Static Risk Score (categorized according to sanction grid levels)
ference) 0.326 0
0.322 0
0.178 0
ender 0.174 0
 Score*** Total risk score (0-8) 3.190 2
** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
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Cases were paired based on the computed propensity score using a conventional 
matching algorithm that employs “nearest-neighbor” matching without replacement, such 
that treatment cases are matched to comparison cases in descending order on the basis of 
highest score (Painter, 2004).  Once matched, those cases are then unavailable for 
subsequent matching.  Following King et al. (2007), we used a caliper restriction of .01 
propensity units to limit selection of cases to only those pairs with closely matching 
propensity scores.  While this significantly restricts the size of our starting samples, it 
increases the rigor of our recidivism analyses.  Subsequent comparisons between the 
matched samples on the characteristics of race, felony, parole eligibility, and offender 
risk revealed only very minor and non-significant differences.  We attempt to minimize 
the effect of remaining significant differences on residential instability through statistical 
controls.  The resulting matched sample of 1,044 (522 in each group) is used throughout 
most of the outcome analyses below.   
 
Results: Offender-Level Recidivism Analyses   
 
  We begin by presenting descriptive data in Table 5 summarizing the full range of 
non-compliant behavior among both groups in the first year of supervision.  The top half 
of the table shows percentage distributions by detailed violation type, categorized by 
violation severity.  The number columns report the sum of individual counts across all 
coded incidents in order to show the overall volume of violation behavior.  The results 
show remarkable similarity in the distribution of violation types, revealing that substance 
abuse and reporting violations are the most frequently occurring forms of non-
compliance in both groups.  High severity and major violations together make up half of 
all documented violation behaviors.  On the other hand, the overall volume of misconduct 
is substantially higher among those supervised under the progressive sanctions policy, 
and PS offenders are less likely to have committed no violations in the first year.  
Separate analyses of the data indicate that these differences are not due to greater levels 
of time at risk.  While it is reasonable to assume that increased case staffing and 
automated record-keeping lead to better documentation of violation activity, the 
similarity in composition by severity level is inconsistent with that explanation.  Instead, 
the results are consistent with differences in means levels of major supervision outcomes 
reported at the bottom of Table 5.  Post-guidelines offenders are less likely to be revoked 
(similar to the incident-level findings above), but they are more likely to be re-
incarcerated on a new felony crime, commit a major violation, have an unsuccessful 
termination from supervision, and commit a new felony.  The differences are moderate 
but significant in the case of re-incarceration, major violations, and termination, and point 
to a broader tendency among the PS sample toward less rule conformity, poorer 
adjustment and increased criminality.   
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Table 5. Detailed
Violation Behav
Major Violations
Felony  - Violent
Felony - Nonviolent
Misdemeanor - W
Threat Behavior
Total
High Severity Vi
Sanction Violatio
Absconding/Fleeing
Association Violati
Parole Board Spec
Programming Viol
Misdemeanor, ex
Total
Low Severity Vi
Change of Residence Vi
Change of Employ
Reporting Violatio
Substance Abuse
Failure to Follow I
Communication w
Curfew Violation
Misdemeanor - T
Total
All Violations (acr
Number of Offenders
Number of Offenders
Key Supervision O
Revocation for Te
Recommision for N
Major Violation B
Successful Term
New Felony Crim
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .0
^p ≤ .10
† Dependent var
ior:  Documented violations (up to 7 violations coded per incident)
 (not addressed by Sanction Grid)
44 2.78% 49 2.38%
97 6.14% 147 7.15%
eapons 15 0.95% 12 0.58%
15 0.95% 17 0.83%
171 10.82% 225 10.94%
olations
n 45 2.85% 75 3.65%
 Supervision 178 11.26% 193 9.38%
on 32 2.02% 31 1.51%
ial Condition 10 0.63% 11 0.53%
ation 131 8.29% 186 9.04%
cept traffic 228 14.42% 311 15.12%
624 39.47% 807 39.23%
olations
olation 91 5.76% 144 7.00%
ment Violation 8 0.51% 6 0.29%
n 252 15.94% 324 15.75%
 Violation 283 17.90% 357 17.36%
nstruction 89 5.63% 123 5.98%
ith Prisoner  10 0.63% 5 0.24%
12 0.76% 13 0.63%
raffic 41 2.59% 53 2.58%
786 49.72% 1025 49.83%
oss all incidents) 1581 2057
 with One or More Violations 330 63.22% 350 67.05%
 with No Violations 192 36.78% 172 32.95%
utcomes:
chnical Violation 1=Any violation behavior during follow-up resulting in revocation/prison return; 0=No revocation/return   10.00% 7.70%
ew Felony Offense 1=Re-incarceration for felony crime committed during follow-up; 0=No re-incarceration 11.50% 16.90% **
ehavior † 1=Arrest for felony crime/documented weapons or threatening behavior; 0=No major violation 22.80% 28.40% *
ination of Supervision 1=Favorable termination/still active at study end with no revocation; 0=Unfavorable/revoked/new felony 63.80% 57.50% *
e (including Absconding) † 1=Arrest for felony crime or declared violator at large; 0=No felony behavior during follow-up period 35.20% 39.70%
1; *** p ≤ .001.
iables used in recidivism models. 
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  The increase in re-incarceration reported here is consistent with administrative 
data on recidivism patterns among all releases, which point to a gradual upward trend in 
recent years in the one-year rate of return for new crimes.  These patterns, and related 
increases in prison intake, are puzzling in light of relatively stable rates of violent crime 
in Ohio during this period.  They are at least partly due to growing imprisonment rates 
among non-violent crimes like absconding, but also to increased net-widening and 
resulting growth in offender populations with longer criminal histories and more 
community failures.  The bivariate differences in the violation and behavioral measures, 
however, point either to a negative policy intervention effect or residual sample 
heterogeneity unresolved through case matching.  We pursue this question below with the 
use of statistical controls in several multivariate models of reoffending.    
We examine two of the supervision outcomes at the bottom of Table 5 in our 
assessment of the impact of progressive sanctions on recidivism: felony reoffending and 
major violation behavior.  These are both dichotomous outcomes, with the felony 
measure coded as 1 if the offender is arrested for committing a new felony crime or has 
absconded and been declared a violator at large.  Absconding from supervision is 
considered a violation of Ohio’s felony escape statute, has been increasingly targeted for 
prosecution, and is the special subject of recently scholarly work (Mayzer, Gray and 
Maxwell, 2004; Schwaner, 1997; Williams, McShane and Dolny, 2000).  The violation 
measure captures misconduct considered to be of the highest severity by the sanctions 
policy, including felony crimes (but not routine, in-state absconding), threat behavior, 
and weapons-related violations.  Thus, both variables are incident-based, behavioral 
measures unbiased by court processes and post-arrest discretionary factors.  They overlap 
in terms of measurement, but also diverge in important conceptual ways.  Felony 
reoffending, in this context, is a broadly cast, statutorily defined measure of criminal 
behavior with important implications for re-incarceration, whereas the violation measure 
is a more policy-based indicator of behaviors that pose the greatest threats to public 
safety.  Together, they offer a more complete picture of recidivism patterns.   
  Tables 6, 7, and 8 present results from a series of Cox proportional hazards 
regression models of reoffending.
20  Cox regression is a common technique used in 
survival analysis to study the factors that determine the timing of an event, and so it is 
well suited to analyses of recidivism and related supervision outcomes.  Specifically, 
these equations model the hazard of the event of interest at time t as a function of an 
unspecified baseline hazard ratio plus a set of covariates.  Cox models, in the present 
context, are appealing since they model the duration of survival on supervision, thus 
accounting both for differential time at risk and censoring of observations for which the 
event does not occur within the follow-up period.  Some SB2 offenders for whom PRC is 
not mandatory are terminated early (less than one year) if compliant with the conditions 
of supervision.  Other offenders may have been revoked prior to more serious offending.  
Both types of cases are treated as censored observations in the models below.   
Cox models are referred to as proportional hazards models because they assume 
that covariate hazards ratios are proportional across time.  We confirmed this assumption  
 
20 Due to limitations in the SPSS Cox regression module, the analyses were conducted without correcting 
for the slight oversampling of female cases.  To check for any potential bias, we estimated comparable 
logistic regression models on both outcomes using a weight variable, which yielded no meaningful 
differences in the substantive results.    
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 6. Co
 B )
Race
  Non-whit 5  
  White (refe
Sex
  Male 4  
  Female (
Age at Re 1 *
Felony L 0 **
Employment
  No Emp ***
  At Least P
Residenti
 High Rat 6
 Low or No
Overall V ***
Criminal Histor
  Sex Offend
  High Ris  
  Medium  
  Low Risk
Sanction Gui
  Post-Gui
  Pre-Guid
Interactio
  Risk x Sanc
Model chi- 8 ***
-2LL 4
*p ≤ .05; ** p 
^p ≤ .10
 †Risk entered as
x Regression Analysis of Felony Reoffending
Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B
e -0.046 0.955 -0.021 0.979 0.093 1.098 -0.016 0.98
rence)
0.252 1.287   0.225 1.252 0.498 1.645 * 0.161 1.17
reference)
lease -0.024 0.976 *** -0.036 0.965 *** -0.024 0.976 * -0.019 0.98
evel of Committing Offense -0.127 0.881 ** -0.114 0.892 ** -0.202 0.818 *** -0.151 0.86
 during Supervision
loyment 0.966 2.628 *** 0.941 2.562 *** 0.960 2.612 *** 1.023 2.782
art-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
al Moves (rate per month)  
e 0.189 1.208 ^ 0.211 1.235 ^ 0.287 1.333 0.145 1.15
 Moves (reference)
iolation Rate (per month) 0.657 1.929 *** 0.648 1.911 *** 0.872 2.391 *** 0.714 2.041
y Risk Score† 0.282 1.326 ***
er 0.433 1.541 *          
k (non Sex Offender) 1.239 3.451 *** 0.779 2.179 *** 0.294 1.342
 Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.987 2.683 ***          
 (reference)
delines 
delines Sample 0.047 1.048   0.456 1.577 ^
elines Sample (reference)
n Term
tion Guidelines -0.091 0.913 ^
square 340.263 *** 338.507 145.742 *** 168.49
4912.589 4900.026 2086.920 2321.74
≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
 total computed score for interaction model.
 Matched Sample (N=1,044)
New Felony Crime
Pre-Guidelines Post-Guidelines
New Felony Crime (Matched Sample, N=1,044)
 
New Felony Crime
 Matched Sample (N=1,044)
3
4
 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
through visual inspection of covariate log minus log plots, which revealed no evidence of 
time dependence.  In each of the regression tables, we report the unstandardized effect on 
the hazard rate as well as the hazard ratio [Exp(B)], similar to the odds ratio in logistic 
regression and interpretable as a measure of effect size.    
  Table 6 presents findings from the matched sample analysis of felony reoffending.  
Time to failure is measured in days from the start of supervision.  Our strategy is to first 
test for evidence of an overall intervention (treatment) effect of the sanctioning policy 
after introducing several other possible sources of recidivism as controls, some of which 
were used in the matching procedure.  In doing so, we attempt to minimize remaining 
sample heterogeneity and thus isolate the guidelines effect.  Our use of controls is 
parsimonious, and the final models, aside from the demographics, exclude variables that 
failed to achieve significance in the initial estimation of felony behavior.  Variables that 
turned out not to be predictive of new crimes include parole release status, early 
substance abuse violations, pre-release security threat group status, offense type, and 
documented needs in the areas of employment and substance abuse.
21 While we examine 
the role of time-dependent covariates in later analyses, residential instability and rule 
violation behavior are treated here as fixed, time-invariant measures so as to capture their 
global effects across the entire supervision period. 
  The results in the first set of columns in Table 6 reveal a weak and non-significant 
sanction guidelines effect, indicating that the policy intervention has no impact on risk of 
felony reoffending in the first year of supervision.  The unfavorable bivariate effect 
reported in Table 5 no longer holds in the full covariate model shown in Table 6.  On the 
one hand, the findings lend no support to the theoretical expectation that progressive 
sanctioning, as applied in the Ohio policy, has a diffuse, generalized effect on reducing 
felony behavior among the entire supervision population, either through deterrence or 
increased perceptions of system fairness or legitimacy.  On the other hand, they also 
discount the notion that reduced reliance on more immediate punitive responses increases 
the risk of failure.  There is no evidence that recent increases in Ohio’s short-term felony 
recommission rates have been exacerbated through the APA’s more selective use of jail 
detention and revocation penalties discussed above.  In fact, in separate baseline 
regressions without controls (not shown), the initially significant and positive effect of 
the guidelines is completely attenuated once felony level, employment and residential 
instability are introduced, all of which are significant and in the expected direction in 
Table 6.  This suggests that the recidivism increases are partly due instead to aggregate 
growth in non-violent releases with chronic employment and housing needs.  
  The next three models in Table 6 address the extent to which the sanction 
guidelines interact with key covariates in their effect on time to failure.  We focus mainly 
on offender risk and violation history since these are now both central in determining 
agency response.  Both factors significantly shorten survival on supervision in the 
combined sample (first model of Table 6), although the impact among sex offenders 
(relative to low risk offenders) is marginal, consistent with other general findings on sex 
offender recidivism (Langan and Levin, 2002: Sample and Bray, 2003; Spivak and 
                                                 
21 Data on marital status at the start of supervision are not available.  Living arrangement was collected, but 
is missing in a substantial number of cases.  The needs assessment variables were constructed on the basis 
of pre-release dynamic domain assessment scores and supervision programming areas documented on case 
planning forms, depending on availability.   
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Damphousse, 2006).  The question here is whether the policy moderates these effects, on 
the assumption that graduated responses enhance supervision outcomes for higher risk 
and less compliant offenders through earlier programmatic interventions and community-
based responses that are less disruptive than confinement.  If a policy that delays 
violation hearings in favor of local sanctions is beneficial for these offenders, then we 
would expect to see significantly reduced effects for the violation rate and offender risk 
variables in the post-guidelines regression model.   
  We test for this by running the Cox regressions separately by sample in order to 
compare the size of the effects before and after the policy.  But as a preliminary step, we 
first model the hazard of reoffending in the combined sample as a function of the same 
covariates, plus a term representing the interaction between the treatment dummy and the 
offender’s ordinal risk score (0-8).  The ordinal score provides more statistical variation 
and allows us to test for the presence of an interaction across the full continuum or risk 
irrespective of classification category.  In the split models, the measure is dichotomized 
into the high and all other risk (including sex offenders) categories in order to isolate 
possible differential effects among those offenders most likely to commit new crimes in 
the first year, as shown in the first model of Table 6.  The two approaches together help 
provide a more comprehensive test of guidelines-based differences by risk.  
  The results across these three models in Table 6 are mixed.  The magnitude of the 
interaction term based on the ordinal score is modest, but in the expected direction, 
indicating that the guidelines do indeed moderate the strong positive relationship between 
risk and reoffending.
22  The effect is only marginally significant, however.  On the other 
hand, the differences by risk revealed in the split-sample models are more pronounced.  
The effect on the hazard of felony reoffending for the high risk category in the 
comparison group is twice that of all other offenders, but is rendered statistically non-
significant under the sanction guidelines.  While there is no direct test of program 
exposure in these models, the finding suggests that early reliance on rehabilitative 
responses for these offenders improves supervision outcomes.  Of course there are many 
other plausible explanations for such a finding over time, including better case 
management, service delivery, or resource availability, all of which may have little or 
nothing to do with changes in sanctioning response.  Further, in alternative models using 
the original four-category risk variable (not shown), the pre-post test difference at the 
high-risk level is substantially attenuated by the increased importance of medium levels 
of risk in increasing felony reoffending in the PS sample.  It may be that the policy has 
resulted in a greater degree of incongruence between programmatic intervention and 
criminogenic need levels, worsening outcomes for middle range offenders and thereby 
diluting its positive impact on the highest risk cases.  We examine more direct evidence 
on the relationship between program involvement and reoffending in additional analyses 
below.   
  In contrast to the moderating effect of the guidelines on risk, the last two models 
in Table 6 indicate that there are no significant differences across samples in the effects 
of technical violations on time until felony reoffending.  The frequency of violations per 
month is predictive of poor outcomes in both cases, irrespective of differences in policy  
 
22 The moderating effect of the sanction guidelines on the hazard ratio for offender risk is interpretable 
through an adjusted hazard ratio, calculated as Exp(.282-.091)=1.210, nine percent less than the main effect 
of risk [Exp(.282)=1.326].  
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Table 7. Cox Regr
 B
Race
  Non-white  
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male *
  Female (
Age at Release **
Felony Level of Co  
Employm
  No Empl ***
  At Least P
Residential M
 High Rat ^
 Low or No M
Overall Violation ***
Criminal History
  Sex Offender
  High Risk *
  Medium Risk  
  Low Risk
Sanction Gu
  Post-Guidel
  Pre-Guidel
Interaction T
  Risk x Sanction 
Model chi ***
-2LL
*p ≤ .05; ** p 
^p ≤ .10
 †Risk entered a  
ession Analysis of Major Violation Behavior
Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
-0.119 0.888 -0.107 0.898 0.015 1.016 -0.074 0.928
0.941 2.562 *** 0.868 2.383 *** 1.238 3.448 *** 0.731 2.077
reference)
-0.025 0.976 ** -0.037 0.963 *** -0.020 0.980 ^ -0.028 0.972
mmitting Offense -0.033 0.968   -0.014 0.986 -0.078 0.925  -0.066 0.936
ent during Supervision
oyment 0.866 2.377 *** 0.838 2.312 *** 0.909 2.482 *** 0.824 2.279
art-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
oves (rate per month)  
e -0.171 0.843   -0.160 0.852 0.154 1.166 -0.389 0.678
oves (reference)
 Rate (per month) 0.534 1.705 *** 0.508 1.662 *** 0.794 2.211 *** 0.512 1.669
 Risk Score† 0.241 1.273 ***
0.185 1.203              
 (non Sex Offender) 1.113 3.044 *** 0.561 1.753 ** 0.446 1.562
 (non Sex Offender) 0.916 2.500 ***          
 (reference)
idelines 
ines Sample 0.162 1.176   0.351 1.420
ines Sample (reference)
erm
Guidelines -0.040 0.961
-square 206.419 *** 205.255 *** 94.833 *** 91.657
3405.776 3400.898 1365.014 1697.498
≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
s total computed score for interaction model.
 Matched Sample (N=1,044)
Major Violation Behavior
Pre-Guidelines Post-Guidelines
Major Violation Behavior (Matched Sample, N=1,044)
 
Major Violation Behavior
 Matched Sample (N=1,044)
3
7
 
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
environments relating to the timing and severity of sanctioning response.  The 
comparable strength of this finding across samples is perhaps not surprising, given the 
wide range of criminogenic needs with which parole violations are correlated (Loza and 
Loza-Fanous, 2000).  In our own data, violation rates are positively correlated with 
employment, substance abuse and attitudinal needs in the post guidelines sample (where 
complete dynamic domain data are available), underscoring the importance of early 
interventions in those cases.  It is also important to note, however, that neither does 
progressive sanctioning appear to worsen outcomes among chronic violators.  The 
implication is similar to that of the non-effects of the overall policy intervention shown in 
the first model of Table 6, in both cases suggesting that more a judicious and 
concentrated use confinement does not necessarily pose unacceptable public safety risks.   
Table 7 extends the analysis conducted in Table 6 using an overlapping, 
alternative measure of recidivism.  We specify an identical set of Cox models predicting 
time to the first incident involving a major violation, defined to include felony behavior 
(but not absconding that is not otherwise eventually prosecuted), weapons-related 
infractions and threatening behavior.  Again, time to failure is measured in days from the 
start of supervision, and terminations and revocations are both treated as censored 
observations, as in Table 6.  The same basic research questions are addressed using the 
same modeling strategy.  For purposes of comparison, the regression models also include 
the same set of covariates used to develop the base model of felony reoffending.   
  The results in the first equation of Table 7 are generally consistent with those of 
Table 6, indicating that the sanction guidelines have no net impact on major violation 
behavior in the combined sample.  The significant bivariate differences reported earlier 
are no longer evident in the multivariate regression.  This finding reinforces the tentative 
conclusion above that supervision under the new reforms neither improves nor worsens 
offender outcomes in the first year.  Similar to Table 6, the results also show that higher 
risk, chronically unemployed, younger offenders and those who commit frequent 
technical violations are all more likely to experience shorter survival on supervision, with 
increased risk of involvement in major violation behavior.  In contrast, the effects of 
gender are strongly significant in Table 7, reflecting a greater propensity among men to 
commit weapons and threat behaviors.  Low level crimes (i.e., felony variable), 
residential instability and sex offender status are all modestly, but significantly related to 
felony reoffending, but not major violations, suggesting that these factors are more 
associated with chronic reporting and residential placement problems that eventually 
result in absconding.   
The results in both tables reveal strong main effects of the technical violation rate 
on recidivism, consistent with past research in this area (Gray et al., 2001; Martin et al., 
2004).  Like the new crime models, there are no significant interactive effects of 
violations on major offending (split models of Table 7), even though the effect size is 
moderately smaller among PS offenders.  The findings in Table 7 also show, however, 
that the guidelines do not significantly alter the effects of offender risk, either by total 
score or among high-risk cases only, in contrast to the results in Table 6.  One possible 
interpretation is that the models of felony reoffending are especially sensitive to the 
inclusion of routine absconding outcomes.  Absconding may have simply become less 
associated with risk over time, possibly because increased interventions among higher 
risk offenders have helped mitigate the criminogenic needs that underlie such behavior.   
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In sum, the results in Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that there is no overall 
intervention effect of the sanction policy, and there is only very limited and mixed 
evidence that the policy exerts a moderating influence on the key determinants of these 
recidivism outcomes.  At the same time, they show that progressive responses to 
violation behavior have not increased recidivism in Ohio in the short term, and that those 
system-wide increases are likely due instead to other compositional changes in release 
cohorts.  But if a policy environment that is more uniform, rehabilitative, and presumably 
fairer does not yield improved supervision outcomes in general, are there any 
circumstances under which this new system is more effective?  In the last set of analyses, 
we examine the effectiveness of alternative forms of agency response, and how that 
varies before and after implementation.   
The results considered so far are based on the entire matched release sample, 
regardless of actual exposure to the sanctioning process due to non-compliance.  Even 
though close to 70% of the sample overall did commit at least one violation during their 
first year of supervision (Table 5), models that are based on the full sample are less 
appropriate as a basis for testing the effectiveness of specific sanctions imposed.  In 
Table 8, we address this question by limiting the focus to offenders who commit high-
severity technical violations in the early stages of supervision.  This alternative strategy 
allows us to compare similarly situated offenders who show early indications of relatively 
serious non-compliance, are likely to become more closely monitored by their parole 
officer, and are at risk for future criminal offending.
23  It also ensures at least some 
degree of involvement in the APA sanctioning process and is thereby likely to provide 
greater statistical variation in terms of response.  We use the sanction grid definition of 
high-severity violations, which includes misdemeanors, program violations, violations of 
previous sanction orders, victim contact, and failure to appear at violation hearings.  The 
dependent variable is felony reoffending, based on the same operational definition used 
in Table 6 that includes absconding.  Absconding is excluded from the high severity 
category to avoid overlapping definitions.  The analysis is based on 229 cases from the 
unmatched sample in which the offender committed at least one high severity violation 
within the first three months of supervision.
24 The unmatched sample is used in order to 
increase the size of cell counts in the split sample models that follow.
25
Table 8 presents the results from a Cox regression analysis of these early 
violators, estimating time until first felony offense as a function of the guidelines effect 
plus a modified set of covariates.  We use the same set of controls used in Tables 6 and 7, 
along with three key measures tapping the effects of sanction response.  The first is a 
weighted index of sanction intensity, defined as the total number of non-programming 
interventions or sanctions imposed (i.e., local unit reprimands, restrictions on 
activities/increased reporting /other conditions, or pre-hearing jail detention, weighed by 
severity) divided by the total number of cumulative violations.  Revocations are not 
 
23 This group has an average violation rate per month (for the entire follow-up period) that is nearly six 
times the rate for offenders with no serious violations in the first three months.   
24 The high-severity violation incident used as a selection filter and the outcome variable (i.e., felony 
reoffending) are thus defined as mutually exclusive events for the purposes of this analysis.  We omitted a 
small number of cases wherein a high-severity violation occurred within the first three months, but 
subsequent to the failure event.   
25 In parallel main effects models run using the matched sample, the results were virtually identical to those 
obtained in Table 8.  
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Table 8. Cox Regression Analysis of Felony Reoffending among Early Violators
 BE x p ( B ) B E x p ( B ) B E x p ( B )
Race
  Non-white 0.251 1.285 0.486 1.626 0.241 1.273
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male -0.030 0.920   -0.312 0.732   0.402 1.495  
  Female (reference)
Age at Release -0.013 0.987  -0.024 0.976   -0.004 0.996  
 
Felony Level of Committing Offense -0.136 0.872  -0.150 0.861   -0.139 0.871  
Employment during Supervision
  No Employment 0.935 2.548 *** 1.240 3.457 *** 0.769 2.157 **
  At Least Part-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
Residential Moves (rate per month)    
 High Rate 0.296 1.344  0.082 1.086   0.410 1.506  
 Low or No Moves (reference)
Overall Violation Rate (per month) 1.762 5.825 *** 2.374 10.737 *** 1.679 5.361 ***
Criminal History Risk Score 
  Sex Offender 0.238 1.269   0.153 1.166   0.262 1.300  
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.304 1.355   0.943 2.568   0.001 1.001  
  Medium Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.735 2.085 ** 0.818 2.265   0.753 2.123 *
  Low Risk (reference)
Non-Programming Sanction Intensity   0.286 1.332 ** 0.174 1.190  0.431 1.539 **
Prior Programming/Treatment Sanction    
  One or More Prior Programming Sanctions -1.013 0.363 *** -0.820 0.440 * -1.001 0.367 **
  None (reference)
Prior Halfway House Referral Sanction
  One or More Prior Referrals -0.641 0.527 * 0.040 1.041   -0.983 0.374 **
  None (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample -0.123 0.884  
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Model chi-square 165.540 ***   92.319 *** 87.894 ***
-2LL 1021.390 305.710 620.606
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10
 
Pre-Guidelines (N=97) Post-Guidelines (N=132)
Offenders with High Severity Violation within First 3 Months (Unmatched Cases)
Full Model (N=229)
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included since those are treated as censored events throughout our analyses.  The variable 
represents a summary measure of the extent to which the aggregate of responses are 
disproportionately punitive or control-oriented relative to the number of technical 
violations.  The other two variables represent the effects of programming and treatment 
interventions imposed as sanctions, measured dichotomously and coded as 1 if a 
programming or halfway house referral sanction was ever imposed.  In all three cases, the 
measures are treated as fixed and simply capture the generalized effects of prior exposure 
to at least one attempt to impose a rehabilitative response to early violation behavior.
26 
The intervention variables do not necessarily reflect instances of successfully completed 
programming, but in combination with the intensity index, they do allow for a 
comparative assessment of treatment versus punitive forms of sanctioning response 
among offenders who are at risk for chronic non-compliance.   
We first consider the results in Table 8 using the same analytic strategy as before, 
examining for evidence of a policy intervention effect independent of controls in a 
combined sample model (first equation).  We are also interested, however, in the relative 
effects of the response measures as part of a more basic test of the effectiveness of 
competing supervision strategies.  These measures are then assessed in the context of the 
sanction guidelines through split-model equations, and finally, in risk-based interaction 
models below (Table 9).  The results show that there is no independent effect of the 
sanction guidelines on risk of reoffending among the early violator subsample, consistent 
with our previous findings from the full sample models in Tables 6 and 7.  Even among 
offenders with earlier and heavier involvement in the sanctioning process, exposure to the 
grid system does not by itself extend survival time on supervision.  Taken together, the 
absence of a main policy effect across Tables 6, 7, and 8 is inconsistent with the notion 
that progressive sanctioning, as implemented in Ohio, has produced a generalized 
deterrent or legitimizing effect that promotes compliance.  It is important to note, 
however, that the study is not designed to test those arguments directly, nor do we have 
perceptual data available from the offender population and so our findings remain 
inconclusive in that regard.  
The analysis does allow for a more definitive assessment of which supervision 
strategies might be most effective under progressive sanctioning.  We begin by 
examining in Table 8 the main effects of three alternative ways of responding to 
violations on the risk of committing a new crime among the early violators in the 
combined pre/post grid sample.  The results reflect novel and interesting findings 
regarding the relative efficacy of punitive and treatment-oriented agency responses to 
violation behavior.  They show significant, mitigating effects of exposure to sanction-
based treatment interventions on the risk of reoffending.  Interpreting the hazard ratios, 
having received one or more programming/treatment sanctions reduces the hazard rate of 
felony reoffending by about 65% among early violators, controlling for other standard 
factors related to parole failure.  Halfway house placement referrals, which involve 
structured programming in a residential setting, reduce the risk by nearly 50%, although 
                                                 
26 All three response variables measure sanctions imposed prior to experiencing the failure event.  For 
censored observations, the measures are based on sanctions imposed over the course of the entire period 
during which offenders are at risk for failure.  The response(s) is not necessarily directly linked to the high 
severity violation used as a filter for case selection and in some cases may have imposed prior to that 
violation.   
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the effect is less significant.  In contrast, there is a significant positive relationship 
between the intensity of restrictive sanctions and reoffending.  Disproportionate increases 
in the use of reprimands, restrictions on activities, and reporting requirements have an 
independent, worsening effect on recidivism in the first year of supervision.   
To our knowledge, the analysis in Table 8 represents the first critical test 
comparing the efficacy of alternative sanction responses that is based on a statewide 
supervision sample and modeled using event history techniques.  Our measure of 
programming sanctions is arguably crude, encompassing a wide range of treatments and 
interventions irrespective of program compliance and completion.  In light of the sanction 
intensity effect, however, this general finding is consistent with research in the reentry 
treatment literature (e.g., National Research Council, 2007; Taxman, 1998; Zhang¸ 
Roberts, and Callanan, 2006; Zhang and Zhang, 2005) and research highlighting the 
relative importance of treatment compared to control and surveillance strategies (Aos, 
Miller and Drake, 2006; Paparozzi and Gendreau, 2005; Petersilia, 1998; Solomon, 2006; 
Taxman, 2002).  Since the analysis is limited to early violators, the results also point to 
the importance of “frontloading” supervision resources, to the extent that the 
interventions shown to be effective here are tied to those violations that occur in the first 
few months out of prison (National Research Council, 2007; Petersilia, 2007).  It may 
also be the case, however, that early violations help prompt a more focused and timely 
effort to deliver services tied to the offender’s supervision plan, independent of sanction-
based programming.   
The treatment effect reflected in the halfway house measure is likely diluted by 
the fact that it is not necessarily a measure of program compliance and includes referrals 
that result in unsuccessful termination.  Further, the effectiveness of these referrals as a 
sanction option is compromised by the potential misalignment of needs and intensive 
services that occurs when halfway houses are treated by officers simply as a convenient 
intermediate confinement option.
27 The smaller effect size of halfway house interventions 
shown in Table 8 is consistent with our incident-level descriptive findings discussed 
above, which suggest that utilization rates have become less correlated with offender risk 
over time.   
The results raise important questions concerning the efficacy of purely punitive 
responses as a general strategy for managing chronic violators who are at risk for 
supervision failure.  The findings are consistent with reviews of research that document 
the ineffectiveness of surveillance-oriented approaches (Aos et al., 2006), and suggest 
that heavy of use of restrictive sanctioning may lead to a downward spiral of non-
compliance by way of increased detection, eventually resulting in more serious criminal 
behavior.  The sanction finding should be qualified, however, in two important respects.  
In models run on the entire sample (as opposed to early violators), sanction intensity 
modestly, but significantly, reduces recidivism, though the effect is not significant in the 
post-guidelines sample (results shown in Appendix 5).
28  The problematic effects of 
                                                 
27 See Lowenkamp and Latessa (2005) for comprehensive findings on the effectiveness of residential 
treatment programs in Ohio, including those having iatrogenic effects.   
28These differences by sample could be due partly to the restricted use of jail detention under the sanction 
grid for those violations most strongly correlated with the dependent variable.  We tested for this possibility 
by removing jail holds from the sanction index and entering it as a separate dummy effect on both the full 
and early violator samples (results shown in Appendices 6 and 7).  This alternative strategy yielded the 
same positive effect of sanction intensity and no independent effect of jail holds among early violators 
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intensity may be limited to chronic violators, and may reflect the ineffectiveness of 
heavier reliance on reprimands and restrictions with that group.  The broader substantive 
importance of the finding is also limited by that fact that we do not test for revocation 
effects on later reoffending, which is not possible under the current design, but should be 
considered as a central subject of future research.
29
The pre/post grid status findings from Table 8 (and in the full sample models in 
Appendix 5) reveal interesting differences in how the effects of sanction type differ by 
guidelines status.  The coefficients for sanction intensity (positive), treatment (negative) 
and halfway house referrals (negative) are all strongly significant among the post-
guidelines group.  Prior programming is also important for pre-grid offenders (with 
reduced magnitude), but the other two response measures are not.  Thus, the new 
sanctions policy appears to have enhanced the effectiveness of community services in 
general for offenders with more chronic patterns of non-compliance.   
But do these effects hold equally among all risk levels?  Table 9 extends the 
recidivism analysis of early violators to determine whether the findings on agency 
response reported in Table 8 vary by offender risk, and if so, whether those differences 
are moderated further by the new sanction guidelines.  We test for these differences first 
with an interaction effects models based on the combined sample, then by splitting the 
models by pre/post guidelines status and estimating separate equations.  Each model 
contains two risk-based interaction terms, one for sanction intensity and the other for 
programming.  Interaction terms for halfway house sanctions are not included because of 
collinearity and small sample counts.  These models include all of the controls shown in 
Table 8, though we report coefficients and hazard ratios only for the interaction effects 
and their constituent terms.  We use a dichotomized version of risk (as in the split models 
of Tables 6 and 7), focusing on the interaction effects by high risk status, since those 
offenders are the ones usually targeted for intensive interventions, spend the longest time 
under supervision, and are the costliest to supervise.   
  Considering the full model in the first column of Table 9, the results show that 
sanction intensity significantly reduces the hazard of reoffending among high-risk early 
violators, but not prior programming.  While the small sample count yields only marginal 
significance, the sanction effect is substantively compelling, indicating that unit increases 
in the intensity index reduce the risk of reoffending among high risk violators by about 
13% (adjusted hazard ratio).  Considered in light of the unfavorable main effect in Table 
8, the findings suggest important differences in the efficacy of punitive sanctions by risk, 
and that lower risk parolees who pose minimal public safety risks are perhaps best 
managed through an expanded reliance on administrative review.   
With regard to programming responses, differences do emerge by risk and 
become robust once the models are split by sanction grid status.  Among PS offenders, 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Appendix 7).  In the full models split by sample, however, jail holds reduce the risk of reoffending, with a 
slightly stronger effect among the pre-guidelines groups (Appendix 6).  It is also possible that the results 
are an artifact of case censoring in the Cox model, to the extent that punitive sanction intensity is more 
strongly associated with early revocation.  We obtained substantively similar results on the early violator 
sample, however, in Cox models that omitted those cases.  We also ran comparable logistic regression 
models that yielded similarly strong effects of programming but non-significant effects of sanction intensity 
and halfway house referrals. 
29 However, in a major analysis of the BJS 1994 release data, re-released technical violators who served the 
remainder of their sentences had higher rearrest rates than other release groups (Solomon et al. 2005). 
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the interaction effect reported in the last column of Table 9 is strongly significant, 
indicating the high-risk violators (relative to all others) benefit substantially from having 
received at least one prior programming sanction.  The interaction term has no significant 
effect in the comparison group, however.  A similar, but weaker effect emerges with 
regard to punitive sanctions.  These responses have undesirable consequences overall in 
the PS group, but work to reduce the hazard of reoffending at the highest risk levels.   
In contrast to programming, there are no meaningful differences in the magnitude of the 
interactions across the split models, with both coefficients approaching significance at the 
.10 level.
30  Finally, in a three-way interaction term testing the combined effectiveness of 
sanction intensity and prior programming among all PS offenders (not just early 
violators), the effects are pronounced and highly significant at the high-risk level after the 
guidelines, but not before (not presented).
31  Taken together, these results underscore the 
importance of frontloading intervention resources for serious offenders and combining 
those resources with increased restrictions, the effects of which are substantially 
enhanced under a system that formally limits the early use of revocation mostly to 
situations involving public safety risks.   
To facilitate interpretation of the complex of findings in Table 9, we present  
simple descriptive data in Table 10 that show mean levels of felony reoffending for early 
violators and all offenders, by risk and criminogenic need level, before and after 
implementation of the sanction guidelines.  In both panels, the data are based on the 
matched sample, though in this case, the early violator subset is expanded to include high 
severity incidents in the first six months in order to increase statistical variation on the 
needs measure.  High risk offenders are combined with sex offenders.  Since systematic 
and comparable administrative data on assessed needs are not available for the pre-grid 
sample, a proxy measure was constructed by dichotomizing the assessment data 
(asset/low need versus some or high need) where available and supplementing it with a 
measure tapping programming activities noted on the offender’s supervision 
accountability plan or similar case planning documents.  The criminogenic needs 
examined are restricted to employment and substance abuse since these areas both show 
significant bivariate correlations with felony reoffending are more likely to be reliably 
assessed by agency staff.  The measure is coded equal to 1 if a need/activity is indicated 
in both of the employment and substance abuse domains.   
 
30 We discuss the substantive importance of these effects due to especially small sample counts.  In 
additional models not presented, the interaction effect between high risk offenders and the modified 
intensity measure described in the preceding footnote is actually stronger in the post-guidelines model 
(p=.06).  The risk by jail interaction is also negative (i.e., reduced risk of reoffending) and approaches the 
.10 level.   
31 Each unit increase in the sanction intensity scale for high risk offenders with a prior programming 
sanction results in a 54% decrease in the hazard of reoffending.   
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Post-Guidelines (N=132)
  B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Criminal History Risk Score 
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.933 2.543 ^ 0.664 1.942   1.184 3.266 ^
  Non-High Risk (reference)
Non-Programming Sanction Intensity   0.331 1.392 * 0.308 1.361 0.460 1.585 **
Prior Programming/Treatment Sanction  
  One or More Prior Programming Sanctions -0.923 0.397 *** -1.156 0.315 ** -0.588 0.555 ^
  None (reference)
Interaction Terms:
  High Risk x Sanction Intensity -0.466 0.628 ^ -0.603 0.547   -0.521 0.594  
  High Risk x Prior Programming -0.753 0.471   0.958 2.607 -1.723 0.178 **
Model chi-square 160.759 *** 91.084 *** 88.605 ***
-2LL 1024.685 306.487 541.780
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10
Note: Models control for all covariates shown in Table 8. 
 
Full Model (N=229) Pre-Guidelines (N=97)
 
4
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Table 10. Mean Levels of Felony Reoffending, by Risk and Employment/Substance Abuse Needs
Pre-Guidelines Post-Guidelines
Early Violators:
Low/Medium Risk
  Minimal Need  48.3% 64.0%
  Moderate/High Need 51.9% 47.4%
High Risk/Sex Offender 
  Minimal Need  39.1% 40.0%
  Moderate/High Need 57.1% 53.8%
 
All Offenders:
Low/Medium Risk
  Minimal Need  28.4% 33.1%
  Moderate/High Need 36.6% 44.6%
High Risk/Sex Offender 
  Minimal Need  36.6% 32.5%
  Moderate/High Need 48.3% 46.7%
 
Comparing levels before and after, the results reveal moderate, though non-
significant, reductions in one-year recidivism rates that are concentrated among 
(matched) higher risk offenders with high needs.  The offender categories that 
experienced declines are shown in boldface.  In the case of early violators, the higher 
need offenders, regardless of risk, show reductions in new crimes of four to five 
percentage points. The elevated reoffending levels over time among low-need/lower risk 
offenders are suggestive of the iatrogenic effects of heavy sanctioning noted above, 
though the effects are not statistically significant.  Among the entire matched sample, the 
decrease is slightly smaller, but limited to high risk and sex offenders.  This is generally 
consistent with the risk-based interaction findings presented in Table 9, suggesting that 
supervision strategies under the guidelines have been more responsive to those offenders 
who present serious case management challenges.  In separate descriptive analyses in 
which we compare changes in overall sanction-based programming rates (not shown), 
pre/post grid increases in chemical dependency referrals, for example, are greatest in the 
high risk/high substance abuse need population, while sex offenders have experienced the 
biggest increases in the use of halfway house sanctions.   
In order to further explore pre/post grid differences in program/treatment sanction 
responsiveness, Table 11 presents results from Cox regressions of rehabilitative 
sanctioning using the full matched sample.  The dependent variable is time until the first 
program sanction is imposed, regressed on the same set of controls used above, plus the 
main guidelines effect.  The key variable of interest, however, is the same criminogenic 
needs assessment measure considered in Table 10, treated here as a dummy variable and 
coded as 1 if the offender exhibits moderate to high employment and substance abuse 
needs.  The purpose of the analysis is thus to examine differences in the timing of 
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program intervention response (relative to assessed need) before and after 
implementation of the sanction grid.  Using the same modeling strategy as above, 
equations are first shown for the full model and then split by sample status.   
Not surprisingly, results from the initial full model in Table 11 show a strong 
main effect of high-need status on the hazard of receiving a program-based sanction.  
Interpreting the hazard ratio, having greater levels of assessed employment and substance 
abuse needs increases the odds of receiving a program or treatment sanction by about 
57%, net of control variables that include the overall violation rate.  While progressive 
sanction offenders overall do not enjoy earlier sanction-based program interventions (first 
equation), the split models reveal interactive effects of dynamic needs by pre/post grid 
status, showing a significant effect of high needs only among the post-grid sample.  The 
results suggest better agency responsiveness to these needs among offenders supervised 
under the sanction grid.  Overall, the pattern of results in Tables 10 and 11, along with the 
earlier incident-level descriptive data from Figure 13, diverge from findings reported by 
Solomon, Kachnowski and Bhati (2005) and Solomon (2006) that call into question the 
overall effectiveness of parole, especially for more serious offenders.  Instead, they 
suggest that parole supervision can be improved for those groups under sanctioning 
systems that provide graduated monitoring and earlier opportunities for intensive 
treatment services. 
In our final set of multivariate results on offender outcomes, we switch back to an 
analysis of the full sample, continuing with an event history approach but shifting to a 
more dynamic set of predictors that include time-varying covariates.  In Table 12, we 
present results from a broader analysis of felony reoffending using a discrete-time logistic 
regression modeling technique that incorporates both durational outcomes as well as 
discretely measured covariates whose values may vary across the observation period.   
Our data are conducive to this approach because of detail available in the dataset on the 
timing of programming and sanction histories and residential movements.  While the Cox 
regressions above treat these effects as fixed, the models in Table 12 allow values on 
these factors to vary as offenders move in and out of programming, experience bursts of 
violation activity, change living arrangements, and so.  The general purpose, therefore, is 
to extend the earlier analyses by examining how these variations over time might 
contribute to predicting supervision failure and whether the sanction guidelines moderate 
the importance of those factors.   
This analysis follows conventional modeling procedures described by Allison 
(1984) for predicting discrete time hazard rates.  We first transformed the offender-level 
dataset into a “person-period” file, such that each record consists of segmented time 
intervals representing each month of the follow-up period during which an offender is at 
risk of failing (i.e., committing a new felony offense).  The event history for offenders 
who do not experience the failure event and remain on supervision until the study end 
point would be represented through twelve person-month records.  Cases that fail are 
coded as 1 on the reoffending variable for the month in which the outcome event occurs.  
This method accommodates censored cases that leave supervision early by including 
segmented records only for those months at risk.  The dates for the reoffending event 
(which are used to define the continuous time variable in the Cox models), as well as for 
the start and end dates of time dependent covariates, are recoded into dichotomous 
variables to capture changes in status for each monthly observational record.   
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Table 11. Cox Regression Analysis of Rehabilitative Sanctioning 
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Race
  Non-white 0.144 1.155 0.264 1.303 0.065 1.067
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male -0.114 0.892   -0.176 0.838   0.010 1.010  
  Female (reference)
Age at Release -0.017 0.984 ^ -0.019 0.981  -0.016 0.984  
 
Felony Level of Committing Offense -0.034 0.966  0.038 1.039   -0.094 0.911  
Employment during Supervision
  No Employment -0.268 0.765 ^ 0.029 1.029   -0.532 0.588 *
  At Least Part-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
Residential Moves (rate per month)     
 High Rate 0.213 1.237  0.242 1.273   0.143 1.154  
 Low or No Moves (reference)
Overall Violation Rate (per month) 1.291 3.635 *** 1.378 3.966 *** 1.216 3.372 ***
Criminal History Risk Score 
  Sex Offender -0.460 0.631   -0.522 0.594   -0.335 0.715  
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.140 1.151   0.088 1.092   0.268 1.307  
  Medium Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.170 1.185  0.155 1.168   0.208 1.231  
  Low Risk (reference)
Employment/Substance Abuse Needs
  Moderate or High Need 0.450 1.569 ** 0.313 1.368 0.588 1.800 **
  No or Minimal Need (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample 0.107 1.113  
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Model chi-square 247.970 ***   115.022 *** 130.477 ***
-2LL 2656.273 1057.071 1308.42
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10
 
Pre-Guidelines (N=522) Post-Guidelines (N=522) Full Model (N=1,044)
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Table 12. Discrete Time Event History Analysis of Felony Reoffending
  B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Race
  Non-white -0.069 0.933   -0.165 0.848
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male 0.306 1.358     0.124 1.133  
  Female (reference)
Age at Release -0.025 0.975 * -0.020 0.980 ^
Felony Level of Committing Offense -0.125 0.883 * -0.090 0.914  
Employment during Supervision
  No Employment 0.972 2.643 *** 1.042 2.834 ***
  At Least Part-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
Criminal History Risk Score Category
  Sex Offender 0.724 2.063 * 0.325 1.383
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 1.434 4.197 *** 1.172 3.228 ***
  Medium Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.867 2.381 *** 1.105 3.020 ***
  Low Risk (reference)
Time Dependent Covariates:
Cumulative Violation Rate
 High 1.012 2.752 *** 1.008 2.739 ***
 Medium 0.458 1.581 ^ 0.520 1.681 *
 Low (reference)
Substance Abuse Violation
 Violation Committed 0.305 1.356 0.232 1.262
 No Violation (reference)
Residential Move
 Offender Changed Residence 0.456 1.578  -0.075 0.928
 No Change (reference)
Non-Programming Sanction Intensity   
  High -0.129 0.879   -0.037 0.964  
  Low (reference)       
Jail Hold (pending possible violation hearing)
 Offender under Hold Order -0.144 0.866   -0.339 0.713
 No order (reference)
Non-Sanction based Programming/Treatment
 Offender in Programming (excluding halfway house) -0.864 0.422 ** -0.474 0.622 *
 No Programming (reference)
Residential Programming
 Offender in Programming -0.039 0.962 0.077 1.080
 No Programming (reference)
Sanction based Programming/Treatment
 Offender in Programming (excluding halfway house) 0.534 1.706   -1.015 0.363 **
 No Programming (reference)
Nagelkerke R Square 0.131 0.145
Model chi-square 177.318 ***   206.676 ***  
-2LL 1376.205 1466.620
Note: Models include time dummy covariates.  
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
Post-Guidelines
Full Matched Sample (N=9,225)
Pre-Guidelines
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  We then estimate the models by specifying the logit transformation of the hazard 
of reoffending (at time t, given risk at time t) as a function of time, plus a set of both 
fixed and time-dependent covariates.  The independent effects of time are measured 
through a set of dummy variables representing each of the first eleven months of 
observation (see Allison, 1984).  Once the data are arranged in this format, the models are 
simply estimated using logistic regression techniques, with the unstandardized 
coefficients interpretable as the effects on the log odds of reoffending for each unit 
increase in an independent variable.  Although Cox regression is extendable to this 
context, the computation of time segmented variables is cumbersome and the method is 
not recommended for models containing several time dependent covariates (Yaffee and 
Austin, 1994).
32   
  Table 12 presents results from the discrete time models estimated on each sample.  
Unlike in Table 8, these models are based on the full matched sample file in order to 
maximize variation on some of our key covariates of interest.  This file consists of 9,225 
observations after transposing the records as described above.  Initial models run on the 
combined sample revealed no independent effect of the sanction guidelines, consistent 
with earlier findings, so we present only the split models in Table 12. The same basic 
controls are included, plus a set of time dependent variables that tap a mix of violation 
history and response factors.
33 The cumulative violation measure is the same one used in 
Tables 6-9, except that the rate is now categorized and allowed to vary by month of 
observation.  The other violation measure captures in the level of substance abuse history, 
coded as 1 for each month in which at least one substance abuse violation occurred.  
Punitive sanctioning is measured through the sanction index (dichotomized) and a 
dummy code representing months in which an offender was placed under a jail hold order 
(detention pending a hearing or investigation).   
The models also include three rehabilitative-oriented covariates.  Sanction-based 
programming is similar to the measure used above in Tables 6-9, while residential 
programming is similar to the halfway house referral measure, but broader in scope.  The 
residential housing measure taps involvement in any structured residential placement 
setting, including halfway houses and independent housing agencies (offering more 
limited services), and is not necessarily sanction-based.  The third measure, non-sanction 
based programming and treatment, refers to all other interventions and referrals related to 
an offender’s supervision plan, parole board special conditions, or assessed needs.  This 
is also a broadly defined measure that would include interventions ranging from intensive 
treatment to short-term employment assistance.  Importantly, these variables measure 
only compliant/successful involvement in services or attendance at appointments.  They 
are dummy-coded as 1 in each observational record only if the offender ultimately 
completes the program or is still active at the study end point.  We use dummy coding to 
facilitate comparison of effect sizes.  While these measures do not tap the effects of the 
entire treatment experience, they do serve as an acceptable proxy of ongoing compliance 
with program goals.  Finally, all of the time-dependent covariates are entered as lagged 
                                                 
32 Initial results from a base model run on the combined sample that included the same covariates as in the 
main Cox model in Table 6 showed substantively similar effects, confirming the robustness of the method.  
33 The models control for the effects of the time dummies.  The coefficients are not presented since none is 
statistically significant.   
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effects, such that the outcome event is regressed on supervision experiences that occurred 
in the preceding month.  This is a common procedure used in discrete time methods and 
is done to avoid the potential for reverse causation between two variables measured in the 
same segmented time period.   
The results indicate effect sizes among the core set of controls that are very 
similar in both cases to the results reported in the Cox models in Table 6.  Our main 
interest, however, is in assessing the effects of the time-dependent variables and whether 
those effects interact with the sanction guidelines.  The dynamic effects of cumulative 
technical violations are similarly strong for both groups.  High rates of technical 
violations are very important in predicting new felonies, whether treated as fixed effects 
(in the Cox models) or allowed to vary with time.  High rates measured in the preceding 
month of observation increase the odds of recidivism by a factor of almost three.  These 
results suggest that parole officers should be especially sensitive to spikes in the 
concentration of violations since they portend poor outcomes.  There is no evidence, 
however, that the sanction guidelines alter the outcomes of high-rate violators, similar to 
results reported above.  Possible explanations include the possibility that specific 
sanctions imposed under the grid are not sufficiently aligned with risk and need level, 
local resources continue to be unevenly available, or that restrictive sanctions are not 
applied soon enough for high-rate violators who are also of high risk.   
On the other hand, substance abuse violations and residential instability have no 
impact on the risk of committing new crimes in the discrete time analysis.  Months in 
which substance abuse violations occur have no significant (lagged) effect in either 
group.  It is possible that substance abuse plays a more immediate role in supervision 
failure and that our measurement is insensitive to that relationship, though in some of our 
initial multivariate models (not shown) we observed only a very weak and non-significant 
relationship between substance abuse needs and recidivism.  Similarly, although high 
levels of residential mobility help explain supervision failure among early violators 
(Table 8), the effects throughout the study have been weak and inconsistent.  Other 
research has found that instability is predictive of probation revocation (Mayzer et al., 
2004), absconding (Williams et al., 2000) and other lower-level forms of non-compliance 
(Schulenberg, 2007), suggesting that it may have minimal net impact on more serious 
types of felony recommission.  This would be consistent with the weaker effects reported 
in our Cox models of major felony behavior that exclude absconding.   
  Our two measures of punitive response also have no independent, dynamic impact 
on the odds of reoffending in either group.  In contrast to the early violator models in 
Tables 8-9, the direction of the intensity index is negative but the coefficient is not 
significant.  There is no relationship in the short term between increases in the intensity 
of sanctions imposed, when allowed to vary over time, and subsequent criminal behavior.  
Furthermore, temporary jail detention, though necessary and required in many cases for 
investigative and public safety purposes, appears to have no added benefit from a 
deterrence standpoint.  These results thus appear to support current policy guidance that 
discourages discretionary use of hold orders.  However, it is important to recall the 
caveats noted above that complicate the interpretation of jail effects (see footnote 28).  
When jail holds are isolated as a separate variable, they work to strongly reduce 
recidivism in the full matched comparison group sample.  In the post-grid sample, they 
exhibit a smaller effect, but the interactive effect is in the expected direction (i.e., 
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indicating decreased reoffending) for high risk offenders (not presented), suggesting 
again that restrictive and confinement responses may work much better at those levels.  
Additional research is necessary to better understand the circumstances in which 
temporary jail confinement can be most effective as a discretionary sanction, and to allow 
more definitive conclusions about whether effectiveness varies according to offender 
risk.    
  The findings regarding the three treatment measures are more compelling and 
suggestive of the potential for rehabilitative effects under reentry-oriented progressive 
sanctioning.  The measures offer a more nuanced picture of service delivery and allow for 
more precise assessment of the relative importance of non-punitive interventions.  The 
results indicate that successful compliance with services tied mostly to case planning are 
effective in reducing risk of felony reoffending in both groups, though the effect is larger 
and more significant among the comparison group.  While compliant involvement in 
residential programming has no effect, sanction based programming is predictive only 
among the post-guidelines group.  The results are robust, indicating that PS offenders 
who maintain successful involvement in sanction-related interventions experience a 65% 
reduction in the odds of reoffending compared to those who are non-compliant or have no 
sanction-related services at all.  In contrast, there is no significant impact in the 
comparison group.   
  The non-sanction based effects present in both models of Table 12 highlight the 
general rehabilitative benefits of treatment services among all supervised post-prison 
offenders, regardless of sanction policy context.  This is an intuitive finding that is 
broadly consistent with the community based treatment literature and substantiated by it’s 
presence in a conservatively specified model that controls for restrictive sanctions and 
background factors.  In contrast, we find no evidence in the discrete time models 
supporting the efficacy of residential programming among either cohort.  This finding 
diverges partly from the favorable effects of halfway house referrals observed in the early 
violator subsample (Table 8).  The null effects shown in Table 12 could be due to our 
overly broad measurement of such programming, which encompasses supportive housing 
arrangements with less intensive services as well as halfway house placements.  The 
differential effects of overall programming as a sanction response are perhaps most 
compelling, however, since they point to the importance of structured sanction guidelines 
in enhancing the efficacy of these responses.  Comparing the effect sizes of the odds 
ratios in the post-guidelines sample, the decrease in the risk of recidivism from the 
sanction-based effect is nearly twice that of non-sanction programming.  The finding is 
also consistent with the strong main effects of both treatment and halfway house 
sanctions that emerge among early violators in the PS sample (see discussion of Table 8).  
Together, the findings suggest that the sanction policy enhances the rehabilitative effects 
of program involvement, first through better alignment between risk and intensive 
services in response to violations, but perhaps also through closer engagement in the 
offender’s progress and the increased certainty of a revocation hearing as a consequence 
of program failure.  
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Summary of Findings 
 
  Correctional agencies implementing prisoner reentry initiatives face enormous 
rehabilitative and public safety challenges as they consider the most effective supervision 
strategies for confronting large and diverse, crime-prone parole populations with multiple 
criminogenic needs (Petersilia, 2001).  At the same time, new findings based on multi-
state release data have called into question the overall utility of supervised release 
(Solomon et al., 2005), while the fragmentation of sentencing and supervision philosophy 
and increasing rates of parole failure have created organizational strain and identity crises 
among state parole authorities (Travis and Peterisilia, 2001).  Progressive sanctioning 
policies represent a relatively new, but largely untested, strategy designed to conserve 
supervision resources and improve offender outcomes by combining principles of 
procedural justice with structured decision-making guidelines.  The systematic study of 
these policies is important to understand how they might contribute to a growing body of 
knowledge regarding best practices in correctional supervision.   
This project provides evidence from a wide-ranging assessment into the 
effectiveness of progressive sanctions as implemented with Ohio’s post-prison 
supervision population.  Using a historical comparison group design, the study explored 
several dimensions of effectiveness related to policy and recidivism outcomes using data 
from offender samples before and after implementation of the progressive sanction 
guidelines.  Major clusters of findings from the study are summarized below.   
 
 
  The main procedural and administrative objectives of the violation policy 
and progressive sanction grid have been accomplished.
34 
 
The major procedural objectives of the policy guidelines have so far been largely 
accomplished, as evidenced by significantly reduced reliance on revocation hearings, 
revocation sanctions, and local jail detention, more efficient and concentrated use of 
hearings, and better congruence between offender risk and revocation sanctions.  The 
guidelines have also increased the progressiveness and proportionality of responses, as 
measured through violation hearing rates across cumulative incidents and violation 
severity.  The incident-level multivariate models substantiate these findings, showing that 
post-grid offenders are significantly less likely to experience a violation hearing and to be 
revoked or returned to prison, net of control variables.  Further, in the revocation models 
split out by sample cohort, the effects of violation history, prior violations and assessed 
risk are all significantly stronger under the new system, suggesting that the objective 
criteria of the sanction grid extend to revocation decisions as well.   
 
                                                 
34 We conclude that these findings are largely substantiated by the replication study reported in Appendix 9.  
The ODRC and UC incident-level models both indicate significant and negative effects of the post-
guidelines sample on the decision to pursue a revocation hearing and revocation outcomes.  Both studies 
also show strong effects of violation severity and cumulative incidents on organizational response, and 
strong effects of severity, violation rate, and risk on revocation outcomes.  In contrast, however, the UC 
regressions of hearing decisions revealed non-significant effects of offender risk.   
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  The progressive sanction guidelines have no independent impact on 
recidivism.
35 
 
The bivariate results with regard to supervision outcomes show that offenders 
supervised under the new sanction guidelines have generally higher failure rates.  This is 
consistent with recent one-year recidivism patterns reported in administrative data 
available on full release populations.  These differences are rendered non-significant, 
however, in the multivariate models that control for standard sources of recidivism.  In 
other words, the introduction of progressive sanctions has played no independent role in 
increasing recidivism, even under a more limited use of revocation hearings.  The results 
also show that offenders who are younger, less violent, chronically unemployed, and 
medium to high risk (excluding sex offenders) are more likely to commit new crimes.  
Technical violations are strongly associated with both felony reoffending and major 
violation behavior, and the sanction grid neither worsens nor attenuates their impact.  We 
find similarly strong effects when the violation rate is measured dynamically in the final 
models.  Residential instability is mildly predictive of new crimes, but not major 
violation behavior.    
 
  Program and treatment-based interventions are more important than 
punitive sanctions in reducing reoffending, and the sanction guidelines 
enhance the effectiveness of those interventions, especially for higher-risk 
offenders. 
36  
 
In models based on early violators (at risk for chronic non-compliance), prior 
programming sanctions substantially reduce the risk of felony reoffending, while control-
oriented sanctioning has a worsening effect.  The effect of halfway house referrals is 
significant but less important than the general programming effect, which encompasses a 
wide range of services and interventions.  The sanction intensity effect is more 
ambiguous and less stable, since the direction of the impact varies by modeling approach.  
In only one instance, however, do punitive sanctions reduce the risk of reoffending (in 
full sample models, in which prior jail detention noticeably improved outcomes in the 
pre-grid sample).  On the other hand, the beneficial impact of sanction-based 
programming seems more consistent, and the effects are generally enhanced under the 
sanction guidelines.  When the early violator models are split by sample group, halfway 
house referrals and program sanctions work substantially better under the sanction 
guidelines.  They work especially well for post-guidelines high-risk (non-sex) offenders, 
consistent with an established body of correctional treatment literature.  In contrast, there 
                                                 
35 We conclude that findings from the felony reoffending and major violation behavior analyses are also 
mostly substantiated by the replication study, although the UC sample revealed no significant bivariate 
differences on any of the key offender outcomes.  Importantly, the UC multivariate models show no 
significant policy effect on either outcome, consistent with the ODRC study.  The direction and size of the 
covariate effects found in both studies are largely similar (with the notable exception of residential 
instability), though the effects of risk are generally weaker among the UC sample.  No interactive effects of 
risk are present in the UC findings, though the major violation models do show moderating effects of the 
sanction guidelines on the violation rate, in contrast to the ODRC results.   
36 These questions were not investigated in the UC replication due to funding constraints on the scope and 
level of detail of information collected from case files.  
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is no mitigating effect of program referrals for those offenders in the pre-grid cohort.  
Further, combining treatment services with restrictive sanctioning also significantly 
reduces recidivism at the high-risk level in the post-grid sample.  In dynamic models 
predicting felony behavior on the full-sample split equations, program sanctions and 
supervision plan activities combine to reduce the risk of reoffending, but only among in 
the post-grid release cohort.  In terms of relative importance, the strongest predictors in 
this final analysis are chronic unemployment, offender risk and successful involvement in 
sanction-based programming or services.   
 
  Implementation of the sanction grid policy has been facilitated by uniformity 
of staff training, but undermined by perceived agency disregard of officer 
opinions and professional autonomy.   
 
Findings from the survey of Adult Parole Authority officers (reported in detail in  
Appendix 9) reveal that training on use of the grid was perceived to be adequate, but that 
professional opinions and skills were not sufficiently considered in its design.  
Perceptions about the failure to genuinely involve officers throughout the policy 
formation process are correlated with poor understanding of the intent of the policy, 
which, in turn, are negatively associated with perceptions about the sanction grid’s 
effectiveness and potential in helping to control offender behavior.  While officer 
satisfaction with supervisors and regional administrators enhances perceptions of 
effectiveness, those with authoritarian approaches to supervision are less favorable in 
their assessments.  Finally, officers who view the basis of their power to compel offender 
compliance in coercive terms have more favorable opinions about the grid, while those 
who view this power on the basis of legitimate authority are less favorable, especially 
with regard to effectiveness and offender control, suggesting that some officers might 
actually perceive the grid as undermining their legitimacy.   
 
Policy Implications and Study Limitations 
 
  The findings from the study suggest that progressive sanction regimes can serve 
as an important and seemingly cost-effective population management tool when 
revocation and incarceration resources are used in a parsimonious fashion and limited 
mostly to high risk offenders or those who pose public safety risks.  Our results 
demonstrate that the sanction grid and violation policy effectively filter the highest risk, 
non-compliant offenders into hearings sooner, consistent with the basic principles of risk 
management and proportionality of response.  Importantly, however, the progressive 
structure of the grid also allows for critical, community-based treatment interventions to 
occur before pursuing a hearing, without increasing overall rates of felony reoffending.  
Although the long-term efficacy of revocation was not examined in this study, there has 
been no overall adverse effect realized so far under the current policy relaxing its use.  It 
is also important to note that in results from our incident-level analyses, revocation 
outcomes in the current system are influenced only by formal, policy-based criteria.  Any 
policy changes that rescind or otherwise weaken these elements of the guidelines may 
potentially compromise the uniformity and proportionality that has been achieved. 
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  On the other hand, the results show consistently that the sanction guidelines have 
no global impact on reducing the risk of committing either new crimes or major violation 
behavior.  This finding undermines the procedural justice notion that deterrence 
principles increase compliance by increasing legitimacy and fostering perceptions of 
fairness, despite the objective uniformity, proportionality and progressiveness of the 
system.  Our findings should be regarded as tentative in this regard, however, since we 
lack attitudinal data with which to fully evaluate those arguments.  Further, it is unknown 
to what extent the purpose of the sanction grid and consequences of non-compliance have 
been consistently communicated across caseloads.  It is also possible that administrative 
sanction models alone are insufficient to produce this effect unless integrated with 
broader case management reforms in which parole officers become more proactively 
engaged with clients in reinforcing accountability and motivating self-directed change, as 
advocated by Taxman et al. (1999).   
  It is important to note that this study has been conducted in the early stages of 
implementation, and so perhaps it is too soon to evaluate its direct effects on improving 
supervision outcomes in the aggregate.  Unfortunately, however, the process evaluation 
suggests that implementation has been compromised by limited officer “buy-in”, poor 
understanding of the intent of the policy and unfavorable assessments of effectiveness, all 
of which are negatively affected by perceptions of disregard for professional opinion and 
by authoritarian styles of officer supervision.  These findings from the survey have 
important implications for how parole agencies communicate the purpose of supervision 
reforms and involve line staff in their design and implementation.  The extent to which 
such reforms are narrowly perceived as enhancing coercive power or, alternatively, as 
part of a cultural change in which officers associate evidenced-based practices with 
improved outcomes can ultimately affect offender perceptions of fairness and legitimacy.    
As a self-contained policy, we are thus less inclined to see the findings as 
dismissive of a procedural justice effect, and instead as demonstrating how the guidelines 
provide a structural opportunity to align treatment sanctions with high-risk and 
potentially chronic violators on the front-end of supervision, allowing those offenders to 
retain any pro-social experiences gained without facing the presumption of immediate 
revocation.  This includes intensive residential treatment for sex offenders, which as 
shown in our descriptive findings, has increasingly displaced revocation as an early 
response option, even though sex offenders are not formally addressed by the grid.  
Indeed, perhaps the most compelling findings of the study concern the relative efficacy of 
control versus programming responses to violation behavior, and how these responses 
interact with higher risk levels and the sanction policy.  The results indicate that early 
treatment interventions are especially effective for high risk and need clients, and they 
support a heavier use of control sanctions for these groups where necessary.  
Furthermore, as shown in the dynamic models of reoffending, there is a substantial 
crime-reduction benefit from on-going successful participation in treatment services 
among all offenders supervised under the sanction guidelines.  Why would sanction-
based programming and treatment interventions produce enhanced benefits under a 
graduated sanctions policy?  One reasonable interpretation is that for those involved in 
such services, the certainty of the consequences for failing to comply have now become 
more pronounced under the sanction grid.  It might also be because these policies provide 
stronger guidance to consider the full range of risk and needs, resulting in better 
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alignment of services once violation behavior has occurred.  Finally, it is possible that 
structured sanctioning promotes closer monitoring of compliance with treatment services 
and that this occurs earlier in the supervision process.   
  On the other hand, the study casts doubt on the general efficacy of purely punitive 
approaches to supervision, consistent with long-standing findings in the community 
corrections literature.  While there is a consistently strong correlation between violation 
rates and reoffending, responding to those violations with control-oriented responses 
appears to be effective only among higher-risk offenders.  Further, jail holds, as they are 
currently used, appear to offer no generalized deterrent value.  The policy implications 
are complex, because they raise legitimate questions about the best way to manage low-
risk offenders who become chronic nuisance violators for whom neither revocation nor 
intensive sanctioning appear effective.  Indeed, punitive sanction intensity seems to 
worsen their outcomes, especially under a sanction policy that requires a protracted series 
of responses before pursuing a revocation hearing.  Some of these may include 
inappropriate treatment services, including halfway houses, which have been shown to 
produce iatrogenic effects for such offenders (Lowenkamp and Latessa, 2005).   
  Accordingly, we offer three concrete, interrelated suggestions on ways to improve 
the sanction grid in Ohio, and progressive sanctioning systems in general.  First, 
mechanisms to downgrade low-risk offenders to monitored-time supervision (i.e., 
administrative review) should be significantly expanded and should occur as early as 
possible where simple rule compliance has been demonstrated.  Second, and more 
generally, APA managers should consider more formally integrating the positive 
incentive system developed in 2006 together with the violation policy, similar to 
Georgia’s response structure (see Burke, 2004), instead of bundling it with the current 
classification policy.  The incentive system should also be simplified and include easily 
attainable and meaningful goals for certain categories of offenders, such as the step-down 
reward described above.  Revising these systems such that they are melded together as a 
single, unified policy may help to better promote positive behavior among nuisance 
violators.  Finally, the APA should consider an expanded use of temporary jail 
confinement, or at least mandated halfway house confinement, as a specific, punitive 
sanction option on the grid for high-risk offenders who fail to comply with early 
programming opportunities.  This approach should still be explored with caution, since 
any positive impact of jail holds (when used mainly for investigative purposes now) has 
not been conclusively demonstrated in our findings and requires further study.  It is worth 
noting, however, that judicious and swiftly imposed short jail stays are a central 
sanctioning option in effective drug court programs and are one of many 
recommendations made recently by the Reentry Policy Council (CSG, 2005).   
  Of course the findings from this investigation are potentially undermined by 
important design limitations, as is typical in most quasi-experimental designs.  Before 
and after research designs are inherently subject to threats to internal validity involving 
history effects, and those effects are a potential source of contamination in this study.  It 
is possible that the observed differential effects regarding program interventions, for 
example, are due not to the structured guidance imposed by the sanction policy, but to 
improvements over time in program integrity, risk and needs assessment, or overall 
supervision case management.  From this standpoint, the differences over time regarding 
sanction effectiveness should be viewed as suggestive and not definitive.  It is sometimes 
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possible to strengthen designs that use historical comparison groups by measuring pre 
and post-test observations at multiple time points.  While such an approach was not 
feasible with available data in the current design, we have separately analyzed 
administrative data (available on the full APA population) on violation hearing trends 
back through 2002.  Those data reveal a virtually flat pattern of revocation rates at the 
hearing level from FY 2002-2005, followed by a sharp increase starting in FY 2006, 
entirely consistent with our implementation results reported above.  Further, baseline 
violation data from an earlier ODRC study of releases in late 2000 (Martin et al., 2004) 
show a pattern of progressiveness in hearing rates that is similar to the pre-grid patterns 
described here.  These additional data points help substantiate our conclusions regarding 
the procedural outcomes of the policy.  However, we are unable to investigate the full 
impact of the sanction grid as employed in the later stages of supervision, since the study 
uses a relatively short follow-up period of one year.  It is likely that a longer follow-up 
period would increase statistical variation in our outcome measures and strengthen the 
implementation findings, but further study is needed to confirm this.  Additional research 
using extended follow-up periods is also required to make more definitive statements 
about the sanctioning effects examined here.   
  It is possible that the study results pertaining to offender outcomes are 
undermined by selection bias.  Our descriptive results revealed significant pre/post-test 
differences on several key background factors, not surprisingly, since the samples were 
not matched at the point of selection.  The retrospective case matching procedures we 
used are a common corrective measure for this potential problem, but are limited by 
possible specification error in the propensity score prediction model and level of rigor 
used in the subsequent matching criteria.  While our use of statistical controls helps 
minimize residual sample differences, the findings from the study should be qualified by 
the possibility of remaining bias.   
  Despite these limitations, our findings contribute to an emerging literature on 
effective supervision strategies, addressing gaps noted by Petersilia (2001) and the 
National Research Council (2007) regarding the lack of evidence on parole innovations 
and the effectiveness of current practices.  This study provides important evidence 
demonstrating that structured sanctioning reforms are clearly beneficial as a management 
tool in the context of large, heterogeneous post-prison release populations.  They 
minimize the haphazard use of costly and possibly ineffective revocation penalties and in 
doing so, help to establish formal systems of consistent, proportional, and progressive 
responses.  Perhaps most importantly, they provide a structural presumption for earlier 
reliance on community-based interventions and services that help to foster reintegration 
among those offenders at highest risk for reoffending.   
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Appendix 2. Incident-Level Analysis:  Imposed Sanctions, by Risk and Violation Severity, Before and After Policy Implementation
Informal/ Programs Restrictions Restrictions Halfway Revocation/ Local Charges
Risk and Violation Severity Reprimand percent Only* percent Only* percent and Programs* percent House** percent Prison Return** percent Initiated*** percent Total percent
Sex Offender (off grid)
Major Violation (off grid), Pre-Grid 0 0.0% 2 7.4% 4 14.8% 1 3.7% 1 3.7% 5 18.5% 14 51.9% 27 100.0%
Major Violation (off grid), Post-Grid 1 3.3% 0 0.0% 2 6.7% 4 13.3% 0 0.0% 17 56.7% 6 20.0% 30 100.0%
High Severity, Pre-Grid 14 16.1% 12 13.8% 22 25.3% 17 19.5% 0 0.0% 15 17.2% 7 8.0% 87 100.0%
High Severity, Post-Grid 12 12.1% 11 11.1% 30 30.3% 19 19.2% 7 7.1% 11 11.1% 9 9.1% 99 100.0%
Low Severity, Pre-Grid 13 23.2% 16 28.6% 15 26.8% 9 16.1% 1 1.8% 0 0.0% 2 3.6% 56 100.0%
Low Severity, Post-Grid 11 17.2% 10 15.6% 19 29.7% 18 28.1% 3 4.7% 1 1.6% 2 3.1% 64 100.0%
  
High Risk   
Major Violation (off grid), Pre-Grid 1 1.4% 3 4.3% 8 11.6% 10 14.5% 0 0.0% 13 18.8% 34 49.3% 69 100.0%
Major Violation (off grid), Post-Grid 1 1.9% 3 5.8% 13 25.0% 2 3.8% 1 1.0% 9 17.3% 23 44.2% 52 100.0%
High Severity, Pre-Grid 9 7.1% 15 11.9% 20 15.9% 19 15.1% 16 12.7% 25 19.8% 22 17.5% 126 100.0%
High Severity, Post-Grid 3 3.4% 7 8.0% 18 20.5% 21 23.9% 10 11.4% 15 17.0% 14 15.9% 88 100.0%
Low Severity, Pre-Grid 14 16.5% 30 35.3% 12 14.1% 18 21.2% 6 7.1% 4 4.7% 1 1.2% 85 100.0%
Low Severity, Post-Grid 6 9.5% 18 28.6% 16 25.4% 17 27.0% 3 4.8% 0 0.0% 3 4.8% 63 100.0%
  
Medium Risk   
Major Violation (off grid), Pre-Grid 3 3.4% 3 3.4% 12 13.8% 4 4.6% 3 3.4% 20 23.0% 42 48.3% 87 100.0%
Major Violation (off grid), Post-Grid 2 1.5% 2 1.5% 23 17.3% 26 19.5% 6 4.5% 15 11.3% 59 44.4% 133 100.0%
High Severity, Pre-Grid 19 8.9% 21 9.8% 41 19.2% 48 22.4% 17 7.9% 43 20.1% 25 11.7% 214 100.0%
High Severity, Post-Grid 21 8.5% 16 6.5% 41 16.6% 73 29.6% 30 12.1% 29 11.7% 37 15.0% 247 100.0%
Low Severity, Pre-Grid 25 14.8% 58 34.3% 42 24.9% 31 18.3% 6 3.6% 3 1.8% 4 2.4% 169 100.0%
Low Severity, Post-Grid 30 16.2% 42 22.7% 38 20.5% 56 30.3% 15 8.1% 2 1.1% 2 1.1% 185 100.0%
  
Low Risk   
Major Violation (off grid), Pre-Grid 0 0.0% 1 3.0% 6 18.2% 4 12.1% 0 0.0% 7 21.2% 15 45.5% 33 100.0%
Major Violation (off grid), Post-Grid 0 0.0% 3 5.7% 4 7.5% 7 13.2% 5 9.4% 9 17.0% 25 47.2% 53 100.0%
High Severity, Pre-Grid 12 12.2% 13 13.3% 18 18.4% 18 18.4% 2 2.0% 17 17.3% 18 18.4% 98 100.0%
High Severity, Post-Grid 15 11.6% 13 10.1% 28 21.7% 42 32.6% 10 7.8% 4 3.1% 17 13.2% 129 100.0%
Low Severity, Pre-Grid 20 16.9% 28 23.7% 26 22.0% 35 29.7% 4 3.4% 1 0.8% 4 3.4% 118 100.0%
Low Severity, Post-Grid 26 18.4% 37 26.2% 30 21.3% 36 25.5% 9 6.4% 0 0.0% 3 2.1% 141 100.0%
Total
  Pre-Grid 130 11.1% 202 17.3% 226 19.3% 214 18.3% 56 4.8% 153 13.1% 188 16.1% 1169 100.0%
  Post-Grid 128 10.0% 162 12.6% 262 20.4% 321 25.0% 99 7.7% 112 8.7% 200 15.6% 1284 100.0%
* May include informal warnings or reprimands, but not HWH or revocation sanctions; ** May include any lesser sanction; *** Refers to incidents with local prosecution but no APA response.
Sanction Type
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Appendix 3. Incident-Level Analysis: Level of Organizational Response, by Risk and Violation Severity, Before and After Policy Implementation
Risk and Violation Severity Level of Response
Sex Offender (off grid):  Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 28 80.0% 34 85.0% 12 66.7% 21 87.5% 7 63.6% 6 60.0% 4 80.0% 4 57.1%
  Revocation Hrg (VSP) 7 20.0% 6 15.0% 6 33.3% 3 12.5% 4 36.4% 4 40.0% 1 20.0% 3 42.9%
35 100.0% 40 100.0% 18 100.0% 24 100.0% 11 100.0% 10 100.0% 5 100.0% 7 100.0%
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 28 100.0% 35 100.0% 15 100.0% 14 93.3% 7 100.0% 6 85.7% 1 100.0% 2 100.0%
  Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 6.7% 0 0.0% 1 14.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
28 100.0% 35 100.0% 15 100.0% 15 100.0% 7 100.0% 7 100.0% 1 100.0% 2 100.0%
High Risk:            
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 33 80.5% 21 95.5% 11 45.8% 18 90.0% 8 50.0% 10 76.9% 5 38.5% 7 63.6%
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 8 19.5% 1 4.5% 13 54.2% 2 10.0% 8 50.0% 3 23.1% 8 61.5% 4 36.4%
41 100.0% 22 100.0% 24 100.0% 20 100.0% 16 100.0% 13 100.0% 13 100.0% 11 100.0%
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 37 94.9% 30 100.0% 19 95.0% 16 100.0% 9 100.0% 10 100.0% 5 83.3% 7 100.0%
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 2 5.1% 0 0.0% 1 5.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 16.7% 0 0.0%
39 100.0% 30 100.0% 20 100.0% 16 100.0% 9 100.0% 10 100.0% 6 100.0% 7 100.0%
Medium Risk:
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 45 69.2% 56 90.3% 38 69.1% 45 91.8% 15 50.0% 37 86.0% 9 45.0% 25 86.2%
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 20 30.8% 6 9.7% 17 30.9% 4 8.2% 15 50.0% 6 14.0% 11 55.0% 4 13.8%
65 100.0% 62 100.0% 55 100.0% 49 100.0% 30 100.0% 43 100.0% 20 100.0% 29 100.0%
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 74 100.0% 76 100.0% 40 95.2% 50 100.0% 20 90.9% 27 100.0% 12 92.3% 14 100.0%
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 4.8% 0 0.0% 2 9.1% 0 0.0% 1 7.7% 0 0.0%
74 100.0% 76 100.0% 42 100.0% 50 100.0% 22 100.0% 27 100.0% 13 100.0% 14 100.0%
Low Risk:
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 22 81.5% 35 92.1% 18 85.7% 23 100.0% 12 70.6% 22 95.7% 5 55.6% 12 100.0%
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 5 18.5% 3 7.9% 3 14.3% 0 0.0% 5 29.4% 1 4.3% 4 44.4% 0 0.0%
27 100.0% 38 100.0% 21 100.0% 23 100.0% 17 100.0% 23 100.0% 9 100.0% 12 100.0%
 
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 51 100.0% 65 100.0% 29 96.7% 41 100.0% 15 93.8% 21 100.0% 9 100.0% 10 100.0%
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 3.3% 0 0.0% 1 6.3% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
51 100.0% 65 100.0% 30 100.0% 41 100.0% 16 100.0% 21 100.0% 9 100.0% 10 100.0%
Incident 1 Incident 2 Incident 3 Incident 4
Pre Guidelines Post Guidelines Pre Guidelines Post Guidelines Pre Guidelines Post Guidelines Pre Guidelines Post Guidelines
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Risk and Violation Severity Level of Response
Sex Offender (off grid):  Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Count Percent Cou
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 3 75.0% 5 83.3% 5 71.4% 8 88.9% 59 73.8% 78
  Revocation Hrg (VSP) 1 25.0% 1 16.7% 2 28.6% 1 11.1% 21 26.3% 18
4 100.0% 6 100.0% 7 100.0% 9 100.0% 80 100.0% 96
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 2 100.0% 1 50.0% 0 4 100.0% 53 100.0% 62
  Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 1 50.0% 0 0 0.0% 0 0.0%
2 100.0% 2 100.0% 0  4 100.0% 53 100.0% 65
High Risk:           
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 3 50.0% 8 80.0% 6 60.0% 5 62.5% 66 60.0% 69
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 3 50.0% 2 20.0% 4 40.0% 3 37.5% 44 40.0% 15
6 100.0% 10 100.0% 10 100.0% 8 100.0% 110 100.0% 84
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 3 100.0% 2 100.0% 5 71.4% 1 100.0% 78 92.9% 66
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 28.6% 0 0.0% 6 7.1%
3 100.0% 2 100.0% 7 100.0% 1 100.0% 84 100.0% 66
Medium Risk:
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 8 57.1% 17 85.0% 3 33.3% 6 40.0% 118 61.1% 18
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 6 42.9% 3 15.0% 6 66.7% 9 60.0% 75 38.9% 32
14 100.0% 20 100.0% 9 100.0% 15 100.0% 193 100.0% 21
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 5 100.0% 11 100.0% 8 100.0% 11 91.7% 159 97.0% 18
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 8.3% 5 3.0%
5 100.0% 11 100.0% 8 100.0% 12 100.0% 164 100.0% 19
Low Risk:
High Severity Violation Unit Sanction 4 100.0% 8 80.0% 1 20.0% 8 100.0% 62 74.7% 10
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 2 20.0% 4 80.0% 0 0.0% 21 25.3%
4 100.0% 10 100.0% 5 100.0% 8 100.0% 83 100.0% 11
Low Severity Violation Unit Sanction 6 100.0% 4 100.0% 3 100.0% 2 100.0% 113 98.3% 14
Revocation Hrg (VSP) 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 2 1.7%
6 100.0% 4 100.0% 3 100.0% 2 100.0% 115 100.0% 14
Pre Guidelines Post G
Incident 5 Incident 6 or Higher Total
Pre Guidelines Post Guidelines Pre Guidelines Post Guidelines
nt Percent
81.3%
18.8%
100.0%
95.4%
3 4.6%
100.0%
82.1%
17.9%
100.0%
100.0%
0 0.0%
100.0%
6 85.3%
14.7%
8 100.0%
9 98.4%
3 1.6%
2 100.0%
8 94.7%
6 5.3%
4 100.0%
3 100.0%
0 0.0%
3 100.0%
uidelines
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Appendix 4. Percent Revoked/Returned among all Incidents Involving Revocation Hearings
Pre-Guidelines Post-Guidelines
(N=181) (N=109)
  Percent Revoked/Returned Percent Revoked/Returned
Sex
  Male 0.684 0.908
  Female   0.565 0.909
Race **
  Non-white 0.580 0.914
  White   0.753   0.902
Parole Release *** ^
  Parole Release 0.448 0.818
  Post Release Control   0.772   0.931  
Parole Region
  Akron 0.682 1.000
  Cincinnati 0.700 0.905
  Columbus 0.581 0.867
  Lima 0.741 0.857
  Mansfield 0.636 0.824
  Chillicothe 0.700 1.000
  Cleveland  0.750 0.900
Violation Severity *
  Major 0.778 0.980
  High 0.645 0.857
  Low  0.500 0.750
Offender Risk
   Sex Offender 0.792 0.906
   High (non-sex offender) 0.596 1.000
   Medium (non-sex offender) 0.667 0.889
   Low (non-sex offender) 0.727 0.883
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10.  
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Appendix 5. Cox Regression Analysis of Felony Reoffending (Full Matched Sample)
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Race
  Non-white -0.050 0.952 0.122 1.130 -0.157 0.855
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male 0.246 1.279   0.348 1.417   0.193 1.213  
  Female (reference)
Age at Release -0.026 0.974 *** -0.028 0.972 ** -0.024 0.976 *
 
Felony Level of Committing Offense -0.129 0.879 ** -0.155 0.857 ** -0.096 0.909 ^
Employment during Supervision
  No Employment 0.993 2.700 *** 1.068 2.910 *** 0.996 2.707 ***
  At Least Part-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
Residential Moves (rate per month)     
 High Rate 0.228 1.256 ^ 0.300 1.349  0.171 1.187  
 Low or No Moves (reference)
Overall Violation Rate (per month) 0.949 2.582 *** 1.080 2.944 *** 0.969 2.636 ***
Criminal History Risk Score 
  Sex Offender 0.489 1.631 * 0.645 1.906 * 0.301 1.352  
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 1.295 3.652 *** 1.459 4.303 *** 1.198 3.314 ***
  Medium Risk (non Sex Offender) 1.056 2.876 *** 0.834 2.302 *** 1.243 3.466 ***
  Low Risk (reference)
Non-Programming Sanction Intensity  -0.133 0.876 * -0.236 0.790 ** -0.032 0.968  
Prior Programming/Treatment Sanction     
  One or More Prior Programming Sanctions -0.444 0.642 ** -0.276 0.759   -0.655 0.519 ***
  None (reference)
Prior Halfway House Referral Sanction
  One or More Prior Referrals -0.354 0.702   -0.471 0.624   -0.326 0.722  
  None (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample 0.046 1.047  
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Model chi-square 406.504 ***   186.952 *** 225.757 ***
-2LL 4816.057 1998.288 2266.604
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10
 
Pre-Guidelines (N=507) Post-Guidelines (N=520) Full Model (N=1,027)
 
 
  69
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice. 
Appendix 6. Cox Regression Analysis of Felony Reoffending (Full Matched Sample): Alternative Sanction Intensity Model
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Race
  Non-white -0.052 0.949 0.084 1.088 -0.137 0.872
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male 0.248 1.281   0.386 1.471 ^ 0.145 1.156  
  Female (reference)
Age at Release -0.025 0.975 *** -0.027 0.973 ** -0.022 0.978 *
 
Felony Level of Committing Offense -0.130 0.878 ** -0.170 0.844 ** -0.085 0.918  
Employment during Supervision
  No Employment 0.969 2.634 *** 1.040 2.830 *** 0.949 2.582 ***
  At Least Part-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
Residential Moves (rate per month)     
 High Rate 0.226 1.253 ^ 0.232 1.261  0.198 1.219
 Low or No Moves (reference)
Overall Violation Rate (per month) 1.004 2.729 *** 1.203 3.329 *** 1.011 2.748 ***
Criminal History Risk Score 
  Sex Offender 0.478 1.613 * 0.613 1.847 * 0.299 1.349  
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 1.302 3.678 *** 1.469 4.343 *** 1.212 3.361 ***
  Medium Risk (non Sex Offender) 1.040 2.830 *** 0.784 2.190 *** 1.240 3.457 ***
  Low Risk (reference)
Non-Programming Sanction Intensity (without holds) -0.138 0.871 * -0.173 0.841 ^ -0.069 0.933  
Prior Jail Hold
 One or More Prior Holds -0.464 0.629 ** -0.681 0.506 ** -0.467 0.627 *
  None (reference)
Prior Programming/Treatment Sanction     
  One or More Prior Programming Sanctions -0.413 0.662 ** -0.307 0.735   -0.560 0.571 **
  None (reference)
Prior Halfway House Referral Sanction
  One or More Prior Referrals -0.290 0.748   -0.493 0.611   -0.179 0.836  
  None (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample 0.029 1.029  
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Model chi-square 424.575 ***   198.351 *** 235.419 ***
-2LL 4846.275 2022.895 2268.550
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10
 
Pre-Guidelines (N=519) Post-Guidelines (N=522) Full Model (N=1,041)
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Appendix 7. Cox Regression Analysis of Felony Reoffending among Early Violators: Alternatvie Sanction Intensity Measures
 B Exp(B) B Exp(B) B Exp(B)
Race
  Non-white 0.190 1.210 0.189 1.208 0.195 1.216
  White (reference)
Sex
  Male 0.037 1.038   -0.433 0.649   0.495 1.641  
  Female (reference)
Age at Release -0.008 0.992  -0.010 0.990  0.004 1.004  
 
Felony Level of Committing Offense -0.199 0.819 * -0.285 0.752 * -0.164 0.849  
Employment during Supervision
  No Employment 0.926 2.523 *** 1.124 3.078 *** 0.839 2.314 **
  At Least Part-time/Year or Non-Labor Force (reference)
Residential Moves (rate per month)     
 High Rate 0.259 1.295  -0.116 0.890  0.325 1.383  
 Low or No Moves (reference)
Overall Violation Rate (per month) 1.665 5.286 *** 2.277 9.745 *** 1.601 4.958 ***
Criminal History Risk Score 
  Sex Offender 0.227 1.255   0.186 1.204   0.318 1.374  
  High Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.375 1.454   1.178 3.248 * -0.083 0.921  
  Medium Risk (non Sex Offender) 0.683 1.979 * 0.650 1.916   0.778 2.176 *
  Low Risk (reference)
Non-Programming Sanction Intensity (without holds) 0.251 1.285 * 0.193 1.213  0.507 1.661 **
Prior Jail Hold
 One or More Prior Holds -0.028 0.972 -0.470 0.625 0.201 1.222
 None (reference)
Prior Programming/Treatment Sanction     
  One or More Prior Programming Sanctions -1.077 0.341 *** -1.144 0.318 *** -1.051 0.349 ***
  None (reference)
Prior Halfway House Referral Sanction
  One or More Prior Referrals -0.563 0.569 * 0.075 1.077   -0.996 0.369 **
  None (reference)
Sanction Guidelines 
  Post-Guidelines Sample -0.239 0.788  
  Pre-Guidelines Sample (reference)
Model chi-square 168.553 ***   103.124 *** 83.924 ***
-2LL 1083.291 341.996 559.107
*p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01; *** p ≤ .001.
^p ≤ .10
 
Pre-Guidelines (N=106) Post-Guidelines (N=133)
Offenders with High Severity Violation within First 3 Months (Unmatched Cases)
Full Model (N=239)
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Appendix 8.  Coding Sheets for Source Documents 
 
 
 
 
Title: Examining the Effectiveness of Ohio’s Progressive Sanction Grid 
Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction 
Award #:  NIJ 2005-IJ-CX-0038 
 
 
 
General/Background Information  
 
G1:  __ __ __ Coder’s Initials 
 
G2:  C __ __ __ __ __ __   Offender’s CCIS ID number (six digits) 
 
G3:   __________________________________ Last Name of Offender 
 
G4:   __________________________________ First Name of Offender 
 
G5:  __ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ Supervision Start Date (mm/dd/yyyy) 
 
G6:  __ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ Study End Date (one year from Start Date) or Early Termination 
Date (revocation/return/early termination) if less than one year (mm/dd/yyyy) 
 
G7:  A __ __ __ __   Current APA Unit 
 
G8: _____  File  Status 
 
  1=FOS notes/Violation Report available and information ascertainable 
  2=FOS notes/other documents not available; insufficient information to code file 
  3=Paper file unavailable to code (reason unknown) 
  4=File is substantially incomplete due to transfer 
5=FOS notes are only partially available or available on-line only (mid-way through 
follow-up period) 
 
G9:  _____   Offender Status at Study End Point 
 
  1=Still on active supervision 
 2=Final  Release 
  3=Unfavorable PRC Final Release 
  4=Revoked/Returned to Prison 
  5=Recommitted on new crime 
  6=Violator At-Large/Whereabouts Unknown 
  88=Not ascertainable  
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
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Appendix 8 (continued). 
 
 
C __ __ __ __ __ __   Offender’s CCIS ID number (six digits) 
 
 
G10:  __/ __ /__ /__ /__ / __ /__ Domain Areas/Activities Addressed on Supervision Plan 
(Code as marked) 
 
 1=Employment/Education 
 2=Family/Marital 
 3=Financial/Community  Functioning 
 4=Mental  Health/Personal/Emotional 
 5=Substance  Abuse 
 6=Vocational/Educational 
  7=Sex Offender Treatment 
 8=Attitude   
 9=Associates 
 10=Other 
  11=Supervision plan available, but no areas marked 
 88=Not  ascertainable 
 
G11:  _____  Educational Attainment at Start of Supervision [Source: Facesheet; PSI, if GED 
indicated; Institution Summary Report] 
 
  1=Less than high school degree 
 2=Diploma/GED 
  3=Diploma/GED, plus vocational training 
 4=Some  College 
  5=4 year degree or higher 
 88=Not  ascertainable 
 
G12:  _____  Overall Employment Status during Study Time Frame 
 
1=Evidence of at least one period of regular, part-time or full-time employment/school 
enrollment during study period (complete work history section) 
2=Not employed/enrolled at all during study period, or intermittent day-labor only (do 
not complete work history section) 
3=Disabled/Retired (do not complete work history section) 
88=Not ascertainable (do not complete work history section) 
 
G13:  __ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ Date Offender stepped Down to Monitored Time during Study 
Time Frame (88=change occurred but not ascertainable; 99=not applicable) 
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Appendix 8 (continued). 
 
 
 
C __ __ __ __ __ __   Offender’s CCIS ID number (six digits) 
 
IA0   __ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ Date of Initial Assessment (for old form only; 88=missing; 
99=not applicable, RAP static only) 
 
IA1 _____ 
IA2 _____ 
IA3 _____ 
IA4 _____ 
IA5 _____ 
IA6 _____ 
IA7 _____ 
IA8 _____ 
IA9 _____ 
IA10 _____ 
IA11 _____ Total Score 
IA12 _____ Classification Category 
IA13 _____ Override Code on Initial Assessment 
 
RA0   __ __/__ __/__ __ __ __ Date of first Re-assessment (for old form only; 88=missing; 
99=not applicable, early termination) 
 
RA1 _____ 
RA2 _____ 
RA3 _____ 
RA4 _____ 
RA5 _____ 
RA6 _____ 
RA7 _____ 
RA8 _____ 
RA9 _____ Total Score 
RA10 _____ Classification Category 
RA11 _____ Override Code on Re-assessment 
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Appendix 8 (continued). 
Value definitions for Violation, Employment, Programming, and Housing Modules 
(code using module forms) 
Violation Section  
 
V1:  Incident/Arrest Date  [Use first applicable date for incidents with multiple violations.  
For incidents resulting in PVAL status, code date behavior was first detected. Source: 
FOS notes; Arrest Report; Order of Arrest; Violation Report; CCIS Printout] 
 
88=Not ascertainable or unknown.  
99=Not applicable (no incidents during first year of supervision; enter in first incident column 
and leave rest of form blank)  
 
V2:  Incident/Action Type  [Record all violation-related incidents, including incidents 
resulting in local prosecution or PVAL status.  Do not count citations issued for traffic 
offenses. Source: FOS notes; Arrest Report; Order of Arrest; Violation Report; CCIS 
Printout] 
 
1=Violation of rules of supervision without arrest (with or without APA sanction imposed) 
2=Violation of rules of supervision resulting in APA arrest  
3=Misdemeanor or felony crime resulting in law enforcement arrest 
4=Misdemeanor or felony crime resulting in APA arrest 
5=Misdemeanor of felony crime (including absconding/PVAL) leading to APA warrant, or APA 
warrant and subsequent arrest 
6=Law enforcement arrest due to outstanding non-APA warrant 
7=APA arrest for investigation purposes 
8=Other (specify) 
88=Not ascertainable 
 
V3:  Violation Behavior(s)  [Refer to code numbers. Source: FOS notes; Arrest Report; Order 
of Arrest; Violation Report; Hearing Report Data Form] 
 
V4:  Employment Status at Time of Violation [Source: FOS Notes; Violation 
Report] 
 
1=Evidence of at least regular, part-time employment/school enrollment 
2=Not employed/enrolled, or intermittent day-labor only 
88=Not ascertainable 
 
V5:  Does incident involve multiple substance abuse violations? [Source: FOS 
Notes; Violation Report] 
 
1=Yes 
2=No (single substance abuse violation only) 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (no substance abuse involved) 
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Appendix 8 (continued). 
 
 
V6:  Declared PVAL Date  [Code date that PVAL status is formally declared.  Source: FOS 
Notes; CCIS Printout] 
 
88=PVAL declared, but date not ascertainable (or unknown) 
99=Not applicable (violation did not involve absconding supervision/no PVAL declared) 
 
V7:  Holder Placement Date [Source: FOS Notes; Blue Holder Card; Violation 
Report; CCIS Printout] 
 
88=Hold order placed, but date not ascertainable (or unknown) 
99=Not applicable (violation did not result in placement of hold order) 
V8:  Release From Confinement Date  [Source: FOS Notes; Blue Holder Card; 
Violation Report; CCIS Printout] 
 
88=Hold order placed, but release date not ascertainable (or unknown) 
99=Not applicable (violation did not result in placement of hold order) 
 
 
V9:  APA Response  [Source: FOS Notes; Violation Report; Hearing Report Form; Local 
Sanction Receipt; Court Docket/Judgment] 
 
1=Local unit sanction (including informal/verbal warning) 
2=Parole Board summons 
3=VSP hearing 
4=Declared PVAL or PVAL arrest warrant issued 
5=APA Warrant issued for arrest 
6=No APA response (violation noted by officer, no action taken or warning given) 
7=No APA response (local prosecution only) 
8=APA sanction in conjunction with court-imposed sentence (no VSP hearing) 
9=VSP hearing pursued (violation report prepared) prior to re-commission for new offense or 
subsequent absconding  
10=APA response on subsequent incident  
88=Not ascertainable 
 
V10:  Court Outcome  [Source: FOS Notes; Violation Report; Court Docket/Judgment] 
 
1=Local charges initiated but dropped 
2=Found guilty and community sanction/jail sentence imposed 
3=Found guilty and recommitted on new felony conviction 
4=Found not guilty   
5=Prosecuted on subsequent arrest 
6=Prior suspended sentence reinstated for probation violations 
88=Not ascertainable/unknown 
99=Not applicable (no local court action) 
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V11:  Sanction(s) Imposed  [Refer to code numbers.  Source: FOS Notes; Violation Report; 
Sanction Receipt] 
 
88=Not ascertainable/unknown 
99=Not applicable (unresolved PVAL violation; criminal charges dropped, etc) 
 
V12:  APA Sanction Date  
 
88=Not ascertainable/unknown 
99= Not applicable (court disposition only) 
 
V13:  Court Conviction Date 
 
88=Not ascertainable/unknown 
99= Not applicable (APA sanction only) 
 
V14: Grid  Referenced 
 
V15:  Date of Grid Override 
 
 
[Leave V16 through V21 blank if not applicable.  Source: Violation Report; Violation 
Hearing Form] 
 
V16:  VSP Hearing Date 
 
88=Not ascertainable/unknown 
 
V17: Location 
 
1=In-custody 
2=Out-of-custody  
3=Other 
88=Not ascertainable 
 
V18: Finding 
 
1=Guilty to all charges 
2=Some charges dismissed 
3=All charges dismissed 
88=Not ascertainable 
 
V19:  Days Served Local Jail  [Count days held in jail pending hearing] 
 
0=No time served in local jail 
8888=Not ascertainable 
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V20:  Length of Prison Sanction  [Refers to prison sanction time imposed for PRC (not 
parole) offenders] 
 
8888=Not ascertainable 
9999=Not applicable (offender is a parolee; non-prison sanction) 
 
V21:  Prison Time Exhausted?  [Code as “Yes” if available prison sanction time is 
exhausted with current sanction] 
 
1=Yes 
2=No 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (offender is a parolee; non-prison sanction)  
 
Employment Section [Source: FOS Notes; Periodic Supervision Report Forms; Pay 
Stubs] 
 
J1:  Start Date   
 
88=Not ascertainable 
 
J2: Status 
 
1=Part-time or full-time (employment with regular schedule/non-intermittent work only) 
2=Intermittent or temporary (includes day-to-day labor with no regular schedule) 
3=Actively self-employed 
4=Student (if both student and employed, code nature of employment status) 
88=Not ascertainable 
J3: End  Date 
 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (still employed/enrolled at study end point) 
 
J4:  Reason for Termination 
 
1=Unfavorable 
2=Voluntary termination 
3=Laid off/position terminated 
4=Change of employment 
5=Disability 
6=Treatment 
7=Arrest/revocation/re-commission  
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (still employed/enrolled at study end point) 
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Appendix 8 (continued). 
 
Programming/Intervention Section [Source: FOS Notes; Supervision Plan; CDS 
Referral Sheets; Case Management reports] 
P1:  Referral Date/FOS Entry Date 
 
88=Not ascertainable 
 
P2:  Start Date/Appointment Date 
 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (program not started) 
 
 
P3:  Name/Type of Program/Referral (enter name of program/treatment, if available, if 
category not identifiable) 
 
1=Substance abuse 
2=Interpersonal/Emotional 
3=Family 
4=Education/Training 
5=Employment 
6=Mental Health 
7=Sex Offender Treatment 
8=Housing/Community Functioning  
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (program not started) 
 
P4: Reason 
 
1=Per supervision plan 
2=Imposed as sanction 
3=Parole Board condition 
4=Self admission/referral 
5=Other intervention (e.g., employment or housing referral; VA services) 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (program not started) 
 
P5: End  Date 
 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (not started; still active at study end date; one-time appointment) 
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Appendix 8 (continued). 
P6:  Final Disposition/End Status 
 
1=Completion 
2=Unsuccessful termination (for any reason) 
3=Suspended 
4=No treatment recommended 
5=Still active/On-going referral/One-time appointment (e.g., employment/housing) 
6=No show at program start/appointment date 
Housing/Residence Section [Source: FOS Notes; Supervision Report Form] 
 
H1:  Begin Date/FOS Entry Date [should be on or about supervision start date] 
 
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (whereabouts unknown from start of supervision) 
H2: Street  Address 
H3:  City, State, and Zip Code 
 
H4: Living  Arrangement [do not code confinement/jail address] 
 
1=alone 
2=domestic partner (i.e., significant other or boy/girlfriend) 
3=dependent children only 
4=parent (includes step parent)/parent + other family members 
5=sibling only 
6=other relative 
7=friend/roommate  
8=homeless 
9=Halfway House/other residential 
10=at-large or whereabouts unknown upon release 
88=not ascertainable 
H5: Out  Date 
  
88=Not ascertainable 
99=Not applicable (still present at above address at study end point) 
H6: Reason 
 
1=Voluntary move (e.g., for employment, or reason not specified) 
2=Domestic conflict 
3=Eviction 
4=Residential program completion/termination 
5=Revocation/Return to prison/Re-commission  
6=Housing availability 
88=Other non-ascertainable 
99=Not applicable/study end  
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This section of the report was provided by a research team from the Division of Criminal 
Justice at the University of Cincinnati (UC). The UC researchers were contracted by the Ohio 
Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC) to validate a portion of the quantitative 
analyses performed by the ODRC researchers and to conduct a process evaluation of the 
implementation of the progressive sanction grid. Beginning with the process evaluation, the 
results of the UC researchers’ efforts are presented here.     
PROCESS EVALUATION 
The Ohio Adult Parole Authority Progressive Sanction Grid was implemented in July of 
2005 as part of a larger policy addressing the sanctioning of offenders who violate the conditions 
of parole or post-release control supervision. The policy revision was issued in response to 
perceived disparities in the treatment of offenders who violated conditions of supervision. 
Specifically, the policy was designed to: 
foster consistent procedures designed to promote public confidence, safety, and fair, 
objective decision making when the Adult Parole Authority imposes sanctions for violation 
behavior committed by offenders during their period of supervision (ODRC policy 100-
APA-14, 2005). 
 
The policy was also consistent with the Department’s larger reentry initiative which was 
published in 2002 and contained recommendations to develop a violation policy that was 
supportive of the Department’s reentry goals (e.g., reduce recidivism) and that structured and 
provided statewide consistency in the use of progressive sanctioning (ODRC, 2002).  
  By evaluating the effectiveness of the progressive sanction grid in terms of specific 
procedural and policy objectives as well as offender outcomes, the larger project within which 
this study is contained adds to the limited body of empirical literature on sanctioning reform. The 
process evaluation was designed to examine an equally under researched area; how the reform 
was perceived by the key actors in the sanctioning process: adult parole authority officers.  
PROCESSES UNDERLYING PERCEPTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGE  
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  Very few studies have examined criminal justice actors’ perceptions of agency policies or 
changes in agency policies. Still, there is a rich body of organizational literature and 
corresponding theory which could be potentially relevant to the subject. Even though the study 
methods described below were largely inductive, several organizational perspectives were still 
applicable to the process evaluation. Suffice it to say that the following theoretical perspectives 
were implicit in shaping the conceptual framework of the study; therefore, most of the measures 
which were considered for the analyses could potentially be framed in one or more of these 
perspectives. 
  Expectancy theory (see, e.g., Mastrofski, Snipes, and Ritti, 1994; Mitchell, 1974) could 
be relevant to understanding officers’ perceptions of the sanction grid. This is because officers’ 
beliefs or expectations regarding the effectiveness of the sanction grid could be influenced by 
their individual experiences, training, and views about the intent and outcomes of the sanction 
grid. Variables such as training, perceptions of the intent of the sanction grid, length of service, 
orientation towards parole supervision, and so forth could shape officers’ perceptions regarding 
the effectiveness of the sanction grid. 
  Aspects of need theory (Maslow, 1943) could also be related to understanding officers’ 
views regarding the sanction grid. For example, belonging needs such as satisfaction with 
coworkers or supervisors could influence officers’ attitudes towards their job as well as any 
policies the administration requires them to apply. Similarly, esteem-related needs may also 
influence officers’ perceptions of the sanction grid because officers may vary in their opinions 
concerning whether their skills and experience were recognized in the design of the sanction 
grid. Accordingly, concepts tapping involvement in organizational decision-making, years of 
service, salary, or rank could be linked to officers’ perceptions of the sanction grid.  
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  Perspectives on equity in the workplace (see, e.g., Stojkovic, Kalinich, and Klofas, 2003) 
may also be relevant to the subject. If particular groups of officers perceive that the sanction grid 
disproportionately affects their ability to perform their job, they may be less likely to view the 
sanction grid in a positive manner. Drawing from this perspective, individual officer 
characteristics such as age, race, gender, rank, office location (e.g., rural), caseload size, or 
specialization (e.g., sex offenders) could be associated with particular views about the sanction 
grid.  
  Finally, perspectives on achievement and power (see, e.g., Hepburn, 1985; McClelland, 
1965; French and Raven, 1959) could be useful in understanding officers’ views regarding the 
intent and efficacy of the sanction grid. For example, how officers view their basis of power 
(e.g., coercive) could be pertinent to perceptions of the sanction grid because the sanction grid 
was designed to standardize the treatment of offenders. Similarly, officers who perceive a gap 
between their (or their superiors’) ideal and actual amount of control over their caseload could 
view the sanction grid more negatively due to its design to regulate offender treatment. From this 
perspective, officers’ basis of power, rank, and perceptions of personal control could all be 
applicable to explaining their perceptions regarding the sanction grid.   
Officers Attitudes and Organizational Change 
  The implementation of the sanction grid was carried out under ODRC’s larger 
department-wide reentry initiative. Therefore, regardless of its intent, the sanction grid could 
carry with it the impression that it was a “rehabilitative” measure, as reentry and rehabilitation 
are often conceptually linked. Officers’ attitudes towards supervision could influence their 
perceptions of the sanction grid because some officers emphasize law enforcement objectives 
versus treatment and assistance objective (Clear and Latessa, 1993; Harris, Clear, and Baird, 
1989). If officers are more favorable to the law enforcement goals of supervision, they may 
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perceive any policy implemented under the guise of “reentry” or “rehabilitation” as a challenge 
to the skills and duties they perceive as most important to their job. 
  Power can be defined as the ability of party A to determine the behavior of a party B 
(Hepburn, 1985; Stojkovic et al., 2003). By virtue of their legally ordered relationship, parole 
officers are charged with ensuring offenders comply with conditions of supervision. As such, 
power is relevant to the performance of a parole officer’s job. Variation in officers’ views on 
how offender compliance is attained may center on their individual bases of power. As noted 
above, the sanction grid was designed to be consistent with notions of procedural justice, which 
suggest that compliance is achieved by promoting fairness, preserving offender dignity, and 
responding with certainty and swiftness to violation behavior (Taxman, Soule, and Gelb, 1999). 
It follows that the degree of concordance between the purposes and design of the sanction grid 
and officers’ individual bases of power could influence their perceptions regarding the sanction 
grid’s intent and outcomes. 
METHODS 
  The process evaluation was designed to determine Adult Parole Authority (APA) 
officers’ perceptions regarding ODRC’s transition to the sanctioning grid. The process 
evaluation was carried out in two phases. First, focus groups with line-level APA officers and 
semi-structured interviews with parole services supervisors were conducted in four of the seven 
APA supervision regions. The focus groups and interviews were conducted to guide the 
development of a mail survey which was distributed to APA officers as the second phase of the 
study. The focus groups and interviews were carried out between August and December of 2006 
and the survey was administered between March and May of 2007.  
FOCUS GROUPS AND INTERVIEWS 
  85
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Appendix 9--Examining the Effectiveness of Ohio’s Progressive Sanction Grid—UC Report 
 
The regions in which focus groups and interviews were conducted were purposively selected 
based on size and geographic location, and included Cincinnati, Chillicothe, Lima, and 
Cleveland. In each of the four regions, all APA officers were invited via electronic mail to 
participate in focus groups that would be carried out during a week in which the UC researchers 
would be at their regional office collecting data from offender files for the validation study. The 
invitations resulted in five focus groups (at least one in each region) ranging in size from 5-12 
officers. It should be noted, however, that one of the focus groups had to be cancelled due to an 
unspecified critical incident that occurred the day the focus group was scheduled. In place of the 
focus group, individual interviews were subsequently conducted with those officers who had 
volunteered to participate. Supervisors who volunteered to participate in the focus groups were 
interviewed individually in order to protect the confidentiality of the participating line officers. 
Altogether, four focus groups and 14 interviews were conducted. 
The focus groups were conducted by at least two researchers, where one of the researchers 
acted solely as a note taker. All participants were asked the same 12 questions (see Appendix 1), 
and additional questions were asked when the researchers determined them to be relevant to the 
study. For the interviews with supervisors, the questions were modified slightly to address 
potential supervisory concerns. As noted above, the findings from the focus groups and 
interviews were primarily used to guide the development of the officer survey; however, the 
findings were also useful in providing some contextual information to supplement the survey 
findings.  
OFFICER SURVEY 
    The target population for the officer survey included all the APA officers who had used 
the sanction grid during the course of performing their job duties. These officers include line 
level parole officers who supervise parole and post-release control (PRC) cases, senior parole 
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officers who manage parole and PRC cases, but also perform some administrative 
responsibilities for their supervision unit, and parole services supervisors, who are responsible 
for overseeing an APA supervision unit.  
  Similar to most large parole agencies, the job responsibilities (e.g., report writing versus 
field supervision) of APA officers often change during the course of their employment. In order 
to adjust for the possibility that an officer had experience with the sanction grid, but at the time 
of the survey no longer carried an active parole/PRC caseload, the sampling frame included all 
the parole services supervisors, senior parole officers, and line level parole officers employed by 
the APA (N = 621). Each officer was sent a survey through the mail, and follow-up mailings 
were sent in general accordance with the procedures outlined by Dillman (1978). Several minor 
adjustments to Dillman’s (1978) method, however, should be noted. First, the initial mailing was 
followed with an electronic mail reminder, as opposed to a postcard. Another electronic mail 
reminder was also sent between the second and fourth follow-up mailings. Additionally, the 
fourth and final follow-up mailing was sent to only those officers who were identified by ODRC 
to be either a parole services supervisor or a parole/PRC caseload carrying officer at the time the 
sampling frame was generated. As such, this group of officers received four follow-up 
reminders, as opposed to the three reminders sent to the entire sampling frame. These procedures 
resulted in 469 returned surveys, a response rate of nearly 76 percent. 
  The information obtained from the surveys, along with the official data obtained from 
ODRC, facilitated the determination of the number of officers who had used the sanction grid 
and should therefore be included in the target population (N = 460). The remaining APA 
employees were excluded from the study because they did not have experience with the sanction 
grid and instead performed duties such as transports, presentence investigations, or supervision 
of community control (probation) cases. Of the 460 officers who were determined to be the 
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target population, 380 returned surveys, a response rate of nearly 83 percent. The final sample 
was further reduced to 373 officers because seven surveys were determined to be unusable due to 
substantial missing data. Univariate hypothesis tests revealed that the sample statistics for the 
variables age, race, gender, rank (e.g., parole services supervisor), and years employed by ODRC 
were not significantly different from the corresponding population parameters which were 
generated from official data provided by ODRC.    
Measures 
  Unless a specific answer was required (e.g., gender), the survey asked officers to respond 
to questions by choosing from likert type response categories (e.g., agree, disagree). All of the 
measures included in the final models are described in Table 1; although a larger pool of 
potential predictors were initially considered for the analyses. The measures in Table 1 were 
ultimately selected after considering their theoretical relevance as demonstrated in the empirical 
literature, thorough checks for (multi)collinearity, the stability of coefficient estimates 
(influenced by the number of predictors relative to sample size), and the strength of the zero-
order relationships. 
-- table 1 about here -- 
The outcome measures were created by factor analyzing responses to multiple survey 
questions regarding the sanction grid. Exploratory factor analysis resulted in seven factors with 
eigenvalues > 1.00, six of which were initially used as outcome measures. The factors that were 
ultimately used in the analyses were created separately to permit examination of potential 
covariation between the concepts of interest (i.e., some of these measures were included as 
predictor variables in subsequent analyses). Each scale, however, was primarily based on the 
results of the exploratory analysis. The individual items which made up each factor and their 
component loadings are described in Appendix 2.  
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Two factors tapped officers’ perceptions regarding the implementation of the sanction grid. 
Professional respect measured the degree to which officers perceived their views and skills were 
considered in the design of the sanction grid. Adequacy of training assessed officers’ opinions 
regarding the level of training they received on how to use the sanction grid. A second pair of 
factors examined officers’ understanding regarding the intent of the sanction grid. Primary intent 
assessed officers’ understanding of the purposes of the sanction grid (e.g., application of 
consistent procedures), whereas secondary intent examined officers’ perceptions regarding other 
potential purposes, whether intended or not (e.g., reduce the prison population), of the sanction 
grid. The final two outcome measures tap officers’ views regarding the outcomes resulting from 
the transition to the sanction grid. Effectiveness examined the officers’ opinions of whether the 
sanction grid achieved its intended purposes. Offender control is a more specific measure which 
assessed officers’ perceptions about whether offender behavior has been easier to manage since 
the implementation of the sanction grid. Only the responses from officers who had been with the 
ODRC before and after the implementation of the sanction grid (N = 338) were used to create 
this scale.   
  Based on the criteria described above, the predictor variables that were ultimately 
included in all of the models were whether an officer was female, nonwhite, had education 
beyond a bachelor’s degree, was a parole services supervisor, supervised sex offenders, their 
number of years of service with ODRC, and each officers’ caseload size. For the measure of 
caseload size, the values for parole services supervisors were created by standardizing the total 
cases assigned to their unit by the number of officers in their unit. Factors tapping officers’ level 
of satisfaction with their supervisor, coworkers, and regional administrator were also created to 
ascertain the influence of the officer’s perceptions of the organizational climate on their 
evaluation of the sanction grid. The same procedures as those described above were used to 
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create the scales related to dimensions of organizational satisfaction. Descriptions of the 
individual items that make up each of the satisfaction scales are also contained in Appendix 2. 
Finally, the seventh factor discussed above, case management adjustment, measures the degree 
of change in routine case management that officers’ perceived had occurred as a result of the 
sanction grid. Case management adjustment was only created for those officers who had been 
with the department before and after the implementation of the sanction grid. As such, this 
variable was only included in the analyses of offender control. 
  Attitudinal measures were also created to examine whether officers’ approaches to 
supervision influenced their perceptions of the sanction grid’s intent or effectiveness. Authority 
and Assistance were factors designed to tap officers’ attitudes toward role performance. The 
individual items used to create these scales, which are listed in Appendix 2, were modified 
versions of questions originally used by Glaser (1969) and subsequently by Clear and his 
colleagues (e.g., Clear and Latessa, 1993; Harris et al., 1989). Measures of officers’ power bases 
were also examined. Following prior studies of the subject (e.g., French and Raven, 1959; 
Hepburn, 1985), measures were created to tap legitimate, coercive, reward, expert, and referent 
power. Two survey questions were used to tap each base of power. The survey questions are 
displayed in Appendix 3. Prior to the analyses, the responses to each of the questions were 
converted to z-scores and summed to create each base of power scale. The analyses which 
included officers’ bases of power were restricted to 372 or 337 (offender control) officers 
because one officer did not respond to the questions used to create these scales.   
Statistical Analyses 
  All steps in the analysis involved multi-level modeling techniques due to the need to 
recognize the hierarchical structure of the data (officers nested within supervision units and 
supervision units nested within APA regions). Tri-level data sets were created with officers at 
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level-1, supervision units at level-2, and APA regions at level-3. The tri-level data files adjusted 
for correlated error among officers “nested” within the same supervision units as well as for 
correlated error among supervision units within the same APA region. The technique also 
facilitated hypothesis tests to determine whether significant variation in each outcome existed 
between supervision units or APA regions (e.g., did officers’ perceptions regarding the adequacy 
of training differ across supervision units or across the seven APA regions?).  
The linear outcome measures were all examined with hierarchical linear regression using 
HLM 6.04 (Raudenbush, Bryk, Cheong, Congdon, and du Toit, 2004). The analyses proceeded 
in two stages. First, an unconditional model (with no predictors) revealed the variance estimates 
in each outcome at level-1 (among officers within supervision units), level-2 (between 
supervision units within APA regions), and level-3 (across regions). Next, fixed-effect models 
were estimated for each of the six outcome measures. Although the limited number of officers 
within units (and units within regions) restricted our ability to examine the random effects of the 
predictor variables, the level-1 model intercepts were still allowed to vary randomly across 
supervision units and the level-2 model intercepts were permitted to vary randomly across APA 
regions. All of the officer-level measures were centered on the means for each unit in order to 
reduce the odds of finding spurious level-1 effects due to unmeasured supervision unit-level 
effects that might also be related to compositional differences in officer populations across 
supervision units or even across APA regions.  
FINDINGS 
  The analyses of the survey data are presented in two parts. First, the outcome variables 
were modeled sequentially with the initial set of predictors that were discussed above. Next, we 
considered the role of officers’ attitudes in officers’ perceptions regarding the intent and 
outcomes of the sanction grid. Officer attitudes were considered separately in order to overcome 
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potential collinearity between the attitudinal measures and because ODRC had a particular 
interest in the outcomes of these analyses.  
  The focus groups and interviews revealed a general dissatisfaction with the sanction grid. 
Despite some variation in responses, officers seemed generally concerned with three major 
issues: 1) how the sanction grid was implemented, 2) the intent of the sanction grid, and 3) the 
outcomes which have resulted from the use of the sanction grid. Accordingly, the questions on 
the officer survey were designed to tap issues related to these three domains, as well as assess 
potential differences between officers’ perceptions of these issues. 
Table 2 contains the findings from the analyses of officers’ perceptions of issues related to 
implementation, professional respect, and adequacy of training. Before delving into the 
multivariate findings, it should be noted that the responses to the individual items comprising the 
professional respect scale indicated widespread disagreement with the notion that officers’ skills 
and views were considered in the design of the sanction grid. On the other hand, officers 
generally felt that they were trained adequately on the sanction grid and understood its use. 
-- table 2 about here -- 
  The multivariate analyses of professional respect revealed that officer’s satisfaction with 
their regional administrator was positively related to perceptions of professional respect; 
however, none of the other predictors were related to professional respect. Satisfaction with the 
regional administrator, being the only significant predictor, accounted for 8 percent of the 
variation in professional respect. More generally, however, these findings are consistent with the 
notion that the attitudes held by APA officers regarding professional respect were widespread. 
That is, regardless of their individual characteristics, the nature of their job, or perceptions of 
their supervision unit, officers did not feel their skills and views were considered in the design of 
the sanction grid. This conclusion is further confirmed by the analysis of variance between units 
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and APA regions. Perceptions of professional respect did not vary across supervision units, and 
only a modest, albeit significant, 3 percent of the variation in professional respect was between 
regions.   
  Turning to the analysis of perceptions concerning the adequacy of training, Table 2 
reveals that none of the predictor variables included in the model was related to the adequacy of 
training. Moreover, officers’ perceptions regarding training did not vary between supervision 
units or between the APA regions. These findings suggest uniformity in officers’ evaluation of 
the training on the sanction grid provided by ODRC. When taken with the responses to the 
questions regarding training, the findings here indicate that ODRC did an equally acceptable job 
in instructing its officers on how to use the sanction grid.  
  The results from the analyses of primary and secondary intent are contained in Table 3. 
Recall that primary intent refers to the principal procedural objectives of the sanction grid such 
as standardizing the sanctioning process. Minority officers and supervisors were more likely to 
understand the primary intent of the sanction grid. Officers’ years of service and their caseload 
size were negatively related to whether they comprehended the primary intent of the sanction 
grid. Officers’ perceptions of professional respect were also positively related to their 
understanding of the primary intent of the sanction grid. Officers’ gender, education level, 
whether they supervised sex offenders, their satisfaction with the dimensions of their work 
environment, and their perceptions regarding the adequacy of training on the sanction grid did 
not have an effect on their perceptions of the sanction grid’s primary intent. Officers’ perceptions 
of the primary intent of the sanction grid did, however, vary significantly across supervision 
units and APA regions, which suggests that there may be unmeasured organizational influences 
that effect the level of understanding regarding the primary intent of the sanction grid. 
-- table 3 about here -- 
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  Secondary intent refers to the more understated or latent goals of the policy such as 
reducing the number of hearings, controlling officer discretion, and so forth. In contrast to the 
analysis of primary intent, the findings from the model of secondary intent (Table 3) revealed 
that minority officers and officers who supervise sex offenders were less likely to perceive a 
secondary intent to the sanction grid. Similar to the analysis of primary intent, supervisors also 
perceived there was a secondary intent to the implementation of the sanction grid. Finally, 
officers who perceived that they were less respected were more likely to view a secondary intent 
to the sanction grid.  
  The significant predictors accounted for 21 percent of the variation in primary intent, 
while the relevant predictors only accounted for 8 percent of the variation in secondary intent. 
Unlike the analysis of primary intent, perceptions regarding a secondary intent of the sanction 
grid did not vary across supervision units or the APA regions. These findings support the idea 
that perceptions regarding a potential secondary intent of the sanction grid were boundary 
spanning. 
  Table 4 contains the results of the analyses of officer perceptions regarding the outcomes 
of the sanction grid. Effectiveness refers to the intended outcomes of the sanction grid such as 
making sanctioning more fair. Offender control is more specific to officers’ perceived ability to 
manage offender behavior. In general, the responses to the items that made up these scales 
indicated a fairly widespread disagreement regarding the effectiveness of the sanction grid and 
its ability to improve offender control. As table 4 makes clear, officers’ reported satisfaction with 
supervisors was negatively related to their perceptions of the sanction grid’s effectiveness. 
Satisfaction with the regional administrator, perceptions of professional respect, and primary 
intent were all positively associated with more supportive views of the sanction grid’s 
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effectiveness. These significant predictors accounted for 46 percent of the variation in officers’ 
perceptions of the effectiveness of the sanction grid. 
-- table 4 about here -- 
  Similar findings emerged from the analysis of officers’ perceptions of offender control. It 
is important to remember, however, that these analyses were restricted to those offenders who 
were with ODRC both before and after the implementation of the progressive sanction grid. 
Consistent with the analysis of effectiveness, officers’ satisfaction with their supervisor was 
negatively related to their perceptions of offender control. Also consistent with the analysis of 
effectiveness, satisfaction with the regional administrator, perceptions of professional respect, 
and primary intent were all positively associated with perceptions of offender control. Unique to 
this outcome, however, was a negative relationship between secondary intent and offender 
control. The measure of case management adjustment was also negatively associated with 
offender control. The latter finding suggests that officers who perceived a change in the way they 
managed their caseload as a result of the sanction grid also perceived a change in their ability to 
effectively regulate offender behavior. All told, the relevant predictor variables accounted for 29 
percent of the variation in offender control.  
  The organizational dimension to both sets of results that can be inferred from the effects 
of satisfaction with supervisor and satisfaction with regional administrator was further supported 
by the analysis of variance in each outcome which revealed that 5 percent of the variation in 
perception of effectiveness was between supervision units and 4 percent was between regions. 
Similarly, 11 percent of the variation in offender control was between supervision units. These 
findings demonstrate that officers in different supervision units and APA regions feel differently 
regarding the outcomes of the sanction grid, which suggests that perceptions and assessments of 
the sanction grid may be linked to broader perceptions of the supervision unit or job satisfaction. 
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Considering Officers’ Attitudes and Perceptions of the Progressive Sanction Grid  
  The attitudinal measures were initially examined without any other predictors in order to 
determine if they were related to the sanction grid outcomes under consideration. Those 
attitudinal measures which were determined to be relevant were retained and included in a fully 
specified model containing the predictors from the earlier analyses. Table 5 contains the results 
of the models of perceived intent of the sanction grid that included the measures tapping attitudes 
toward role performance. In the initial models, officers who viewed their role in terms of 
authority were less likely to agree with the primary intent of the sanction grid. Assistance 
oriented attitudes did not have an effect on primary intent and neither assistance nor authority 
had effects on secondary intent. In the full model of primary intent, the effect of authority 
became insignificant and all the relevant predictors from the earlier analyses maintained their 
relationships with primary intent.  
-- table 5 about here -- 
  The results of the analyses of primary and secondary intent which included the measures 
of officers’ bases of power are displayed in Table 6. Coercive power was positively related to 
primary intent, while all of the other types of power bases were insignificant. Moreover, none of 
the bases of power were associated with secondary intent. In the complete model of primary 
intent, the effect of coercive power became irrelevant while the other relevant predictors from 
the earlier analyses remained associated with primary intent. 
-- table 6 about here -- 
  Table 7 displays the results of the analyses of the outcomes of the sanction grid which 
included the measures of attitudes oriented towards authority and assistance. The initial models 
revealed a negative relationship between authority and perceptions of effectiveness. Assistance 
was unrelated to effectiveness, and neither dimension of role performance was related to 
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offender control. Table 7 also shows that the negative relationship between authority and 
effectiveness held once the other predictors were included in the model. Interestingly, all the 
other relevant predictors except satisfaction with supervisor remained related to perceived 
effectiveness after authority was added to the model. The addition of authority increased the 
overall strength of the model from .46 to .47.  
-- table 7 about here -- 
  The results of the analyses sanction grid outcomes which included officers’ bases of 
power are included in Table 8. Coercive power, expert power, and legitimate power were each 
related to both effectiveness and offender control. Referent power was also predictive of offender 
control. In the full model of effectiveness, the effect of legitimate power diminished, but the 
effects of coercive and expert power remained significant. Both bases of power were positively 
associated with officers’ perceptions regarding the sanction grid’s effectiveness. The other 
relevant predictors from the earlier analysis of effectiveness remained significant, and the overall 
predictive power of the model increased by 3 percent with the addition of coercive and expert 
power.  
-- table 8 about here -- 
  The fully specified model of offender control revealed stable relationships for referent, 
coercive, and legitimate power. Referent and coercive power were positively associated with 
offender control, while legitimate power was negatively associated with offender control. The 
significant predictors from the earlier analysis remained related to offender control, and the 
overall strength of the model increased by 6 percent with the addition of the relevant bases of 
power.    
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SUMMARY 
  The findings from the process evaluation revealed that officers’ opinions regarding the 
implementation of the sanction grid were relatively consistent regardless of their individual 
characteristics or the location of their workplace. Generally, officers did not feel their opinions 
and skills were considered in the design of the sanction grid, but they did feel adequately trained 
on the use of the sanction grid. These findings substantiate what was gleaned from the focus 
groups and interviews, where most officers reported an understanding of the grid, but were 
suspicious as to whether officers were involved in its design. For example, most officers reported 
that they were not aware that any POs were involved in the design of the sanction grid. A few 
officers noted that there were officers included in the workgroup formed to address the sanction 
policy, but that the sanction grid was developed prior to when the workgroup convened. When 
the workgroup did meet, the group was merely informed about the sanction grid and advised that 
it was going to be implemented. Paraphrasing one officer, “…although the officers in the 
workgroup were asked their opinions about the grid, it was generally perceived that those 
opinions were not going to be considered.” Finally, a couple officers advised that they received 
some electronic mails via the Department’s Division of Parole and Community Service list 
serve; however, the electronic mails were worded in a such a way that they were very difficult to 
understand. Generally, officers did not feel that they had a fair opportunity to respond to the 
proposed policy reform.  
The survey data revealed that those officers who did perceive that their opinions and skills 
were considered in the design of the sanction grid, or were otherwise recognized and appreciated,  
reported a better understanding regarding the intent of the policy. Training, however, had no 
effect on officers’ perceptions regarding the intent of the grid. With the exception of race, 
background and job related characteristics of the officers had little effect on their perceptions 
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regarding the intent of the sanction grid. Altogether, these findings suggest that officers who 
believe they are not accorded professional respect by the administration of the ODRC are 
suspicious of the motives behind the development of the sanction grid, but that the training 
adequately prepared officers to apply the grid in practice, regardless of their perceptions of 
intent. 
  Regarding the outcomes of the sanction grid, those officers who understood the primary 
intent of the sanction grid to be to ensure consistent treatment of offenders were more favorable 
in their evaluations regarding the sanction grid’s effectiveness and their ability to control 
offender behavior after its implementation. Officers who felt that that their opinions were 
considered in the design of the grid were also more favorable in their evaluation of the outcomes 
of the sanction grid. Finally, officers’ satisfaction with their supervisor and regional 
administrator were related to their assessments of the effectiveness of the sanction grid as well as 
their opinion about their ability to control offenders after the grid was implemented. Officer 
characteristics had little or no effect on perceived outcomes of the sanction grid, but officers who 
were more authoritative in their approach to supervision were less favorable regarding the 
sanction grid’s effectiveness. Officers’ bases of power also affected their opinions regarding the 
outcomes of the sanction grid. Interestingly, those officers who viewed their base of power as 
coercive were more favorable regarding the sanction grid, while officers who viewed their base 
of power as legitimate were less favorable. This latter finding runs counter to expectations since 
the sanction grid is grounded in notions of procedural justice which are generally consistent with 
perspectives on legitimate authority as a means of compliance (see, e.g., Tyler, 1990). Given 
comments made in the focus groups, it is possible that at least some officers perceive that the 
sanction grid restricts parole officers’ ability to exercise legitimate power.   
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VALIDATION STUDY 
  The validation study was designed to confirm or disconfirm the findings generated by the 
ODRC’s evaluation of the progressive sanction grid. The study involved collection of a separate 
sample of cases from offender files for the purposes of comparison to the parallel ODRC sample 
and replication of the main analyses performed by the ODRC.  
METHODS 
In light of the purposes of the validation study, the methods and analytic techniques 
employed by the UC researchers were virtually identical to those described above by the ODRC. 
The sample of offenders was selected using the same procedures as those used by the ODRC, 
resulting in a pre-sanction grid sample of 1,040 offenders and a post-sanction grid sample of 
1,012 offenders. Approximately 50 percent of each sample overlapped with the parallel ODRC’s 
samples. The offender data for the validation study were collected by two researchers from UC. 
Inter-rater reliability analyses conducted using a random sample of 10 cases selected from one of 
the APA regions revealed an internal consistency between the two researchers of .93. Although 
budgetary restrictions prohibited the UC researchers from collecting the range of information 
obtained by the ODRC, the data collected by the UC researchers did permit replication of many 
of the outcome measures and the main analyses performed by the ODRC. Aside from the 
measures of major and high severity violation used in both the incident-level and offender-level 
analyses and the measure residential instability used in the offender-level analysis, the measures 
included in the final analyses were identical to those used by the ODRC. Regarding the former, 
the difference between the ODRC and the UC measures lies in how misdemeanors with weapons 
were treated. Specifically, the ODRC considered new misdemeanor with a weapon offenses a 
major violation, whereas the UC researchers included all new misdemeanors (including those 
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37 with weapons) in the high severity violation category.  Due to data availability, different 
information was used to create the measure of residential instability. The measure used in the UC 
researchers’ analysis was created by standardizing the total number of residential moves minus 
residential placements by the number of months at risk. The upper quartile of the distribution 
was subsequently treated as a high rate of change in residence. For reasons described below, we 
do not expect that the differences in how these measures were created had a significant impact on 
the results of the validation study.  
FINDINGS 
  The validation study had two components. First, we compared the sample collected by 
the UC researchers to the sample collected by the ODRC. Next, we replicated the primary 
multivariate analyses performed by the ODRC. Each phase was performed for both the incident- 
and offender-level analyses. The incident-level results are presented first. 
-- table 9 about here -- 
  The differences between the ODRC and UC samples are detailed in Table 9. Although a 
few differences did emerge, the samples are generally comparable. The primary difference is the 
substantial dissimilarity in the cumulative violation rate. The UC sample had a much higher rate 
of violations per months at risk than the ODRC sample. Despite the differences in coding 
procedures discussed above, the UC sample had a higher proportion of major violations and a 
lower proportion of high severity violations. As such, it is unlikely the differences in procedures 
contributed to any inconsistencies between studies in the multivariate analyses discussed below. 
Differences in outcomes were small but included a higher rate of pre-hearing jail detentions, a 
lower rate of violation hearings resulting in a return to prison, and a lower revocation/return rate 
overall. More of the incidents in the UC sample were committed by sex offenders, while fewer 
 
37 The data coding form used by the UC researchers did not permit a distinction between types of misdemeanors. 
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were committed by high risk offenders. Finally, the UC sample had incidents that were 
committed by slightly younger offenders and a higher proportion of incidents in the UC sample 
occurred in the Lima region.     
  Table 10 presents the results of models of the decision to pursue a hearing. With respect 
to the effects of the sanction grid, we observed similar findings to those found by the ODRC. 
Similar results were also observed for the effects of violation severity and incident number. 
Noteworthy differences emerged for the effects of offender risk. Specifically, ODRC found 
consistent effects for both high and medium risk regardless of whether the incident occurred in 
the pre- or post-guidelines time period. We did not find any effects for offender risk in any of our 
samples (pooled, pre-, or post). The differences in the findings may lie in the amount of missing 
data. The samples described in Table 9 were generally comparable (ODRC = 3,248 
incidents/1,196 offenders, UC = 3,328 incidents/1,223 offenders), however, once the cuts 
described above were made to the respective samples the remaining UC sample was 
considerably larger. Since the UC sample had a larger proportion of the total incidents that were 
committed by sex offenders and a larger proportion of the total incidents that were major 
violations (both were removed from the analyses in table 10), the ODRC sample should have 
been larger. However, table 4 reveals that the UC sample is larger than the ODRC sample, N = 
1,722 compared to N = 1,566. Although impossible to examine with these data, the distinctions 
between the samples may have contributed to the dissimilarities in the effects of offender risk. 
Then again, sampling error may also have contributed to some of these effects. Regardless of the 
differences between the studies, however, ODRC’s main findings regarding the sanction grid 
were substantiated by our analyses. 
-- table 10 about here -- 
  102
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Appendix 9--Examining the Effectiveness of Ohio’s Progressive Sanction Grid—UC Report 
 
    Table 11 contains the results from the analysis of revocation/returns resulting from 
technical violations. Similar to the findings from the previous analysis (Table 10), our findings 
are generally similar to those reported by the ODRC. In particular, the main findings regarding 
the effects of the sanction grid, violation type, and offender risk are all generally consistent with 
those reported by the ODRC. Notable differences between the two set of findings include those 
regarding the significant effects of felony level in the pooled sample, the effect of medium risk in 
the pre-guideline sample, and the effects for felony level and parole release in the post-guidelines 
samples. Also inconsistent with the ODRC findings were the null effects of violation rate in both 
the pooled analysis and post-guideline period. Similar to the previous analysis, we also observed 
a larger number of total incidents without missing data on sanction type (ODRC: N = 1,970, UC: 
N = 2,298), which may, in part, account for the few differences between the findings from the 
two studies. All told, however, our incident-level results generally mirror those found by the 
ODRC, and if anything, further support their overall conclusions regarding the effects of the 
sanction grid.  
-- table 11 about here -- 
  Turning to the offender-level analyses, Table 12 reveals that the UC sample 
characteristics were generally consistent with the characteristics of the ODRC sample. 
Employment and residential instability were the only measures for which the distributions 
differed in both the pre- and post-guidelines sample. Regarding residential instability, it is 
important to note that the distinctions were probably due to the different sources of information 
used to create the respective measures. As a result of the differences in the procedures, it may be 
more important to note the similarity between the UC sample and the ODRC sample in the 
differences between the pre- and post-guidelines samples (both samples = .06). This similarity 
allows us to place more confidence in the results of the multivariate analyses described below; as 
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it was unlikely the difference in the procedures used to create the measure of residential 
instability altered the overall findings of the analyses. Finally, it is also worth noting that the 
bivariate analyses of the study outcomes derived from the UC sample were actually more 
favorable (compared to the ODRC’s) regarding the sanction grid. Although no reductions in 
offender recidivism were observed, neither were any increases. 
-- table 12 about here -- 
  Table 13 contains the models predicting new felony crime. With minimal exceptions, our 
findings were virtually identical to those generated from the ODRC’s analysis. Similar to the 
ODRC, we did not find an effect for the sanction grid in the pooled analysis. By contrast, we did 
not observe the same, albeit modest, effects for the sanction grid in the interaction model. We 
also observed a consistent difference in the findings for residential instability; however, the 
incongruence in this finding is probably due to the difference in how the two measures were 
created. Finally, our analysis generated an effect for offender risk in the post guidelines sample; 
a finding which could be taken as support for the effect of the sanction grid. 
-- table 13 about here -- 
  The models predicting major violation behavior are contained in table 14. The overall 
effects of the sanction grid found by the ODRC were confirmed by our analysis. Major 
differences between the two studies included the consistent effect of residential instability and 
the inconsistent effect of overall violation rate in our study. The first difference could be 
explained by the differences in coding procedures noted above, and the different effects of the 
overall violation rate is, when considered with the similarities in the earlier analysis (table 6), too 
inconsistent (only two models) to draw any conclusions.  
-- table 14 about here -- 
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  All told, the general pattern of our results from both the incident- and offender-level 
analyses generally confirms the ODRC’s findings. Although a few differences in the statistical 
significance of some predictors did emerge, the substantive findings with respect to the sanction 
grid were nearly identical between the two studies.     
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
  The validation study generally substantiated the findings from the ODRC’s evaluation. 
Specifically, we found very few differences between the characteristics of our incident- or 
offender-level samples and the characteristics of the related samples generated by ODRC. Our 
multivariate analyses also supported the main findings from the ODRC’s analyses. Similar to the 
ODRC, our incident-level analysis revealed that the sanction grid was negatively related to both 
officers’ decision to pursue a hearing and returns to prison for a technical violation. We also 
observed very few differences in the factors that influenced the incident-level outcomes before 
and after the sanction grid was implemented. Also consistent with the ODRC analyses, our 
offender-level results indicated that the sanction grid had no appreciable effect on offender 
behavior (i.e., new felonies, major violation behavior). Taken together, these findings raise the 
level of confidence that can be placed in the main findings of the ODRC’s study. 
  The findings from the process evaluation suggest that very few officer characteristics had 
an effect on officers’ assessments of the sanction grid. By contrast, our findings did indicate an 
organizational effect on officers’ perceptions of the sanction grid. We found that officers 
generally did not feel that their opinions and skills were considered in the design of the grid. 
Officers who did feel they were more respected as professionals, however, had a better 
understanding of the intent of the sanction grid and also were more favorable in their evaluations 
regarding its effectiveness. Similarly, officers who perceived the intent of the sanction grid as 
standardizing the response to offender behavior were more positive in their assessments 
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regarding the outcomes of the reform. Officers who perceived the intent of the sanction grid was 
to restrict professional judgment, however, were less supportive in their evaluations of the 
sanction grid’s effectiveness.  
  The findings from the process evaluation also provided support for an organizational 
dimension to officers’ perceptions of the sanction grid that was linked to the chain of command. 
Officers who were more satisfied with their immediate supervisor were less favorable in their 
evaluations regarding the effectiveness of the policy. Officers who were more satisfied with their 
regional administrator, however, were more positive in their appraisal of the sanction grid. The 
information obtained from the interviews and focus groups aid in making sense of these findings. 
It could be that officers have aligned with their supervisors in some units, as many supervisors 
also viewed the grid as a misguided and unnecessary reform.  
  We were advised that prior to the implementation of the sanction grid, that the standard 
operating procedure was for officers to staff most sanctioning decisions with a supervisor or 
senior parole officer. In many of the officers’ and supervisors’ opinions the staffing served as a 
check and balance system that helped to ensure a fair and progressive response to offenders’ 
behavior. In the period following the implementation of the sanction grid, supervisors no longer 
guided the structuring of sanctioning decisions. Decisions were made in accordance with the 
sanction grid. The result of this change in the sanctioning process could be that, much like many 
of the line officers, some supervisors felt less respected as professionals. In these supervisor’s 
supervision units, officers and their supervisor may have come together in their opposition to the 
policy reform. In other supervision units, however, supervisors may have tried to support the 
department’s initiative, which could have created friction between them and the officers under 
their supervision. For example, one supervisor indicated that the policy was helpful because 
he/she no longer had to persuade some of his/her officers that arrests or hearings were 
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unnecessary for certain violations. The result of these two processes may be the inverse effect we 
observed in the analysis of the survey data. While there was general consistency in the responses 
about the sanction grid that were gained from the focus groups of officers, less uniformity was 
found across the interviews with supervisors. Some supervisors were favorable towards the 
sanction grid, while others were frustrated in much the same way as the line officers.           
  Regarding the regional administrators, the focus groups and interviews revealed that 
officers generally perceived that the regional administrator was the only person who could 
override the sanction grid. It could be that the positive relationship observed in the analyses of 
the survey data was a function of the officers’ perceptions of the regional administrators’ 
willingness to override the policy. In regions where it was perceived that the regional 
administrator was willing to override the sanction grid, officers may have been more favorable 
regarding the reform. In these regions, the regional’s willingness to override may have been 
perceived by the officers as support for their professional judgment. In regions where regional 
administrators were not perceived as willing to override the sanction grid, however, officers may 
have felt less supported. Recall that satisfaction with the regional administrator was also linked 
to perceptions of professional respect. On the other hand, it is likely that officers who understood 
and agreed with the primary purpose of the sanction grid had less desire for overrides and thus 
were more likely to assess their regional administrator positively. Although the survey data do 
not allow us to sort-out the causal ordering of these processes, the data seem to indicate that 
officers’ feelings that their judgment was not supported may have contributed to a more negative 
assessment of the sanction grid. 
  Finally, it should be noted that there was variation in perceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of the sanction grid across supervision units and across the APA regions. While 
some of these differences can probably be attributed to the observations regarding the chain of 
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command that were discussed above, the qualitative information collected from the interviews 
and focus groups suggest other possible explanations. Officers in some regions voiced concerns 
regarding their ability to use the sanction grid effectively in the face of scarce resources. For 
example, officers who worked in more rural areas remarked how it was difficult to progressively 
sanction offenders when the sanctions outlined in the policy are unavailable or impractical as 
illustrated by the following comments. “It is hard to require day reporting or increase office 
reporting when the offender can’t drive and there is no public transportation available.” 
“Community service is no longer useful because of the worker’s compensation requirement.” 
Substantiating these types of statements, the officer survey revealed that close to 50 percent of 
the officers felt that their unit did not have the resources to use the sanction grid the way it was 
supposed to be used. Interestingly, many officers agreed that the policy could be made to work 
(46 percent). Nearly 60 percent officers who responded felt the grid could work if they had more 
sanctions to use. Thus, from many of the officers’ perspectives the problem may not be with the 
policy per se, but more so with the way the reform was implemented and the availability of 
resources to carry out the policy effectively.     
  In sum, the findings from the process evaluation point to the organizational dimensions of 
policy change. Even though the ODRC circulated drafts of the sanction grid and violation policy 
on the Department of Parole and Community Services newsgroup discussion board and 
convened a workgroup which included APA officers prior to the implementation of the sanction 
grid, most officers seemed dissatisfied with how the sanction grid was developed and 
implemented. Officers’ perceptions regarding how the sanction grid was developed and 
implemented, in turn, fueled their perceptions regarding its’ purpose and effectiveness. These 
findings are consistent with what has been observed in process evaluations of sentencing reform 
(e.g., Griffin and Wooldredge, 2001).  
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  Ironically, the policy was designed to make the sanctioning process more just, yet 
according to the majority of officers the process by which the policy was implemented was 
unfair. More broadly, these findings can be considered within perspectives on process based 
leadership (e.g., Tyler and De Cremer, 2005), which hold that when employees perceive that the 
organization or leadership acts in procedurally fair ways it is viewed as more legitimate and 
competent, which in turn makes employees more accepting of organizational change. From this 
evaluation of the Ohio Adult Parole Authority’s transition to progressive sanctioning guidelines 
we observed that parole officers did not feel that they were involved in the development of the 
guidelines and they did not perceive that the sanction guidelines recognized their professional 
abilities. For most officers, these feelings contributed to the perception that the policy was 
illegitimate and hence ineffective. Given the encouraging findings for those officers who did feel 
involved in the development process and recognized by the sanction grid, other agencies seeking 
to implement broad sweeping organizational policy reforms may benefit from increasing the 
involvement of line level employees in order that they identify with the policy and are thus more 
accepting of the change.   
  While our process evaluation found that parole officers, in general, felt excluded from the 
development process and were dissatisfied with the sanction grid, in total, the ODRC adoption of 
graduated sanctions guidelines for parole violations appears to have been successful in terms of 
altering sanctioning practices. The graduated sanctions do not appear to have resulted in any 
significant changes in rates of violation by offenders, but the progressive nature of violation 
sanctions dictated by the sanction grid does appear to have been implemented.  
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Appendix 1: Questions asked in Focus Groups and Interviews of APA Officers 
 
1. What are the purposes of the Graduated Sanction Grid? 
 
 
2. Who developed the Graduated Sanction Grid?    
 
 
3. How did you find out about the Graduated Sanction Grid policy?    
 
4. How were officers trained on the Graduated Sanction Grid policy (supervisors only)?    
 
5. Do you think you (and your officers) have enough information to follow the policy? 
 
 
6. Do you think the offenders know about the policy? 
 
 
7. Has the policy changed the way you manage your caseload (officers)? 
 
 
8. Is there anything good about the policy? 
 
 
9. Has the Grid affected service delivery (in your unit)? 
 
 
10. What is negative about the policy? 
 
 
11. Did the policy affect your (unit’s) ability to place holds on non-compliant parolees? 
 
 
12. How do you think the officers you supervise are adapting to the grid (supervisors only)? 
 
 
13. Are there rewards or penalties for following (officers who follow) the Grid? 
 
 
14. Has the policy changed the way you (your unit) sanction non-compliance? 
 
 
15. Anything else you think we need to know? 
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Appendix 2: Individual Items and Component Loadings for Factors 
 
  Component 
Scales  Loading 
Professional Respect (α = .47, KMO = .676, eigenvalue = 1.95)  
The Grid is based on research on effective discipline  .633 
Parole officers' opinions were considered in the design of the Grid  .806 
The Grid recognizes officers' professional ability  .796 
Using the Grid has lowered officers' spirits  .510 
Adequacy of Training (α = .81, KMO = .802, eigenvalue = 3.28)  
I received training on how to use the Grid  .687 
I did not receive enough information to use the Grid the way it is supposed to be used¹  .787 
I have received on-going training on how to use the Grid  .608 
More training on how to use the Grid would be helpful¹  .626 
I understand how to use the Grid  .676 
The Grid is confusing¹  .710 
The Grid should be made easier to use¹  .680 
Primary Intent (α = .69, KMO = .642, eigenvalue = 1.86)  
The Grid is intended to simplify the discipline process  .821 
The Grid is intended to make sanctioning more fair  .827 
The Grid is intended to reduce differences in offender treatment across the APA regions  .707 
Secondary Intent (α = .56, KMO = .601, eigenvalue = 1.65)  
The Grid is intended to reduce the number of hearings  .769 
The Grid is intended to reduce the prison population  .804 
The Grid is intended to reduce officer discretion  .639 
Effectiveness (α = .84, KMO = .874, eigenvalue = 3.60)  
Using the Grid makes sense to me  .705 
The Grid is useful in controlling officers' prejudices  .709 
The Grid has helped me make sanctioning decisions  .724 
The Grid effectively addresses offender risk  .704 
The Grid treats offenders fairly  .697 
Using the Grid has been helpful when I have gone to hearing²  .783 
The Grid allows for offenders to change  .690 
Case Management Adjustment (α = .55, KMO = .703, eigenvalue = 1.98)  
I staff more sanctioning decisions now that I use the Grid²  .640 
I go through more steps to sanction non-compliance now that I use the Grid²  .707 
I give more written sanctions now that I use the Grid²  .723 
I make more treatment referrals now that I use the Grid²  .531 
Since I started using the Grid I have not changed how I manage my caseload¹
, ² .512 
Offender Control (α = .71, KMO = .735, eigenvalue = 2.48)  
Since I started using the Grid I can respond to violations faster²  .557 
Since I started using the Grid it is harder for me to control offender behavior¹
, ² .712 
Since I started using the Grid my offenders respect me more²  .709 
Since I started using the Grid my offenders get away with less²  .695 
Since I started using the Grid I have had more offenders reoffend¹
, ² .569 
Since I started using the Grid I have more unnecessary paperwork¹
, ² .597 
Notes:  
           ¹ Reverse coded. 
           ² Parole services supervisors were asked to answer question in reference to their unit.  
           ³ Parole services supervisors were asked to answer question about their regional administrator. 
                 4 Parole services supervisors were asker to answer question about central office. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  111
This document is a research report submitted to the U.S. Department of Justice. This report has not 
been published by the Department. Opinions or points of view expressed are those of the author(s) 
and do not necessarily reflect the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.Appendix 9--Examining the Effectiveness of Ohio’s Progressive Sanction Grid—UC Report 
 
Appendix 2: Individual Items and Component Loadings for Factors (continued) 
 
  Component 
Scales  Loading 
Satisfaction with Supervisor (α = .95, KMO = .958, eigenvalue = 8.96)  
My immediate supervisor does a good job using the staff and resources available to him/her for the 
effective supervision of the offenders³ 
 
.844 
My immediate supervisor is helpful in getting me what I need to do my job effectively³  .857 
My immediate supervisor encourages me if I do my job well³  .828 
My immediate supervisor often blames others when things go wrong¹
, ³ .686 
My immediate supervisor helps me resolve problems when they arise³  .841 
My immediate supervisor listens to my suggestions on how to resolve problems³  .851 
My immediate supervisor listens to my suggestions on how to respond to violation behavior³  .796 
My immediate supervisor treats me fairly³  .909 
My immediate supervisor trusts me to do my job³  .839 
My immediate supervisor has not earned my respect¹
, ³ .692 
My immediate supervisor makes fair decisions³   .878 
I would transfer to another unit if given the opportunity to do so¹  .543 
My last performance rating was fair and accurate  .554 
The treatment I get from my superiors is about the same as the treatment my co-workers¹  .652 
My immediate supervisor asks me to work with fellow officers on job related problems that need to be 
taken care of³ 
.655 
Satisfaction with Coworkers (α = .81, KMO = .860, eigenvalue = 3.34)  
I get along with most of my co-workers  .652 
Most of my co-workers do their fair share of the work  .795 
Most of my co-workers are satisfied with their job  .522 
My co-workers volunteer to help handle problems when they come up  .725 
I do not trust my co-workers¹  .652 
My co-workers treat the offenders fairly  .719 
I am proud to work with the staff in this unit  .733 
Satisfaction with Regional Administrator (α = .79, KMO = .795, eigenvalue = 3.21)  
The regional administrator is open to suggestions made by the staff regarding how to solve region 
problems 
.814 
The regional administrator makes fair decisions  .850 
I am told promptly when there is a change in policy, rules, or regulations that affect me  .572 
It is often unclear who has the authority to make a decision¹  .544 
It is not as important to know your job as it is to get in good with the people in charge here¹   .505 
Hard work will typically lead to advancement or other rewards from the administration  .659 
The regional administrator and my unit supervisor are generally on the same page regarding how 
policies should be applied
.717 
4
Authority (α = .78, KMO = .774, eigenvalue = 2.40)  
How often should a parole officer make unannounced home visits  .810 
How often should a parole officer test their parolees for alcohol/drugs  .791 
How often should a parole officer perform record checks  .768 
How often should a parole officer make checks on who their parolees have been hanging out with  .724 
Assistance (α = .64, KMO = .679, eigenvalue = 2.16)  
A parole officer should refer a parolee to an employment service if he/she reports having trouble finding 
a job 
.486 
A parole officer should send a parolee to treatment the first time he/she tests positive for drugs  .435 
A parole officer should help a parolee make a budget if he/she is having trouble making child support 
payments 
.779 
A parole officer should work with parolees on structuring their time  .801 
A parole officer should assist parolees who report having family problems  .695 
Notes:  
           ¹ Reverse coded. 
           ² Parole services supervisors were asked to answer question in reference to their unit.  
           ³ Parole services supervisors were asked to answer question about their regional administrator. 
                 4 Parole services supervisors were asker to answer question about central office. 
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Appendix 3: Individual Items Comprising Officers’ Bases of Power 
 
Scale 
Reward Power 
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because I can give them special help or benefits 
A parole officer should reward parolees who complete supervision goals 
Referent Power  
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because they want my respect 
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because they want my approval 
Coercive Power  
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because they fear sanctions 
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because I can apply pressure or sanction them for not cooperating 
Expert Power  
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because of my skills and experience 
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because they think I know what is best for them 
Legitimate Power  
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because they believe I have the authority to tell them what to do 
Offenders typically do what I ask them to because I am fair 
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       Table 1: Sample Means (Standard Deviations) 
 
x s     
Level-1: Officers (N1 = 373)     
  Female¹  .38  (.49) 
  Nonwhite¹  .19  (.39) 
  Education > bachelor’s degree¹  .26  (.44) 
  Years of service  10.24  (7.02) 
  Parole services supervisor¹  .13  (.33) 
  Caseload size  76.22  (25.38) 
  Supervises sex offenders¹  .24  (.43) 
  Satisfaction with supervisor²  .00  (1.00) 
  Satisfaction with coworkers²  .00  (1.00) 
  Satisfaction with regional administrator²  .00  (1.00) 
  Professional respect²  .00  (1.00) 
  Adequacy of training²  .00  (1.00) 
  Primary intent²  .00  (1.00) 
  Secondary intent²  .00  (1.00) 
  Effectiveness²  .00  (1.00) 
  Authority²  .00  (1.00) 
  Assistance²  .00  (1.00) 
Level-1: Officers (N1 = 372)     
  Reward power³  .00  (1.51) 
  Referent power³ .00  (1.77) 
  Coercive power³  .00  (1.69) 
  Expert power³  .00  (1.70) 
  Legitimate power³  .00  (1.57) 
Level-1: Officers (N1 = 338)     
  Case management adjustment²   .00  (1.00) 
  Offender control²   .00  (1.00) 
Level-1: Units (N2 = 63)     
Level-1: Regions (N3 = 7)     
           N o t e s :    
     ¹ dummy coded. 
                  ² factor (individual items listed in Appendix 2). 
                  ³ sum of the z-scores of the responses to 2 items listed  
                                                          in Appendix 3. 
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          Table 2: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Implementation of  
             Progressive Sanction Grid (level-1 effects “fixed” across  
                                     supervision units) 
 
 Professional  Adequacy 
Respect  of Training 
SE  SE    β  β 
Intercept   .01  (.08) -.0001 (.05) 
        
Female   .09  (.11)  -.09  (.12) 
Nonwhite   .29  (.15)   .01  (.16) 
Education > bachelor’s degree   .18  (.13)   .03  (.13) 
Years of service   .002  (.01)  -.01  (.01) 
Parole services supervisor   .32  (.22)   .37  (.23) 
Caseload size   .000003  (.003)   .004  (.003) 
Supervises sex offenders   .10  (.20)   .10  (.21) 
Satisfaction with supervisor   .05  (.08)  -.01  (.08) 
Satisfaction with coworkers  -.01  (.07)   .08  (.07) 
Satisfaction with regional administrator   .16*  (.07)   .01  (.08) 
Adequacy of training   .001  (.06)  --  -- 
Professional respect  --     .001  (.06) 
N1  373  373 
Proportion variation within units    .97    1.00   
Proportion variation within units explained   .08      .03   
Proportion variation between units   .00      .00   
Proportion variation between regions   .03*      .00   
              * p < .05. 
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                       Table 3: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Intent of Progressive  
              Sanction Grid (level-1 effects “fixed” across supervision  
  units) 
 
 Primary  Intent  Secondary  Intent 
SE  SE    β  β 
Intercept   .01  (.10)   .002  (.06) 
        
Female   .12  (.10)  -.07  (.11) 
Nonwhite   .28*  (.13)  -.34*  (.15) 
Education > bachelor’s degree   .07  (.11)  -.10  (.13) 
Years of service  -.02*  (.01)  -.003  (.01) 
Parole services supervisor   .42*  (.20)   .54*  (.22) 
Caseload size  -.01**  (.002)   .002  (.003) 
Supervises sex offenders   .002  (.18)  -.47*  (.20) 
Satisfaction with supervisor   .04  (.07)   .09  (.08) 
Satisfaction with coworkers  -.04  (.06)   .06  (.07) 
Satisfaction with regional administrator   .12  (.07)  -.09 (.08) 
Adequacy of training   .07  (.05)   .03  (.05) 
Professional respect   .26**  (.05)  -.16**  (.06) 
N 373 373  1
Proportion variation within units    .90     .95   
Proportion variation within units explained   .21     .08   
Proportion variation between units   .06*     .05   
Proportion variation between regions   .04**     .00   
               ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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                       Table 4: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Outcomes of  
                                      Progressive Sanction Grid (level-1 effects “fixed” across  
  supervision units) 
 
 Effectiveness  Offender  Control 
SE  SE    β  β 
Intercept   .03  (.10)   .02  (.08) 
        
Female -.14  (.09)    .02  (.10) 
Nonwhite   .07  (.11)   .03  (.14) 
Education > bachelor’s degree  -.04  (.10)  -.13  (.12) 
Years of service  -.01  (.01)   .003  (.01) 
Parole services supervisor   .01  (.17)  -.36  (.19) 
Caseload size  -.002  (.002)  -.002  (.002) 
Supervises sex offenders  -.21 (.15)    .05  (.18) 
Satisfaction with supervisor  -.11*  (.06)  -.16*  (.07) 
Satisfaction with coworkers  -.05  (.05)  -.07  (.06) 
Satisfaction with regional administrator   .22**  (.05)   .21**  (.06) 
Adequacy of training  -.02  (.04)  -.03  (.05) 
Professional respect   .26**  (.05)   .30**  (.06) 
Primary intent   .45**  (.05)   .21**  (.06) 
Secondary intent  -.03  (.04)  -.13*  (.06) 
Case management adjustment  --  --  -.11*  (.05) 
N 373 338  1
Proportion variation within units    .91     .88   
Proportion variation within units explained   .46     .29   
Proportion variation between units   .05*     .11**   
Proportion variation between regions   .04**     .01   
              ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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            Table 5: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Intent of Progressive Sanction  
   Grid (level-1 effects “fixed” across supervision units) 
 
  Primary Intent  Primary Intent  Secondary Intent 
SE  SE  SE    β  β  β 
Intercept   .01  (.10)   .01 (.10)   .001 (.06) 
            
Authority -.11**  (.05)  -.09  (.05)  -.03  (.06) 
Assistance   .05  (.06)  --  --  -.03  (.06) 
Female       .13  (.10)     
Nonwhite       .26*  (.13)     
Education > bachelor’s degree       .08  (.11)     
Years of service      -.02*  (.01)     
Parole services supervisor       .41*  (.20)     
Caseload size      -.01**  (.002)     
Supervises sex offenders       .03  (.18)     
Satisfaction with supervisor       .05  (.07)     
Satisfaction with coworkers      -.04  (.06)     
Satisfaction with regional administrator       .12  (.06)     
Adequacy of training       .05  (.05)     
Professional respect       .26**  (.05)     
N 373 373  373  1
Proportion variation within units    .90     .90     .95   
Proportion variation within units explained   .02     .22     .00   
Proportion variation between units   .06*     .06*     .05   
Proportion variation between regions   .04**     .04**     .00   
        ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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            Table 6: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Intent of Progressive Sanction  
                           Grid (level-1 effects “fixed” across supervision units) 
 
  Primary Intent  Primary Intent  Secondary Intent 
     SE  SE  β  β 
Intercept   .01  (.10)   .01 (.10)   .001 (.06) 
            
Reward power   .03  (.04)  --  --   .01  (.04) 
Referent power   .01  (.04)  --  --  -.02  (.04) 
Coercive power   .10**  (.04)   .04 (.03) -.03  (.04) 
Expert power   .04  (.04)  --  --   .01  (.04) 
Legitimate power  -.06  (.04)  --  --   .04  (.04) 
Female       .11  (.10)     
Nonwhite       .29*  (.13)     
Education > bachelor’s degree       .08  (.11)     
Years of service      -.02*  (.01)     
Parole services supervisor       .44*  (.20)     
Caseload size      -.01**  (.002)     
Supervises sex offenders      -.01  (.18)     
Satisfaction with supervisor       .04  (.07)     
Satisfaction with coworkers      -.05  (.06)     
Satisfaction with regional administrator       .12  (.07)     
Adequacy of training       .06  (.05)     
Professional respect       .25**  (.05)     
N 372 372  372  1
Proportion variation within units    .90     .90     .95   
Proportion variation within units explained   .04     .21     .00   
Proportion variation between units   .06*     .06*     .05   
Proportion variation between regions   .04**     .04**     .00   
        ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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           Table 7: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Outcomes of Progressive Sanction  
  Grid (level-1 effects “fixed” across supervision units) 
 
 Effectiveness  Effectiveness  Offender  Control 
SE  SE  SE    β  β  β 
Intercept   .03  (.10)    .03 (.10)    .03 (.10) 
            
Authority -.14*  (.05)  -.08*  (.04)  -.09  (.06) 
Assistance   .01  (.06)  --  --  -.03  (.06) 
Female     -.13  (.09)     
Nonwhite       .06  (.11)     
Education > bachelor’s degree      -.03  (.09)     
Years of service      -.01  (.01)     
Parole services supervisor       .002  (.17)     
Caseload size      -.002  (.002)     
Supervises sex offenders      -.19  (.15)     
Satisfaction with supervisor      -.11  (.06)     
Satisfaction with coworkers      -.05  (.05)     
Satisfaction with regional administrator       .22**  (.05)     
Adequacy of training      -.03  (.04)     
Professional respect       .26**  (.04)     
Primary intent       .44**  (.05)     
Secondary intent      -.03  (.04)     
Case management adjustment      --  --     
N 373  373 338  1
Proportion variation within units    .91     .91     .88   
Proportion variation within units explained   .02     .47     .01   
Proportion variation between units   .05*     .05*     .11**   
Proportion variation between regions   .04**     .04**     .01   
       ** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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Table 8: Officer-Level Effects on Perceived Outcomes of Progressive Sanction Grid (level-1 
          effects “fixed” across supervision units) 
 
 Effectiveness  Effectiveness  Offender 
Control 
Offender 
Control 
SE  SE  SE  SE    β  β  β  β 
Intercept .02  (.10)   .03  (.10)  .01  (.07)   .01 (.07) 
                
Reward power  -.0002  (.04)  --  --  -.02  (.04)  --  -- 
Referent power   .03  (.03)  --  --   .07*  (.04)   .06*  (.03) 
Coercive power   .16**  (.03)   .07**  (.03)   .16**  (.03)   .10** (.03) 
Expert power   .09*  (.04)   .06*  (.03)   .08*  (.04)   .04  (.04) 
Legitimate power  -.10*  (.04)  -.04  (.03)  -.13*  (.04)  -.09*  (.04) 
Female     -.15  (.08)        .001  (.10) 
Nonwhite       .06  (.11)       .08  (.14) 
Education > bachelor’s degree      -.03  (.09)      -.12  (.11) 
Years of service      -.01  (.01)      -.002  (.01) 
Parole services supervisor       .02  (.16)      -.34  (.19) 
Caseload size      -.002  (.002)      -.002  (.002) 
Supervises sex offenders      -.20 (.15)        .05  (.17) 
Satisfaction with supervisor      -.12*  (.06)      -.15*  (.07) 
Satisfaction with coworkers      -.07  (.05)      -.08  (.06) 
Satisfaction with regional administrator       .21**  (.05)       .19**  (.06) 
Adequacy of training      -.02  (.04)      -.03  (.05) 
Professional respect       .23**  (.04)       .25**  (.05) 
Primary intent       .43**  (.05)       .18**  (.05) 
Secondary intent      -.03  (.04)      -.13*  (.05) 
Case management adjustment      --  --      -.10*  (.05) 
N 372 372  337  337  1
Proportion variation within units    .91     .91     .88     .88   
Proportion variation within units 
explained 
 .11     .49     .14     .35   
Proportion variation between units   .05*     .05*     .11**     .11**   
Proportion variation between regions   .04**     .04**     .01     .01   
** p < .01; * p < .05. 
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Table 9: Incident-Level Sample Means 
 
 ODRC  UC 
Sample  Sample 
Organizational Outcome    
Level of organizational response
1     .13      .13 
Hearing location
2       .80      .83 
Pre-hearing jail detention      .26      .30* 
Sanctions Imposed    
Hearing outcome
2       .75      .67* 
Revocation/return
3     .13      .10* 
Halfway house placement
3     .08      .09 
Independent Variables    
Offender risk     
  Low      .23      .23 
  Medium      .41      .42 
  High      .21      .19* 
  Sex Offender      .14      .17* 
Violation Severity     
  Major      .16      .18* 
  High      .47      .44* 
  Low      .37      .39 
Cumulative violation rate    1.23    1.88* 
Sex      .87      .87 
Race      .55      .54 
Age 33.38  32.82* 
Felony category of commitment offense    3.03    2.99 
Parole-eligible sentence     .26      .26 
Parole region     
  Akron      .17      .16 
  Cincinnati      .20      .20 
  Columbus      .18      .17 
  Lima      .09      .11* 
  Mansfield      .10      .09 
  Chillicothe      .09      .08 
  Cleveland      .18      .19 
N =  3,248  3,328 
Notes:  
                                  
1 Based on N = 1,722 
                         
2 Based on N = 354 
                         
3 Based on N = 2,298  
                                 * Difference between ODRC and UC samples p < .01  
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Table 10: Logistic Regression Models Predicting the Decision to Pursue a  
           Revocation Hearing (Maximum Likelihood Coefficients Reported with 
           Standard Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Pooled   Pre-Guidelines  Post-Guidelines 
 ODRC  UC   ODRC  UC   ODRC  UC 
Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample  Sample 
Constant    -4.29     -4.02     -5.89 
               
Violation severity high   2.70***   2.52***    2.67***   2.46***    2.74***   2.65*** 
      (.25)        (.29)        (.48) 
Incident number     .33***     .28***      .30***     .20**      .40***     .45*** 
      (.05)        (.05)     (.05)    (.08) 
Offender  risk               
  High     .95***     .25      .79**     .12    1.32**     .58 
      (.24)        (.29)        (.41) 
  Medium     .84***     .28      .66*     .38    1.25**     .02 
      (.21)        (.26)        (.36) 
Post-guidelines sample  -1.51***    -.99***             
      (.17)             
N  =  1,566  1,722     853     869 
Proportion variation explained      .34     .29      .32     .26      .26     .29 
         *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05  
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     Table 11: Logistic Regression Models Predicting Incident-Level Revocation/Return  
          (Maximum Likelihood Coefficients Reported with Standard Errors in 
          Parentheses) 
 
 Pooled   Pre-Guidelines    Post-Guidelines 
 ODRC 
Sample 
UC 
Sample 
 ODRC 
Sample 
UC 
Sample 
 ODRC 
Sample 
UC 
Sample 
Constant   -5.00      -5.20      -5.51 
                
Male     .27     .11       .33     .05      .15     .14 
      (.24)        (.35)        (.35) 
Non-white   -.26ª    -.27ª      -.36ª    -.30     -.10    -.25 
      (.16)        (.22)        (.24) 
Age at release   -.01    -.01      -.001    -.001     -.02    -.01 
      (.01)        (.01)        (.01) 
Felony level of committing offense   -.02     .15*      -.02     .07      .07     .25** 
      (.06)        (.09)        (.10) 
Parole release   -.87***    -.75***    -1.11***    -.61*     -.37    -.96** 
      (.20)        (.26)        (.35) 
Parole region                 
  Akron   -.01     .42       .15     .35      .13     .57 
            (.39)        (.37) 
  Cincinnati   -.15    -.66*      -.18  -1.01*     -.29    -.24 
      (.28)        (.42)        (.40) 
  Columbus    .17     .24       .45     .33     -.26     .23 
      (.26)        (.35)        (.41) 
  Lima    .22     .54ª       .56     .20     -.10   1.12** 
      (.28)        (.38)        (.42) 
  Mansfield    .80**     .63*       .76*     .68ª      .67     .60 
      (.28)        (.39)        (.43) 
  Chillicothe    .21     .26       .54     .68     -.10     .10 
      (.32)        (.46)        (.46) 
Violation severity                 
  Major  3.93***   3.46***     3.62***   3.27***    4.40***   3.59*** 
      (.28)        (.42)        (.39) 
  High  2.81***   2.32***     2.75***   2.56***    3.02***   2.09*** 
      (.27)        (.38)        (.38) 
Violation Rate    .15**    -.02       .12     .04      .20**    -.09 
      (.05)        (.07)        (.09) 
Offender risk                 
  Sex offender    .72**   1.50***       .01   1.36***    1.41***   1.78** 
      (.27)        (.42)        (.37) 
  High    .88***   1.11***       .54   1.19**    1.20**   1.26** 
      (.29)        (.42)        (.43) 
  Medium    .45*     .94***       .31   1.12**      .66ª     .94** 
      (.25)        (.38)        (.34) 
Post-guidelines sample   -.73***    -.35*             
      (.16)             
N =  1,970  2,298      1,083      1,215 
Proportion variation explained    .29     .26       .31     .25      .30     .30 
     *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ª p < .10  
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    Table 12: Offender-Level Sample Means 
 
   ODRC  Sample   UC  Sample  
   Pre  Post   Pre  Post   
Male        .82      .80        .82      .80   
Nonwhite        .53      .48  †      .53      .50   
Age   35.20  35.10    34.40**  35.20   
Unemployed        .30      .28        .35**      .21**  † 
Residential instability
1       .15      .21  †      .10**      .16**  † 
Parole region               
  Akron        .14      .15        .14      .16   
  Cincinnati        .20      .23        .20      .23   
  Columbus        .14      .14        .14      .14   
  Lima        .11      .09        .11      .09   
  Mansfield        .09      .07        .09      .07  † 
  Chillicothe        .08      .09        .08      .09   
  Cleveland        .23      .22        .23      .22   
Felony category of commitment offense      3.29    3.15  †    3.27    3.15  † 
Parole-eligible sentence        .38      .19  †      .38      .20  † 
Offender risk      3.19    2.82  †    3.20    2.76  † 
  Low        .33      .36        .32      .36   
  Medium        .32      .35        .33      .37   
  High        .18      .11        .18      .09*   
  Sex offender        .17      .18        .17      .18   
Key Supervision Outcomes             
Revocation for technical violation
2       .10      .08        .11      .13**   
Recommision for new felony offense
2       .12      .17  †      .18**      .20   
Major violation behavior
2       .23      .28  †      .26      .28   
New felony crime
2       .35      .40        .37      .37   
N =    1,963    1,946   
     Notes:  
                 Differences between ODRC and UC samples denoted by ** p < .01; * p < .05.  
                 Differences between pre- and post-sanction grid samples denoted by † p < .05. 
                       1 Different sources of information used to create measure.  
2 Based on matched sample N = 1,106.  
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Table 13: Cox Regression Models Predicting New Felony Crime (Coefficients Reported with Standard Errors in 
                 Parentheses) 
  
 Pooled  Pooled   Pre-Guidelines  Post  Guidelines 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
Nonwhite       -.05       -.003         -.02       -.03          .09       -.02         -.02       -.001 
         (.10)           (.10)           (.15)           (.15) 
Male        .25        .30ª          .23        .28ª          .50*        .61**          .16        .07 
         (.16)           (.16)           (.22)           (.22) 
Age       -.02***       -.02**         -.04***       -.03***         -.02*       -.02ª         -.02*       -.02* 
         (.01)           (.01)           (.01)           (.01) 
Felony level        -.13**       -.08ª         -.11**       -.06         -.20***       -.17**         -.15**       -.06 
         (.04)           (.04)           (.06)           (.06) 
Unemployed        .97***        .82***          .94***        .79***          .96***        .61***        1.02***      1.10*** 
         (.11)           (.11)           (.15)           (.15) 
Residential instability        .19ª      1.34***          .21ª      1.32***          .29      1.57***          .15      1.18*** 
         (.11)           (.11)           (.16)           (.16) 
Overall violation rate        .66***        .73***          .65***        .74***          .87***        .58**          .71***       1.09*** 
         (.15)           (.15)           (.21)           (.21) 
Criminal history risk score              .28***        .21***             
               (.04)             
  Sex offender        .43*        .43*                   
         (.19)                   
  High risk      1.27***      1.02***                .78***        .50**          .29        .57** 
         (.18)                 (.18)           (.20) 
  Medium risk        .99***        .67***                   
         (.14)                   
Post-guidelines sample        .05       -.03          .46ª        .14             
         (.10)           (.23)             
Risk x sanction guidelines             -.09ª       -.05             
               (.05)             
N =  1,044  1,106  1,044  1,106   522  553    522  553 
χ²  340.26  419.22  338.51  431.19  145.74  199.46  168.50  211.92 
              *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ª p < .10  
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Table 14: Cox Regression Models Predicting Major Violation Behavior (Coefficients Reported with Standard  
                 Errors in Parentheses) 
 
 Pooled  Pooled   Pre-Guidelines   Post  Guidelines 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
 ODRC 
 Sample 
UC 
 Sample 
Nonwhite       -.12        .02         -.11      -.002          .02        .07         -.07       -.04 
         (.12)           (.12)           (.18)           (.17) 
Male        .94***        .77***          .87***        .74***         1.24***       1.05***          .73*        .46 
         (.21)           (.21)           (.30)           (.29) 
Age       -.03**       -.03***         -.04***       -.04***         -.02ª       -.02ª         -.03**       -.04** 
         (.01)           (.01)           (.01)           (.01) 
Felony level        -.03       -.03         -.01       -.01         -.08       -.09         -.07       -.02 
         (.05)           (.05)           (.07)           (.07) 
Unemployed        .87***        .88***          .84***        .84***          .91***        .77***          .82***       1.08*** 
         (.12)           (.12)           (.18)           (.17) 
Residential instability       -.17      1.28***         -.16      1.24***          .15       1.37***         -.39ª       1.25*** 
         (.13)           (.13)           (.19)           (.18) 
Overall violation rate        .53***        .43ª          .51***        .37          .79***        .04          .51***        .89** 
         (.26)           (.26)           (.40)           (.32) 
Criminal history risk score              .24***        .21***             
               (.04)             
  Sex offender        .19        .28                   
         (.22)                   
  High risk      1.11***        .85***                .56**        .53**          .45*        .45* 
         (.21)                 (.21)           (.23) 
  Medium risk        .92***        .53***                   
         (.17)                   
Post-guidelines sample        .16        .18          .35        .41             
         (.12)           (.26)             
Risk x sanction guidelines             -.04       -.06             
               (.06)             
N  =  1,044  1,106  1,044  1,106   522  553    522  553 
χ² 206.42  289.05    205.26  301.80    94.83  118.86    91.66  165.46 
             *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p < .05; ª p < .10  
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